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Before Exit:  
Three Essays on Business Exit in Politically and Economically Adverse Environments 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation re-conceptualizes the exit phenomenon in management research by focusing on 
what precedes exit in times of political and economic turbulence, when firms and entrepreneurs 
are forced to contemplate unwanted exit as they face multiple threats in their home country. The 
three essays of this thesis collectively highlight the inadequacy of theories that conceptualize exit 
as a sudden and complete cessation of activity by showing that exit is an adaptive process that 
unfolds over time, and across parts of given entities.  
The first essay contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial exit by exploring how entrepreneurs 
proactively respond to political and economic turmoil at home that threatens the continuation of 
their ventures. Relying on the accounts of 27 entrepreneurs, the study inductively reveals two 
adaptation mechanisms—temporal and partial—that revise the entrepreneur-venture relationship 
in the aftermath of traumatic events.   
The second essay adopts a longitudinal and comparative case analysis of 12 firms to explore how 
adversity at home influences firms’ internationalization paths. The study shows how firms 
sequentially replace resources, values, and opportunities no longer available in their home 
market with alternatives that they seek and find in foreign contexts. The essay contributes to the 
literatures on institutional arbitrage and relocation by revealing how firms identify 
complementary institutional contexts in international markets, and progressively transition to 
greener pastures.  
The third essay is a systematic review of the exit literatures in strategy, international business, 
and entrepreneurship. The review develops a framework to organize 90 articles that have been 
systematically coded, and outlines relevant decisions, actions, and processes that may precede 
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exit. The analysis highlights the partiality and temporality of exit as focal dimensions for future 
research and theorizing on exit in various management disciplines.  
 
Keywords 
Exit, political and economic adversity, entrepreneur, entrepreneurial exit, institutional arbitrage, 
internationalization, home context, relocation, Middle East. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Turbulence ripples around our world (Oh & Oetzel, 2017), from political conflicts in the Middle 
East (e.g., civil wars in Syria and Yemen) to economic shocks and crises in Europe (e.g., 
“Brexit” and the economic crisis in Greece). The more one’s operating context gets shaken or 
shattered by front-page events, the more relevant questions regarding business closure and/or 
collapse become (Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013). As danger increases (Hiatt & 
Sine, 2014), even the best businesses are at risk of underperforming, and many are forced to 
contemplate premature exit (Aldrich, 2015; Elfenbein & Knott, 2015).  
This dissertation complements and extends prior theories of exit as an event and/or process by 
theorizing and exploring how founders of firms buffeted by repeated shocks persist and resist in 
the face of multiple setbacks (Coelho & McClure, 2005; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983) and/or 
opportunities (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). Combining a systematic, multi-disciplinary review of 
the exit literature with longitudinal and comparative qualitative analysis of 30 cases spanning a 
12-year period field research, I develop insights about the ways businesses handle recurrent 
adversity at home when forced exit is impending.  
I preface the summary of the three essays with an overview of the central concepts anchoring the 
research (turbulence and exit), and clarify how the current work builds on—as well as departs 
from—prior definitions. After outlining each of the three essays, I briefly explain how they are 
interconnected. 
1.1 Turbulence 
The Global Risks Report (2017) of the World Economic Forum shows a rise in political 
disruptions during 2016; the number of political conflicts worldwide rose from 363 in 2010 to 
402 in 2016 (HIIK, 2010, 2016). Interstate conflicts and state collapse or crisis made the top five 
“Global Risks” in the last two years (2015 and 2016). Political turmoil is compounded by the 
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growing incidence of economic shocks and/or the persistence of economic downturns (Bradley, 
Aldrich, Shepherd, & Wilkund, 2011; Marino, Lohrke, Hill, Weaver, & Tambunan, 2008). 
There have been several recent calls for management research that addresses contexts of unrest 
and political and economic instability to study the impact of disasters, crises, risks, and threats 
(George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016), but our understanding of how firms 
manage during these periods remains limited (Oh & Oetzel, 2017). For many of the affected 
firms, turbulence is a constant struggle as they try to delay or prevent the binary outcome (i.e., 
survive or perish), allowing us to discern new recipes for facing, and sometimes escaping, 
ominous circumstances (Oh & Oetzel, 2011).  
Take, for instance, Mahmoud Meme, one of only a few business owners still operating in 
Aleppo, Syria. Although he has had to close four of his stores, he is keeping the last one open as 
an act of defiance; he does not want to abandon his business, or his city, but might have to 
eventually (The view from Aleppo, 2016). Another Syrian entrepreneur says he is determined to 
keep his two factories open, one producing cleaning products for Germany’s Henkel, and the 
other producing lube oil under a licensing agreement with France’s Total. He is hoping peace 
talks will bring the conflict to an end soon (Abu-Nasr, 2014). His colleague operating a 
packaging materials plant already closed his business in Syria and relocated to Turkey (Abu-
Nasr, 2014). Similar anecdotal evidence reveals the stay-or-go dilemmas for businesses in 
Greece (Two groups mulling exit from Greece, 2015). Moreover, some British firms, such as 
Magal Engineering, are taking a similar “wait and see” approach, as the economic uncertainty 
surrounding the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (i.e., “Brexit”) may 
change their fate (Castle, 2017). Across many contexts and kinds of turbulence, these business 
founders share a common concern about whether, and for how long, they can go on.  
1.2 Exit 
Studying firms that exist in turbulent conditions highlights the inadequacy of theories that 
conceptualize exit as a sudden and complete cessation of activity in a specific domain (e.g., 
technology, market, industry, or geographic region) (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Decker & 
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Mellewigt, 2007). It also increases the relevance of processual theories of exit that take a more 
progressive view of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the business (DeTienne, 
2010). Table 1.1 summarizes the conceptualization of exit as event or as process. The 
management literature has moved beyond listing the many factors that can trigger a binary 
outcome (e.g., Cumming, 2008) to more precisely understand the time to exit (Elfenbein & 
Knott, 2015) or the forms of/paths to exit (e.g., Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon, 
2010).  
For business owners like Mahmoud Meme, the eventual outcome (i.e., whether they make it or 
not) is less important than what they can or should do in the here and now to keep going. This 
thesis relies on around a decade of first-hand experiences of 32 entrepreneurs1 (half of whom 
dealt with partial closure of their businesses, and one-third of whom were eventually forced to 
exit completely). Iterative analysis of the combined 378 “founder-years” reveals new and 
pragmatic ways to deal with cumulative adversity. Taken together, these inductive insights 
answer the call for more scholarship on how exit unfolds (Aldrich, 2015; Wennberg & 
DeTienne, 2014; Wennberg et al., 2010), and how it is implemented (Moschieri, 2011). The 
qualitative findings also complement the current attention to what happens after exit (Shepherd, 
Williams, & Patzelt, 2015) by unpacking the many decisions and actions that take place before 
exit (Burgelman, 1994; 1996). Leveraging qualitative insights on the temporality and partiality of 
exit that our data reveals, the third essay takes an abductive approach to reclassify the literature 
on exit across three different disciplines: strategy, international business, and entrepreneurship. 
Although there is no consensus within or across fields of research about what exit is and how it 
should be defined (Mellahi & Wilkison, 2004; Ucbasaran et al., 2013), this systematic analysis of 
90 prior studies draws attention to the importance of further specifying the what of exit (i.e., the 
parts of a given entity that are being discontinued) and the when (i.e., the timing of terminating 
                                                 
 
1
 The data of the dissertation includes 32 entrepreneurs but 30 cases of firms, as two of the cases include 
two entrepreneurs as partners. 
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the parts). The conclusion section works across the three studies to broaden future research 
agendas on turbulence, exit, and the growing overlap between the two.
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Table 1.1  Exit: Event or Process? 
 
 As Event As Process 
Exit Definition: cessation of involvement in a venture 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013), discontinuation of/withdrawal 
from operations (Chung et al., 2013; Gimeno et al., 1997)  
Counterfactual 
Not to exit = to persist (DeTienne et al., 2008) 
Operationalization 
Survival analysis - Event methodology - Binary variable 
Definition: the process by which the founders of privately held firms 
leave the firm they created (DeTienne, 2010) 
Counterfactual 
Not to exit = to resist 
Operationalization  
Who/how initiates (Collewaert, 2012) and/or completes exit (Moschieri, 
2011; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014)? 
Partiality Which portions of existing business units (Vidal & 
Mitchell, 2015) are no longer necessary?  
- How are specific portions being disconnected and/or reconnected? 
- Interpreting and/or compensating for what is lost/kept.  
Temporality When to exit? (Time to exit) (Elfenbein et al., 2017) What happens after exit (Rouse, 2016; Ucbasaran et al., 2013) 
What happens before exit: forces driving exit (Burgelman, 1994; 1996) 
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1.3 Working Definition of Exit 
I entered the field agnostic to scholarly definitions. I was interested instead in how individual 
business owners thought, felt, and spoke about exit. As the qualitative essays underwent multiple 
rounds of peer review, I became sensitized to the dichotomy that splits the existing literature—
that is, the dichotomy between exit as event versus exit as process. As I refined the theoretical 
and empirical contribution of the two field studies (Essay #1 and Essay #2), I became more 
familiar with the disciplinary nuances in how exit has been conceptualized and operationalized in 
strategy, international business, and entrepreneurship, respectively. Appendix 1.1 summarizes 
some of the definitions and operationalizations.  
While the inductive work remains loyal to field-based conceptualizations, the third essay 
reconnects the inductive insights with a large body of (largely quantitative) findings, offering a 
two-dimensional organization of prior arguments. After completing the dissertation, I refined my 
working definition of “exit” to refer to a fracture in the relationship between two entities, 
whether between a founder and one’s venture, a corporate firm and one of its business units, or a 
multinational enterprise and its foreign subsidiary. This broad definition of exit does not presume 
death (non-existence) of either entity, but it does emphasize a significant and unrecoverable 
departure from past existence. 
1.4 Research Contribution 
The unifying theme that frames this three-paper dissertation is re-conceptualizing the exit 
phenomenon in management research by focusing on what precedes exit (although it may not 
predetermine exit) in times of recurrent distress. The overarching research question and intended 
contribution of the three essays taken together is: What does happen before a founder and/or 
firm exit a turbulent environment? 
In times of tremendous disruption, chaos, and uncertainty, the core relationship between a 
founder and its business is at risk. The focus of the dissertation is to understand the period that 
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precedes the disconnection, and examine, in detail, the multiple attempts founders make to 
safeguard this relationship. 
1.5 The Three Essays 
1.5.1 Essay #1 
Given the growing incidence of natural and manmade disasters, systemic upheavals of nations 
and industries, and the forced exit of firms finding themselves in the middle of such conflict and 
crises, entrepreneurs are compelled to contemplate unwanted yet sometimes unavoidable exit. 
Understanding such forced exits requires us to look beyond what makes one firm fail, and 
instead theorize how entrepreneurs grapple with recurring threats. With this motivation in mind, 
we ask: How do entrepreneurs respond to emergencies that threaten the continuation of their 
ventures? 
We examine 27 entrepreneurs who have witnessed a decade of political and economic turbulence 
in Lebanon, a country “at the centre of Middle Eastern conflicts” (Lebanon country profile, 
2016). This extreme context allows us to study a broader range of causes and complications of 
exit. 
While quantitative studies paint a bleak picture by focusing on the numbers of entrepreneurs who 
exit and fail in the context of political disruption, our qualitative research shows that many 
entrepreneurs anticipate and carefully manage the exit process. We develop an inductive account 
of how they respond to recurrent turbulence, and find two exit pathways that combine partial and 
temporal adaptation mechanisms.  
The essay enriches the entrepreneurial exit process (DeTienne, 2010) by revealing a dynamic 
relationship between the entrepreneur and his/her venture when emergencies repeatedly fissure 
this relationship, affording multiple occasions for repair and recovery on either side.  
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1.5.2 Essay #2 
Home country contexts are complex and multifaceted environments that both enable and 
constrain the actions of firms. When they face growing turbulence at home, firms look to 
international markets. In Essay #2, we ask: How does political and economic instability at home 
influence the internationalization of emerging market multinational companies?  
We develop and compare nine longitudinal cases of corporations that have witnessed a 12-year 
window of political and economic turbulence in their home country. Seven of these cases were 
included in Essay #1 and further analyzed in Essay #2. We also pursued two additional, de novo 
cases, and then added three contrast cases, which were not included in Essay #1. 
Adopting a longitudinal comparative theory building approach (Eisenhardt, 1989; Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009), we induce a tripartite process of how distress at home alters the 
internationalization paths. We find that firms “manage” the growing threat of an impending exit 
by sequentially replacing the resources, values, and opportunities no longer available in their 
home market with alternatives they seek (and eventually find) in foreign institutional contexts.  
Understanding changes in internationalization as responses to growing turbulence at home 
contributes to the body of work on home country contexts (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo 
& Wang, 2012). Specifically, we show how firms may reconstruct the relationship with their 
home country context to delay—and, in some fortuitous cases, even avoid—collapse.  
1.5.3 Essay #3 
Essay #3 is a systematic review of the exit literatures in strategy, international business, and 
entrepreneurship. We selected and coded 90 articles and catalogued relevant decisions, actions, 
and processes that unfold from the contemplation of exit through its execution and 
implementation to the finality or irreversibility of exit. We examined the “fuzziness” of exit, 
whereby entities may not remain intact as the process unfolds, to underscore the partiality of exit. 
We also elaborated on the temporality of exit, differentiating between relevant windows, such as 
time to exit, and other ways of temporal organization, such as stages or sequences. By combining 
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these two dimensions (i.e., temporality and partiality of exit), Essay #3 offers a 2x2 framework 
that reclassifies the extant literature, and discusses new avenues for future research that each 
quadrant opens up. 
1.6 Overall Contribution and Connection between the Three 
Essays 
The main contribution of the dissertation is shifting the current understanding of exit in 
management research from an end-state event to a partial and temporal process that unfolds 
before a firm exits. The partiality dimension underscores that most entities do not perish instantly 
but rather, undergo a painstaking—and largely deliberate—dismantling, as some parts are kept 
and others discarded. The temporality dimension draws attention to the ongoing work that 
founders do to avoid, delay, prevent, or resist exit, shedding light on the varieties of processes 
that take place before founders close their business.  
The partial and temporal dimensions of exit are evident in the fieldwork. The entrepreneurs we 
studied in Essay #1 not only adopted a range of partial adaptation mechanisms but also resorted 
to temporal adaptation by slowing down or speeding up the process. The emerging 
multinationals analyzed in Essay #2 managed their exit from the home country through a process 
of internationalization that was both incremental (i.e., by replacing partial elements they were 
losing at home with alternatives they sought and found elsewhere) and sequential (i.e., unfolding 
over time).  
1.7 Organization of the dissertation 
Each of the three essays in this dissertation is an independent paper that is presented with its own 
introduction, theory, methods, discussion, contribution, and bibliography. Following these 
essays, I wrap up with a conclusion of the dissertation.
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 Appendix 1.1  Disciplinary Definitions and Operationalizations of Exit 
Discipline Definitions Operationalization 
Entrepreneurship  
Business exit befalls unviable 
businesses: whether they be “relatively 
unviable” when taking into account the 
entrepreneur’s outside options, or 
“absolutely unviable” in the economic 
sense of being unable to cover costs; 
business “death” is an appropriate term 
for describing business exit (but 
business “failure” is not) (Coad, 2014, 
p. 721). 
 
Business failure is understood as the 
cessation of involvement in a venture 
because it has not met a minimum 
threshold for economic viability as 
stipulated by the entrepreneur 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013, p. 175). 
 
Entrepreneurial exit: the process by 
which the founders of privately held 
firms leave the firm they helped to 
create, thereby removing themselves, in 
varying degrees, from the primary 
ownership and decision-making 
structure of the firm (DeTienne, 2010, 
p. 203). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firms where the principal was still with 
the firm were coded as 0. Firms where 
the principal was no longer with the 
firm were coded as 1 (Brigham et al., 
2007). 
 
Exit, a binary variable, represents the 
exit decision of firm n (0 if the firm 
continued, 1 if it was discontinued) 
(Gimeno et al., 1997). 
 
Exit variable can take on five values 
each year: (0) continuation, (1) harvest 
sale, (2) distress sale, (3) harvest 
liquidation, and (4) distress liquidation. 
(Wennberg et al., 2010). 
 
Decision to persist - Likert scale of the 
likelihood of persistence (Definitely 
Remain in the Market” vs. “Definitely 
Discontinue Operations”) (DeTienne et 
al., 2008). 
 
Probability that firm i will survive 
during the period t1 to t2 (Hiatt & Sine, 
2014). 
 
Qualitative study  – exit in the model as 
likelihood of shutting down versus 
selling (Akther et al., 2016). 
 
Qualitative study - disengagement path 
that founders follow when leaving one 
organization and starting another 
(Rouse, 2016). 
Strategy  
Divestitures are understood as the 
parent company’s disposal and sale of 
assets, facilities, product lines, 
subsidiaries, divisions, and business 
units (Moschieri & Mair, 2008, p. 399). 
 
Business exit is an asset-restructuring 
activity involving a diversified firm's 
divestiture of one of its businesses 
(Decker & Mellewigt, 2007, p. 41) 
 
A dummy variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if the focal firm exits at time 
t (the exit year), and 0 prior to that date 
(Gaba & Terlaak, 2013). 
 
Asset divestment from the industry - 
divested a business unit, the variable 
coded 1 (0 otherwise) (Durand & 
Vergne, 2015). 
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Firm exit was defined as the cessation 
of a firm’s operations in the industry.  
The indicator variable was set to 1 for 
when a firm had exited, and to 0 
otherwise (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). 
 
International 
Business  
Subsidiary divestment is deﬁned as a 
multinational enterprise’s withdrawal 
from a subsidiary operation—that is, 
the closure or sale of a subsidiary by 
the multinational enterprise (Chung et 
al., 2013, p. 126).  
 
Foreign divestment is a signiﬁcant 
corporate-level decision that involves 
the sale of international subsidiaries, 
closure of foreign plants, and exit from 
foreign markets (Soule et al., 2014, p. 
1032). 
 
Broader definition of international 
divestment as any reduction of a firm’s 
engagement in, or exposure to, cross-
border activities (Benito & Welch, 
1997; Wan et al., 2015). 
Subsidiary divestment (Dxt) served as 
an indicator variable, taking a value of 
1 if subsidiary x was divested at time t 
and 0 otherwise (Chung et al., 2013).  
 
Exit is an indicator variable, Ext, that 
takes a value of 1 if subsidiary x exits at 
time t, and 0 if it stays (survives) (Dai 
et al., 2013). 
 
A time-varying dichotomous measure 
for each firm-year, which is coded 1 
when a firm divested its holdings in a 
given year (and is otherwise coded as 0) 
(Soule et al., 2014). 
 
Binary variable denoting whether the 
affiliate is divested or not between early 
1995 and early 1999 (Belderbos & Zou, 
2009). 
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Chapter 2  
2 Emergency Exit 
 
ABSTRACT 
Entrepreneurial exit, defined as the termination of the relationship between a founder and the 
venture s/he created, is a common occurrence even in benign and/or munificent environments. 
This relationship is particularly fragile, however, under adversity: when calamity strikes and so 
disrupts the patterns of living, production, and consumption, that otherwise viable ventures 
struggle to survive. We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial exit by developing an 
inductive account of how entrepreneurs adapt to emergencies that threaten the continuation of 
the individual-venture relationship. We inductively reveal how the individual-venture 
relationship is being revised and sometimes revived in the aftermath of traumatic events: a partial 
mechanism that fractures and fixes aspects of the venture rendered unfit by adverse events, and a 
temporal mechanism that adjusts the horizon of continued individual involvement with 
increasingly fragile ventures. We explain a continuum of responses to emergencies, from de-
personalization to re-personalization of exit, by drawing attention to two recurrent combinations 
of partial and temporal adaptation: lengthening time horizon to enable problem-focused coping, 
and emotion-focused coping to enable shortening time horizon.  
                                                 
 
 We thank the entrepreneurs who made this research possible. We are grateful for the feedback of the 
participants at the Academy of Management, Babson College Entrepreneurship Research Conference, 
Business and Economics of Peace meeting, and Ivey PhD Sustainability Academy. 
We are very grateful for the financial support of Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada Insight Grant (R3695A08).  
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2.1 Introduction  
Exit is often understood as the last stage of business (Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon, 
2010), and takes one of three different meanings: (1) death, demise, or disappearance (Coad, 
2013); (2) a deliberate decision with either good or bad outcomes (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; 
McGrath, 2006); or (3) the termination of a relationship between an individual and his/her 
venture (Byrne & Shepherd, 2013). We adopt DeTienne’s (2010) definition of entrepreneurial 
exit as the process through which an entrepreneur leaves a firm that he/she helped to create. 
Recent reviews suggest that the pressure to exit prematurely and involuntarily may not 
necessarily be terminal, but instead helps to unleash certain kinds of entrepreneurial agency 
(Coad, 2013; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). New entities can be birthed from the ashes of dying 
organizations (Walsh & Bartunek, 2011). The demise of one venture may spearhead others 
(Eggers & Song, 2015), and fragments of knowledge, practices, and processes can find new life 
within the failing firm (Cope, 2011) and/or in other organizations (Hoetker & Agarwal, 2007). 
Moreover, the learning and sense-making mechanisms triggered by the failure can rekindle one’s 
pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities (Mueller & Shepherd, 2014; Shepherd, 2003; Shepherd, 
Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011).  
There have been multiple calls for new theories of exit (Aldrich, 2015; Wennberg & DeTienne, 
2014), and a growing interest in pre- (Morgan & Sisak, 2016; Singh, Corner, & Pavlovich, 2015) 
and post-exit dynamics (Mantere, Aula, Schildt, & Vaara, 2013; Rouse, 2016). Here, we focus 
on the pre-exit dynamics (for a comprehensive review of life after business exit see Ucbasaran, 
Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013). We know that most organizations try to avoid, prevent, or at 
least delay exit (Bakker & Shepherd, 2017). Postponing exit sometimes can be constructive; it 
can help some entrepreneurs to prepare emotionally for the end (Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie, 
2009) or reflect on lessons learned from the closure of the venture (Shepherd, Patzelt, Williams, 
& Warnecke, 2014). Yet at other times, exit may be costly and counterproductive. Entrepreneurs 
may overstay, overinvesting in a venture that lacks core competencies or becomes increasingly 
misaligned with key market success factors (Wennberg et al., 2010).  
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We contribute to the body of work that explores when one leaves a firm that one helped to create 
by focusing on the process of entrepreneurial exit within turbulent contexts, where otherwise 
striving ventures may perish prematurely, despite entrepreneurs’ best efforts to salvage them. 
The incidence of such extreme challenges to business as usual is – unfortunately – increasing:   
“this decade is characterized by political instability, economic volatility, and societal upheaval” 
(George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016, p. 1880). 
While the majority of the literature has examined exit in benign and munificent settings 
(DeTienne, McKelvie, & Chandler, 2015; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014), many entrepreneurs 
operate in highly unstable environments, where resources are scarce, and political disruptions 
may cause previously successful firms to exit against their will (Hiatt & Sine, 2014). In such 
“dangerous” environments, risks are hard to predict or mitigate, and sometimes lead to “erratic” 
or “irrational” behaviours (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). We 
know that when entrepreneurs are pressured to exit, they engage in deliberate efforts to restore 
oneself or revive the venture (Shepherd & Williams, 2014) and experience loss and grief 
(Shepherd & Cardon, 2009; Shepherd, Patzelt, & Wolfe, 2011) when they cannot continue.  
Facing termination reinforces the beliefs one already holds of oneself as an entrepreneur 
(Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). One key way that entrepreneurs cope with involuntary exit is by re-
entry (Burke & van Stel, 2014). Exit from one firm motivates serial entrepreneurs to enter 
existing ventures (Hessels, Grilo, Thurik, & van der Zwan, 2011) or launch a new venture 
(Hessels et al., 2011; Ucbasaran et al., 2013; Walsh & Bartunek, 2011). The focus of the extant 
literature is on entrepreneurs’ attempts to re-enter after an exit has taken place. For example, 
many of those forced to exit by a traumatic event quickly launch new ventures that enable faster 
recovery for themselves and the community (Shepherd & Williams, 2014). There is greater 
experimentation and latitude in the aftermath of such shocks, with new entrepreneurs or 
enterprises emerging to fill some of the needed, and often novel, responsibilities compelled by 
adverse events (Campbell, 2010).  
We elaborate on recent accounts that suggest entrepreneurs may reinvent themselves in the 
aftermath of traumatic events (Shepherd & Williams, 2014), either by launching new types of 
organizations (Campbell, 2010) or launching new organizations for radically different reasons 
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(Williams & Shepherd, 2016). We develop an inductive account of how entrepreneurs operating 
under adversity interpret and respond to events that threaten the continuation of their existing 
ventures. Our findings suggest that an impending and involuntary exit may serve as an invitation 
for dual adaptation: partial and temporal. By focusing on what happens before exit, we begin to 
explain how entrepreneurs may make something positive out of negative circumstances 
(Bonanno, 2004; Joseph & Linley, 2008; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). 
2.2 Methods 
We conducted a qualitative study of entrepreneurs in Lebanon. According to a July 2014 
National Strategy whitepaper (Lebanon’s Ministry of Economy and Trade, 2014), SMEs 
accounted for 93 to 95% of all registered businesses, and over 90% of the active enterprises in 
the country (for an estimated count of 41,629 ventures employing 841,564 people). The same 
report estimates that 82% of Lebanese entrepreneurs are opportunity-driven, and had high-
growth and high-employment potential. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (2016) estimated 
that 16% of the adult population was engaged in entrepreneurship, accounting for “one of the 
highest densities of established business owners, not only in the MENA region, but even 
globally” (p. 16) – at 6.9% the U.S. has only half as many. The Ministry of Economy and Trade 
had launched a dedicated “Enterprise Team” and an Integrated Small and Medium Enterprise 
Support Program (ISSP) initiated in 2005, but the entrepreneurial eco-system was hard hit by 
recurrent adversity. 
 
2.2.1 Research Context 
We chose Lebanon as the context of our study. As it is “at the centre of Middle Eastern 
conflicts” (“Lebanon Country Profile,” 2016), Lebanon is an appropriate setting (Bamberger & 
Pratt, 2010) for studying entrepreneurial exit in response to emergencies. We focused on the food 
and hospitality industry because prior research suggested it often suffers first and most from 
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adverse events, mainly as a result of changes in consumption patterns and life adjustments 
following threats or attacks (Spilerman & Stecklov, 2009).  
Appendix 2.1 lists the major events between 2005 and 2015, the window of our study. Recurrent 
interference from neighbouring countries Israel and Syria (Ezrow & Frantz, 2013), a weak 
internal institutional environment (e.g., the country’s parliament failed multiple times to elect a 
new president since May 2014), and the proliferation of guerilla units representing different 
sectarian groups all contribute to a state of ongoing unrest (Jamali & Mirshak, 2010). Early 
shocks (e.g., the 34-day military conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006) had significant 
repercussions on Lebanese entrepreneurs (Jamali & Mirhsak, 2010), and were experienced 
firsthand by the first author while he worked for a family business in Lebanon between 2004 and 
2008. Temporary travel bans to Lebanon from the United Arab Emirates, along with Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain, issued after a number of security incidents including 
abductions and bombings, exacerbated business disruptions in the chosen setting: food and 
hospitality entrepreneurs had “never experienced conditions as tough as the ones they are going 
through today,” a November 2014 Al Akhbar article reports and were “slowly dying” starved of 
cash and tourists. A few years prior, tourism averaged a direct contribution of 8% and an indirect 
contribution of 22% to Lebanon’s GDP. The sector had boosted double digit growth as recently 
as 2008 and 2009, but experienced negative growth rates in the three years prior (2011 to 2013). 
The disruption peaked once the civil war in Syria spilled over causing over 1.5 million Syrian 
refugees to flee to Lebanon (EIU, 2016). We collected retrospective accounts from 2005 to 2012, 
and followed entrepreneurs in real-time between 2013 and 2015. We stopped the data collection 
in 2015 as the tourism sector begun to rebound, with different sources reporting 2% to 14% 
increases in key metrics (Lebanon tourism sector grows, 2016). After “six tough years”, the 
Ministry of Tourism reported that in 2016 tourist arrivals hit their highest level since 2011, at 
1.69 million tourists; “this is the closest Lebanon has been to the 2.17 million visitors mark 
reached back in 2010,” (Tourism Sector in Lebanon, 2017). Tourism continues to rebound since, 
reaping benefits from ripples of conflict across the Middle East: “while neighbouring Syria and 
Iraq burn, the Lebanese industry is looking — cautiously but optimistically — at the promise of 
a new beginning,” the Associated Press broadcasted on July 2, 2017 (Issa, 2017). Headlines on 
non-tourism related business opportunities resumed in early 2017, ranging from 
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counterproductive initiatives like tobacco and organ trading to internationally-backed 
investments to rebuild the region. 
  
2.2.2 Theoretical Sample 
All of our respondents worked as entrepreneurs in Lebanon’s food and hospitality sector (either 
as manufacturers or service providers). To identify the respondents, the first author contacted the 
Lebanese Chamber of Commerce, the Lebanese Franchising Association, and the Syndicate of 
Owners of Restaurants, Cafes, Night Clubs and Pastries in Lebanon. He used his personal 
networks and attended various private and public symposiums, where he made contacts with 
additional entrepreneurs. He also conducted a comprehensive search of publicly available 
sources. Our paper builds on longitudinal histories of 27 entrepreneurs, each of whom confronted 
multiple disruptions over the 2005–2015 period. Twelve of the entrepreneurs ended up partially 
closing their ventures; of these, eight reported complete cessations of operations in Lebanon. 
Table 2.1 provides the profiles of the entrepreneurs, using pseudonyms to disguise their 
identities. 
2.2.3 Data Collection 
Our primary data of 27 interviews was collected during two successive field trips in July 2013 
and in June/July 2015. Between the first and the second round of interviews, the presidential 
vacuum that started in May 2014 added significant cause for concern for Lebanese entrepreneurs, 
there were successive travel bans that dried up tourism, and the Syrian refugee crisis escalated. 
The interviews with entrepreneurs were semi-structured and open-ended. Appendix 2.2 shows 
the initial interview guide and Appendix 2.3 the follow-up guide.  All interviews were conducted 
in person in Lebanon by the first author, with the exception of three interviews conducted in 
Dubai, United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), and three conducted via Skype. Interviews lasted 60 to 
120 minutes. For some of the respondents (10 of them), we also had access to archival data 
and/or real-time Facebook posts and online blogs. We supplemented our interview data with in-
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depth input from 5 industry experts and first author’s in-situ observations and detailed notes 
taken during each field trip.  
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Table 2.1  List of Entrepreneurs Interviewed 
Entrepreneur Business Exit Histories Entrepreneur Business Exit Histories 
Anthony 
5 restaurants: 118 employees 
closed. 
1 café: 8 employees 
2006 exit 2 ventures  
2010-2015 exit 3 ventures 
Marwan  
 
Food and beverage 
production:  
50 employees  
2005 exit venture 
2008 contemplated exit 
2014 exit Lebanon  
Amer 
 
3 restaurants: 150 employees 
closed.  
Retail business: 400 employees 
2012-2013 total exit out of 
hospitality industry  
Nader  
 
2 restaurants Lebanon: 130 
employees 
8 outlets abroad 
2015 contemplated exit 
Aziz 
9 restaurants/bars 
320 employees local+120 
abroad 
2005 exit 1 venue 
2006 relocated 2 venues 
Oscar 
 
2 restaurants Lebanon: 
closed  
5 abroad: 200 employees 
2006 exit  
2013 exit 
Mike 
 
25 cafés/restaurants 
300 employees local+400 
abroad 
2008 exit 1 outlet and relocated 
headquarters 
2012-2013 closed 4 outlets 
Claude  Food equipment production: 
100 employees local + 40 
Africa 
2006, 2011 and 2013 
contemplated exit 
Kamal 
 
1 restaurant Lebanon: closed  
 2 restaurants abroad  
Total 120 employees 
2012 exit Lebanon  Jean  
 
15 venues Lebanon: closed 
5 venues in the UAE: 
300 employees  
2006 & 2008 partial exits 
2012-2015 total exit 
2005 personal exit  
Luke 1 restaurant concept - 11 outlets 
60 employees full-time +150 
seasonal/temporary 
2007 exit 1 outlet  
2013 exit 2 outlets 
 
Ralph 15 venues Lebanon: closed 
5 venues in the UAE: 
300 employees 
2006 & 2008 partial exits 
2012-2015 total exit 
2013 personal Exit  
Michel 
 
1 hotel & 1 resort: closed 
60 employees 
2014 exit resort 
2015 exit hotel 
Zain  
 
Food production and retail: 
20 employees 
2006 contemplated exit 
2013 contemplated exit 
Ghassan  
 
2 restaurants, 2 hotels 
200 employees + 100 seasonal  
2011 exit 1 venue 
2015 contemplating total exit  
Samer 
 
Food supplies production: 
100 employees 
2006 contemplated exit 
2013 contemplated exit  
Peter 2 hotels: 200 employees 2015 contemplating partial exit 
 
Julian  1 hotel: 70 employees 2015 contemplated exit  
Khalil 
 
Food and beverage production 
170 employees 
2006 and 2013 contemplated 
major international relocation  
Omar  
 
Food and beverage 
production: 20 employees 
2013 contemplated exit 
Yasser  3 cafés and coffee roasters:  
60 employees  
2014 contemplated exit 
 
Maggie 2 restaurants: 110 employees  2005 contemplated exit 
2013 contemplated exit 
Serge 1 hotel and furnished 
apartments: 40 employees  
2006 contemplated exit 
2013 contemplated exit 
Charbel 3 restaurants/bars: 
 65 employees 
2015 exited 1 outlet 
Gaby 
 
5 restaurants, 1 café  
300 employees 
2009 exit 2 restaurants  
2012 exit 1 restaurant 
2013 exit 1 restaurant 
Zach 
 
2 restaurants Lebanon (1 
closed): 85 employees: 
1 restaurant Dubai 
2006 partial exit 
2013 closed 1 outlet  
2014 personal exit 
Hadi 
 
5 restaurants, 1 café  
300 employees 
2006 & 2008 contemplated exit 
2009 exit 2 restaurants  
2012 exit 1; 2013 exit 1 restaurant  
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Our study relies on retrospective accounts of entrepreneurs. Thus, we adopted several techniques 
to reduce the concern with ex post rationalization. First, we were careful to adopt a free-report-
style interview, in which informants were encouraged to recall events meaningful to them 
(Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997).  The 27 entrepreneurs not only offered elaborate accounts of 
events that had occurred as much as 10 years earlier, but repeatedly reinforced how meaningful 
and impactful these events had been for themselves and their ventures. As one of our 
interviewees, Samer, noted: “We are still talking about the 2006 War now. Why? Because the 
impact of 2006 is still felt until today. We are still feeling it. Why? Because the impact is so 
deep. You forget about minor events. But you talk about the major events, because of their 
impacts [such as] the impact of Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination.” We probed our 
interviewees on the details of specific events (who, what, when, where) to trigger episodic 
memory (Tulving, 2002) and facilitate fine-grained post- hoc recollections. According to Tulving 
(2002) and Miller, Cardinal, and Glick (1997), rehashing autobiographical events can improve 
recall accuracy and increase the accuracy of the accounts. We double-checked for retrospective 
bias (Golden, 1992) by comparing recalled events against real-time accounts (interviews, blogs, 
posts) and by revisiting the recalled events in multiple follow-up interviews. When applicable, 
we also triangulated our interviews with trusted media features of the same protagonists at that 
specific point in time, and with those of third-party accounts (e.g., newspapers, magazines, and 
television stations). 
Second, as founders and/or leaders of their ventures, the entrepreneurs we interviewed were both 
knowledgeable and motivated to interpret and to respond to adverse events  (e.g., Vuori & Huy, 
2016). Our context is characterized by many political and security events that all our informants 
witnessed firsthand. However, their recollections offered unique details regarding the impact of 
the same event on different ventures, and revealed a significant range of responses. 
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2.2.4 Data Analysis and Coding 
 
All of our interviews were conducted in Arabic, though some of the entrepreneurs occasionally 
used English and French, as both languages are widely spoken in Lebanon. Interviews were 
audio recorded, translated into English, and professionally transcribed. To check for linguistic 
accuracy, we drew a random sample of 100 short excerpts from the original audio transcripts (10 
excerpts from 10 different entrepreneurs). We asked third parties fluent in the original language 
of the respondents but blind to the purpose of our study to alert us to any discrepancies in the 
transcribed translations. No discrepancies were found in 95% of cases; there were small 
differences in the translation of idiomatic expressions in five cases but these remained consistent 
with our codes. Subsequent follow-ups were conducted in English, by both co-authors, so that 
respondents were presented with the English codes for constructs and relationships to ensure that 
the meaning inferred from the interviews accurately reflected their accounts.  
We followed several best practices of grounded theory to increase the rigour of our qualitative 
method. We read the interview transcripts independently and openly coded them in parallel 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1998) to create themes that captured key insights the interviewees shared 
with us. A clear and quick consensus emerged around entrepreneurs’ interpretations of some 
events, but not others, as emergencies. We then compared and elaborated on these themes during 
regular research meetings, and relied on iterative and collaborative memos to think further about 
theoretical mechanisms and important insights (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) interlinking the 
emerging themes (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013; Strike & Rerup, 2016). We noticed that 
entrepreneurs responded to emergencies in nuanced ways. Accordingly, we mapped responses 
that typically clustered together in a majority of narratives, and noted outliers or exceptions. As 
new themes emerged, we deepened our reading of the literature to delve further into the different 
kinds of adversity and the various ways in which entrepreneurs responded to adverse events, as 
well as their reasons for doing so (Williams & Shepherd, 2016). Figure 2.1 presents our data 
structure.
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Figure 2.1  Data Structure 
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To induce our aggregate constructs, we followed a three-step process. The first step sensitized us 
to the fact that entrepreneurs offered different interpretations of the same events; they also 
recalled a broad range of cognitive, emotional and behavioral responses. In a second step, we 
delved deeper into time-action combinations, querying the data systematically about what 
exactly entrepreneurs did when.  
We came to appreciate that each entrepreneur had one or a couple of closely co-occurring pivotal 
events that seemed to have ‘framed’ how they interpreted and reacted to emergencies henceforth. 
The interviewees did not organize their narratives chronologically. Rather, they emphasized first, 
and dwelled most on, those events they felt had most seriously impacted the ultimate course of 
their venture; they also returned to these pivotal events repeatedly, and often comparatively, 
during their explanations of other decisions (whether they had undertaken those earlier or later). 
We noticed two very different kinds of pivotal events. In some cases, entrepreneurs took the 
impact very personally: “When I left to Dubai [during The 2006 war] to help my family leave, [I 
felt] I had nothing. I was worth nothing. Today, if the country stopped working, I am worth 
nothing,” (Luke). In others, they distanced themselves from it: “You come to a point when you 
don't think about yourself; really, seriously, I don't think about myself - I think about the place, 
customers, employees” (Yasser). 
Sensitive to the influential role of such pivotal events and mindful to variations in the closeness 
or distance between the entrepreneur and their threatened ventures, we returned to the data for a 
third time. We compared and contrasted multiple modes and sources of data for each one of the 
entrepreneurs to construct a chronological map2 that helped us visualize and verbalize time-
action sequences for each of the 27 entrepreneurs. In this last stage, it became clear that 
entrepreneurs iteratively adjusted both their actions and their time frames, until an equilibrium 
                                                 
 
2 We show, and elaborate on, three representative visual maps in the discussion section.  
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was reached. When further events de-stabilized this equilibrium yet again, entrepreneurs 
recommenced this dual adjustment process.  
2.3 Findings 
We induce a generalized process theory of emergency exit that explains how exogenous 
pressures to terminate otherwise successful ventures motivate repeated, ingenious, and 
sometimes successful attempts to repair the distressed relationship between an entrepreneur and 
the venture s/he founded. We start by establishing how entrepreneurs interpret shifts in the 
environment as emergencies (or not). We then group time-action sequences in two modes of 
entrepreneurial exit (i.e., the breakdown of the individual-venture relationship (DeTienne, 
2010)), which we label “de-personalized” and “re-personalized” according to the emphasis 
placed on the closeness or distance between the individual and the venture. As we explain in 
greater detail below, entrepreneurs carefully and repeatedly adjusted this distance through a dual 
adaptation process that updated either their time frames or their actions, often both.  
2.3.1 Emergency 
The starting point for our model is an assessment of a specific event—one that the entrepreneur 
and the organization are facing as an emergency that may jeopardize the continuation of the 
firm’s operations in their current form, location, and context. Entrepreneurs discriminated among 
the threats associated with different events. They were very explicit about the threats they 
perceived, eloquently describing the overall impact, as well as analyzing how significantly and 
how imminently any given event might endanger their organization, as one entrepreneur, Kamal, 
demonstrated: “What’s dangerous for this business is not the situation, because there were a lot 
of successful companies during the constant war. But what bothers you is the fact that you can 
never know what will happen…. For example, a few days after the Charlie Hebdo incident in 
Paris, or for other reasons [like] strikes or demonstrations, you know that work will decrease by 
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70% for two or three days, not for long. The problem in Lebanon is that you never know for how 
long.”3  
The assessment of an event as an emergency was a deliberate call, specific to each 
entrepreneur—that is, although our interviewees experienced the same series of events, they 
often deemed different events emergencies for their venture, and they did so for distinct reasons. 
The literature has long acknowledged that the same event can yield drastically different results 
for different types of organizations, from devastating effects on the tourism and retail sectors to 
beneficial effects on arms exporters (Spilerman & Stecklow, 2009). Research also reveals that 
entrepreneurs respond quite differently to the same events (Williams & Shepherd, 2016).  
From the beginning of our data-collection process, we were intrigued by how the entrepreneurs 
we interviewed interpreted the exact same event in different ways. Most of the entrepreneurs in 
our sample experienced these events firsthand, at the same time, and in the same sequence; for 
example, the assassination of the late Prime Minister Hariri in 2005 was followed by the 2006 
Lebanon War, which sent the country into a tailspin of political insecurity and economic 
“suicide.” There were several other assassinations, bombs, and intermittent security breaches, 
and eventually, multiple spillovers from Syria’s conflict, including the world’s largest influx of 
refugees. The aftermath, however, was uneven. 
For many, the impact of the 2006 War was devastating. Amer noted, “It happens so fast, and 
when it goes down, it all goes down fast.” Yet others, like Yasser, found the impact translated to 
an opportunity to do more. When Yasser arrived at his coffee shop in Beirut “to find people 
waiting for him” at the onset of the war, he instantly decided to keep his coffee shop open 
despite the curfew. He would serve his customers in the morning, then capture the conversation 
of the day in his blog in the afternoon, as he described: “At 7:00 a.m. I used to open the café and 
                                                 
 
3 All the quotations in this paper are based on personal interviews, and prioritize the accurate transcription 
of those interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished 
grammar or syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard. 
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people came, had their coffees and talked ... and I would write what they were saying… so I 
would take notes, and when I finished, I would go home and blog, I did this for 33 days.”  
Unlike Amer, Yasser did not interpret the war as an emergency. Rather, he embraced the 
opportunity to do more than usual for his customers: “I was trying to get [the clients] a good 
feeling. First, there was no TV in the shop, so [they couldn’t] see the news of the incidents. 
People met there … for the first time [since the war started]. People loved each other … people 
became a family during those 33 days.” What was normally “business as usual” became an 
unusual achievement under the circumstances, even an occasion for celebration: “The coffee 
truck arrived [after roads had been blocked for so many days]. The clients outside started 
clapping. It is very nice. They were clapping for me because I got the coffee,” Yasser recalled. 
Even for the same entrepreneur, the same event could affect operations in different locations 
quite differently, as Gaby explained to us while sketching a map on a paper: “ [Restaurant A] is 
here and [Restaurant B] is there. Between here and there, there are only 50 metres, but it is a 
totally different story. Really. I will say it from the end. This is the border. It is crazy, one was 
not affected by the insecurity and was working well, while the other was extremely affected …. 
This one was working well, this one wasn’t working at all.” 
To arrive at an interpretation of an event as an emergency, the entrepreneurs we interviewed 
engaged in four separate assessments, often sequentially. First, they placed the event in its 
historical context; second, they corrected for what the new norm had become for themselves, 
given their own prior experience with conflict; third, they estimated foreseeable ups and downs 
for their specific ventures; and fourth, they expressed how they felt about these fluctuations.  
2.3.1.1 Historicizing 
Our interviewees customized their assessment of the damage using two complementary 
estimates. First, they tried to pinpoint specifics about the events themselves (markers). Then, 
they evaluated the imminence of the threat itself, establishing how soon and/or severely a given 
event might impact their venture (attributions). Oscar referenced to Prime Minister Hariri’s 
assassination using specific calendar dates as markers—“Our official opening was supposed to 
be February 20, 2005, and guess what happened on February 14, 2005?”—underscoring the 
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proximity and inevitability of impact. Oscar had one week to brace for impact, but did not do so 
because “we were ready to open in downtown. So we opened there and then sh*t hit the fan.” 
2.3.1.2 Normalizing 
Experiencing and living through constant instability for a prolonged length of time makes one 
“grow a thick skin.” The more setbacks the entrepreneurs had successfully survived previously, 
the more likely they were to downplay the possible negative consequences of turbulent events on 
the venture. Normalizing referred to recounting one’s adaptability to—and survivability of—past 
encounters that had left them unscathed, drawing the lesson that they had developed the 
expertise, even the habit, to bounce back from historical setbacks: “I personally have been a long 
time in the business. And in this [environment] what do they say? Things coming over my head, 
incidents over incidents, so I am used to how to do it.” (Yasser).  
We found two facets of normalizing: (1) comparing current events with past events the 
entrepreneurs remembered overcoming and (2) contrasting the setbacks current events may cause 
with positive aspirations. Reminders of bad events that ended well offered a more lenient or 
favourable interpretation of the disruption likely to follow a specific event, as Omar stated: “This 
is the Lebanese trait. You rebuild and continue. It’s a survival mode. So I asked [my father] last 
year, ‘What do we do if there is a civil war?’ He told me, ‘Omar, during the civil war, when they 
bomb us, we hide. When they don’t, we work.’ Aspirations enabled entrepreneurs to emphasize 
positive expectations in a way that counterbalanced the negative impact of current events, as 
Amer described: “We are waiting for better days. Our objectives become waiting for promises 
and hope. You start to convince yourself because you are the local and it is your country. … 
God, please make tomorrow a better day. … You start to make plans, saying let me get over this 
year, and see what next year will bring. Maybe next year is better. But technically speaking, if 
you get an external eye that is looking into what you are doing, he will tell you leave.” 
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2.3.1.3 Volatility 
Entrepreneurs vividly described the unpredictable downturns after events: “Something came up 
every two days. We opened, closed, opened, closed. So we had to close. With big losses.” 
(Luke). They also contrasted these with the expected upturns, had the events not happened: 
“Honestly speaking, we started this year extremely well. So it should not be, it could not be, as 
good as it is in this kind of environment, that is so unstable,” (Gaby).4 This jigsaw of the ups and 
the downs created a great deal of generalized volatility. “When it is going good, it is so great. 
Everybody comes, everybody is attracted by it. When it is not blooming, it gets thorns; no one 
wants to come close to it.” (Anthony). But for some entrepreneurs the downs kept coming, and 
cumulating: “We opened in February after a soft opening two months prior. What happened? In 
March, the work was very good. In April, it was amazing. If we had continued like that, 
everything would have been good. On May 11, people visiting Lebanon on a bus were kidnapped 
next to Syria. Then, let me put it bluntly. In just one day, customers dropped by 50%. During the 
last 20 days of May, we worked 50% less than the first 10 days, while the work was supposed to 
go up because the season is getting better. In June, we lost 50% of the 50% that were left. So we 
lost 75%. In July, we then lost 50% of the remaining 50%. That means we had 12.5% left.” 
(Kamal).  
The volatility was particularly dreaded by entrepreneurs like Kamal who, after a cascade of 
downturns, could no longer foresee what may happen next. We heard a lot of “I don’t know” in 
the interviews, which we coded as unknown consequences because entrepreneurs were still 
trying to rebound, counting the many sleepless nights they had spent trying to figure out what 
might happen the next day and what their next move should be. “You have to find a way to keep 
going … [but] there is an uncertainty. … What is going to happen? … We don’t know. We don’t 
know.” (Luke). What made this downward spiral even worse were the known dependencies (i.e., 
                                                 
 
4 The summer period in Beirut after the interview was conducted was relatively calm with no major 
security issues; however, in November, following the interview, there were two suicide bombings, killing 
43 people in Beirut.  
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commitments entrepreneurs had made, often years in advance, which, as the setbacks cumulated, 
they realized they could no longer honour). “In 2008, things were good, and this is when we 
started to think about [this project], planning [this project]. It was three years before, and what 
can you do? You already invested in it, $5 million.” (Charbel). 
2.3.1.4 Vulnerability 
Irrespective of whether/how badly they had been hit, all entrepreneurs underscored how 
vulnerable they felt. Those whose operations had not been negatively affected yet used the 
expression “living with the sword of Damocles hanging over [their] heads” to express their 
feeling of looming danger. Those whose operations had been disrupted used the words “force 
majeure” to underscore the significance of the setbacks. We found two aspects of vulnerability: 
first, as a lack of choice (“There is only so much that you can do.” (Zach)), and second, as an 
absolution of fault and blame (“We can’t blame ourselves.” (Anthony)), because there was 
nothing that anyone could have done differently. The two sides reinforced each other: “So many 
times you needed to shut down the operations, close on many weekends and many days. How 
can you make money? And how can you progress in an environment like this? (Ralph). 
2.3.2 Exit 
When entrepreneurs concluded that they were facing an emergency, even if they had no prior 
plans to exit, they began contemplating it: “In 2004, when they killed [Prime Minister] Hariri, we 
started to worry. The business started to go down but 2006 was the last straw. It was a true 
wakeup call. 2006 was the wakeup call. I had salaries to pay in 2006 but I couldn’t. You can say 
that life stopped in 2006. Something had to be done, we couldn’t continue as we were. It was the 
worst time for us. We fled Beirut and went to Faraya. I had to pay payroll and had people to give 
jobs to, but everything collapsed.” (Claude). If they had prior exit plans (i.e. “We also had offers 
that were supposed to allow us to exit in a clean way …. ‘Clean’ means in a way where we 
didn’t lose much. Meaning, selling the store,” Kamal told us), the emergency nullified all 
lucrative options and “when you don’t sell the store and you leave it as it is without doing 
anything, it is then that you lose a fortune,” Kamal explained. Whether or not entrepreneurs had 
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executed exit before in other ventures or had contingencies in place for their current ones, they 
felt unanimously unprepared for an emergency exit: “We didn’t know how to exit. We didn’t 
know we had to exit,” Oscar underscored.  
Our interviewees described exit in two opposite ways. Some, like Amer, told us, “It is not about 
you anymore.” Others, like Yasser, emphasized, “It affected me on a personal level.” We used 
the words de-personalized and re-personalized to differentiate these two extremes, because in 
each case, entrepreneurs qualified their changing individual-venture relationship as being less or 
more relevant to their person. 
2.3.2.1 De-personalized exit 
Some entrepreneurs de-personalized exit by interpreting away personal inputs and outputs and 
focusing instead on everyone else—the employees, the creditors, the customers, and the 
community, as Samer described: “There are a lot of considerations that you have to make, not 
only for you, in terms of making money, but also for families, for your employees. We have 
many families that live from this business.”  
Many entrepreneurs used the Arabic expression “Haram” to qualify the premature closure of 
their ventures as not right, or against the nature of things, because they felt their businesses were 
good, well-run commercial establishments, with a long history, high status in the community, 
and excellent prospects. Had it not been for the emergency they faced, these entrepreneurs would 
have kept investing in their ventures, expanding and growing them instead of contemplating 
termination. Many used this expression, [in translation] “it’s a shame,” to qualify the 
gratuitousness of the unwanted yet unavoidable losses. “It’s a shame for someone to work in 
Lebanese cuisine and not do it in Lebanon. That’s why I was really excited about this project … 
It’s a shame. It went away really quickly. Like I said, we opened in February and closed in 
August … but it was a shame.” (Kamal).  
Our interviewees called attention to the many parties likely to be harmed by a premature or 
poorly executed exit, and underscored their intention to prevent, minimize, or mitigate the likely 
negative consequences on all relevant third parties. Entrepreneurs listed the stakeholders 
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impacted, counted the families affected by the layoffs, took into account their obligation to the 
community, and then took all the steps they felt they could in order to exit as responsibly as 
possible. “We exited with our head held high. We wanted to pay our suppliers, but they told us, 
‘It’s okay, you can wait.’ We refused. We paid right away and gave them everything. We wanted 
to close our accounts and have clearance. They went crazy. When we reopened, some suppliers 
told us, ‘We have never seen people work as good as you do.’” (Oscar).  
As we describe below, entrepreneurs delayed a de-personalized exit as long as they could afford 
to stay open: “If I close the [business] down in Beirut, there are 150 families that will be 
affected. Can I sleep at night? My decision will affect 150 families.” (Ghassan). Amer agreed: 
“[Delaying exit] becomes humanitarian and moral because I have those people who work for 
me.” Entrepreneurs justified the delay as a way to avoid the anticipated harm that a premature 
exit would cause to their employees and their families. “I cannot tell our employee Elias Sr., who 
has been with us for 40 years, ‘Sorry we are closing down the factory.’ If I didn’t have this 
obstacle, I would have closed it for sure.” (Claude). Giving themselves a little extra time allowed 
them to focus their energy on the problems they could solve. “Have to suck it in and do” 
(Ghassan).  Amer elaborated: “We have to survive, we have to inject money into the business, 
we have to work on our payments, we have to find a way to survive.” Solving problems 
motivated these entrepreneurs to continue business as usual for a while longer, until they found 
another problem to solve, which bought them a little more time yet: “We take altogether the risk, 
attack versus an attack. That way, you can survive during this crisis. … If I don’t take care of my 
employees who have been working with me for 10 years, we will go.” (Maggie). 
2.3.2.2 Re-personalized exit 
Other entrepreneurs re-personalized exit by calling attention to their personal feelings of loss, 
deep sadness, and even suffering. Kamal commemorated the closure by posting a short poem on 
his Facebook page: “I am sad; the restaurant is dead, and many things inside of me.” Exit hurts. 
The pain entrepreneurs experienced made them feel emotionally exhausted: “What can I do on 
my own? You get tired, you feel exhausted and consumed.” (Amer). The more exhausted the 
entrepreneurs felt, the less likely they were to keep going, even if the venture was not in a dire 
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situation yet: “I had another operation (at this mall) that was making 10% profit when it was time 
to renew the rent for six years. I refused, although it was making money. I decided to close it, 
because the headache and the risk factor is so big, … to the extent that I don’t want to try 
anymore.” (Anthony). 
In stark contrast to instances of de-personalized exit that prolonged entrepreneurs’ efforts and 
rekindled their will to survive along with the ingenuity to revive the individual-venture 
relationship, in cases of re-personalized exit, the hurt and exhaustion entrepreneurs felt dulled the 
will to survive. Their efforts to cope with these negative emotions made the situation even more 
unbearable: “It affects your energy because we were not creative anymore,” Jean explained. 
“You get sick, you get tired, enough. Enough! I personally went through a lot of stuff here.” 
(Yasser). The more hurt and exhausted entrepreneurs felt, the sooner they came to recognize an 
irreconcilable mismatch between their resources (time, energy, ingenuity, etc.) and what the 
venture might need to survive the emergency. “You feel this is the last straw,” Yasser explained. 
“You know … it is just gonna make it worse, so you just have to kill it,” Zach added.  
2.3.3 Adaptation 
Both de-personalized and re-personalized exit were adaptive responses: once entrepreneurs 
interpreted a given event as an emergency, they took the steps they deemed appropriate to 
preserve the individual-venture relationship. In every case, they reassessed all the parts that 
might keep their venture running and adjusted the time frame, by either lengthening or 
shortening the time horizon for their next move. We refer to these processes as partial and 
temporal adaptation. While four combinations of these two adaptation mechanisms are logically 
possible, we only found two combinations in our data. Furthermore, the order between partial 
and temporal adaptation was reversed, with temporal adaptation preceding partial adaptation for 
de-personalized exit, and partial adaptation preceding temporal adaptation for re-personalized 
exit. Figure 2.2 shows these two paths.
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Figure 2.2  Inductive Framework of Emergency Exit 
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2.3.3.1 Path 1: De-personalized emergency exit 
With a single exception (unpacked further below (Jean)), entrepreneurs’ initial response to the 
first event they deemed an emergency was to stay the course and figure out a way through the 
adversity. It is important to note that not all adversity was bad for business—our data included 
one extreme case where a serious incident was framed as an opportunity to launch the venture in 
the first place (Marwan)—nor did the severity of events automatically threaten all entrepreneurs 
or all ventures. Whenever entrepreneurs came to realize that the individual-venture relationship 
was in jeopardy due to the specific aftermath of a given event on their operations, they tried to 
figure out how long they could afford to stay open. Then, critically dependent on this time 
horizon, they chose which problems they should begin tackling: “We have reserves which we 
keep for this type of situation. Today, I know if my business stops, how long can I last? ... I’ve 
always tried to never be in debt so that when the situation is bad, I could survive.” (Luke). 
Lengthening time horizon. Emergency made survival important for its own sake, and 
overcoming the emergency set a new bar or metric of success: “Whoever will survive, will 
succeed.” (Maggie). Julian underscored the same point: “The only adaptation we have is 
survival. And sometimes this means taking on more loans and that means we [self-] re-finance 
… I’m putting money from my own pocket.” 
Entrepreneurs delayed exit for one of two reasons: (1) because they felt that staying was, on 
balance, better than the alternatives, or (2) because they had made commitments they could not 
easily break, as Ghassan explained: “You can't get out of it. You can’t. ... You have also your 
reputation and this is what I am saying in any situation, in anything, there are many things that 
are going to get affected: name, credibility, financial situation, the loans of the bank, your 
employees, there are many things. … Forget about me and my financial situation. There are so 
many [other] things: my name… Oh!! The [Ghassan] family closed a [business]! Oh!! They laid 
off employees. Oh! This and that. There are so many things that you need to endure. Have to 
suck it in, and do.… Here, if I don’t have this asset: the hotel and gardens, I would never do 
something in Lebanon.” (Ghassan) 
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Problem-focused coping. Once entrepreneurs decided to delay their exit, they took specific steps 
to improve their odds of survival by identifying and tackling (if not always solving) some of the 
problems brought on by the event itself with the resources at hand (more specifically, the subset 
that remained viable). We found three key approaches: focusing on critical resources or rents; 
shifting critical resources or rents to more favourable contexts; and changing key configurations 
or conditions altogether so that critical resources could be leveraged in an entirely new way. All 
three approaches helped update the individual-venture relationship by changing  (in part rather 
than the whole) the venture side of the relationship. 
Shrinking. We often heard explicit or implicit statements along the lines of “we shrunk the 
business” (Jean), which meant shutting down operations bit by bit, starting with the ones that 
were obviously not working anymore, and focusing on the most critical resources, like core 
employees or the brand. Everything that was not critical could be dispensed with, and was 
reframed as a “luxury”—something no longer warranted given the new reality of the business, 
and something that could or should be given up to preserve the core: “It is (like) you don’t have 
the luxury to spend a lot of money on advertising, you will bring down the advertising budget, 
you don’t have the luxury to do some costly events.… You have an outlet that makes you lose 
money, you close it.” (Amer). 
Stretching. Once entrepreneurs understood which resources remained viable in the aftermath of 
the emergency, they sought to extend or multiply their uses and create new sources of rents, 
iterating through different levels or applications in the hope that they might find a new way to 
keep the business running. Stretching was often radical: prices were cut; customers changed 
(e.g., from wealthy tourists to impoverished Syrian refugees); offerings shifted (e.g., from food 
venues to disco clubs); operations were revamped with ad hoc repurposing of common spaces. In 
all of these cases, a previously critical resource was used in a radically different way in an effort 
to bring out an alternative source of revenues. “I started to change the prices. We did more 
promotions. I did everything that anyone can do within the restaurant business to be able to 
overcome this period. Then I changed the décor. I made a new investment, thinking that people 
might have become bored of the old décor, so I will give them a new look, new menu.” 
(Anthony). These iterations were not trivial undertakings because they were expensive to try out: 
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“Everything will cost you, and the cost is not only the financial cost, but also the time cost. [I 
don’t] want to waste two weeks of my time studying something that I won’t implement or 
include.” (Yasser). Stretching viable resources did not assure business survival. Anthony, for 
example, tried and tried, “but still it didn’t work.” Anthony and Yasser took as many detours as 
possible, and tried as many new combinations as they could afford, all in an effort to avoid 
severing the individual-venture relationship. 
Substituting. At some point, a critical mass of entrepreneurs ran out of the changes they could 
make within Lebanon, and “stepped outside” (Aziz) in search of new conditions or 
circumstances where their businesses could be relocated. Substituting referred to replacing 
factors that shortchanged critical resources or rents with factors that might allow these resources 
or rents to work well again. The predominant change was contextual because, as entrepreneurs 
unanimously concluded, most aspects of the business worked well before the emergency, and 
would have continued working well had it not been for the emergency. As the events escalated, 
more and more entrepreneurs tried to remove themselves from the emergency in an effort to 
preserve their individual-venture relationship by transplanting it elsewhere: “Every time I 
boarded a plane, or after the (2006 War), I met entrepreneurs who were starting businesses 
outside. I do believe that point was a big turning point for many Lebanese businesses.” (Mike).  
Respondents did not run away from instability per se, and in some cases, they started over in 
dangerous settings: “We cannot work in Lebanon anymore, nor can we in America or Europe. 
Nigeria isn’t heaven. It’s dangerous too … but we had to do it.” (Claude). By proactively 
releasing one critical constraint, substituting changed some of the ways in which entrepreneurs 
previously did business so they could go on: “So I could say the political instability sped up our 
expansion process to go abroad. So this is silver lining to it. At least it motivates you to look for 
different alternatives in different markets to apply your investment and your human capital.” 
(Zach). 
Despite the fact that most entrepreneurs felt compelled to delay exit to safeguard others, and 
most had incurred significant and unrecoverable losses along the way, the harder they tried to 
overcome setbacks, the more satisfied they were with their initial decision to stay rather than 
leave. “It is a good thing that we didn’t close the factory, as things got better later on,” Claude 
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told us. “You have to accept the system here is winning sometimes and losing a lot, the other 
times, it’s not always a win-win situation. You just need to accept you are bound to lose business 
in this country.” Trying longer and harder by no means guaranteed success. Ghassan, for 
example, had no choice but terminate the individual-venture relationship once he ran out of 
things he might fix: “I cannot find a way … but I tried everything … I tried to think inside the 
box, and outside the box, and in and out of the box… and half in and half out … enough! F*** 
the box.” 
One of the most counterintuitive ways in which entrepreneurs lengthened the time horizon and 
engaged in problem-solving coping was by starting something else, effectively instantly 
overwriting the individual-venture relationship getting broken by the emergency with a new 
individual-venture relationship, which the entrepreneur felt had better odds of success. “I 
officially signed off [Restaurant X] on April 30, 2013, to open [Restaurant Y] on May 15. That 
was like [rising] from the ashes … 15 days later, you open a new place.” (Zach). “[It seemed] 
crazy enough to open another restaurant … everybody told me, ‘What you are doing?!’” 
(Maggie).  
2.3.3.2 Path 2: Re-personalized emergency exit 
“Surviving” the 11-year window of adversity we studied proved extremely challenging, and for 
20 out of the 27 ventures, we witnessed at least one instance of re-personalized emergency exit. 
This type of exit typically occurred late or last, when, after multiple attempts to prevent 
premature exit, most entrepreneurs had not only already run out of resources and options, but 
were also beginning to run out of energy and ingenuity. As they rapidly approached their 
threshold of personal suffering, they shifted attention to emotion-focused coping. Unfortunately, 
in many cases, this effort proved to be too little too late. Anthony told us, “Today, the game is 
not within our hands anymore.… Here, if you have a grand big ambition, you will hit the wall, 
look at me from nine restaurants to food carts. At the end of the day you say, enough!” Once 
they understood how personally taxing their efforts had already been, most entrepreneurs 
accelerated time to exit: “We didn’t have the guts to take a decision to shut down, the first time. 
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This click of a button. The second time, the “shut down” was like a quick push of a button. The 
decision was overnight with big losses.” (Oscar) 
Emotion-focused coping. Entrepreneurs faced their hardships in two different ways. They found 
new appreciation for whatever alternatives they had in place; and they reclaimed their confidence 
in their abilities to try again and hope to succeed, at a different time or in a different place.  
The worse their ventures got, the more appreciative entrepreneurs became of options they might 
have created for themselves. “There is a hope someday that things will change. If they don’t 
change, we’ll have options. Most importantly, for me, as a person, I do have other options. I have 
Kuwait, Canada, Bahrain, London, and other options. I can move and live … as long as you have 
the option. And this option, not a lot of people have it. And it took me a long time to establish 
these options.” (Oscar). If they had no options, either because their prior options no longer 
worked or because they had not yet looked beyond the failure of the current venture to what may 
come next, they appreciated the lessons they had learned and contemplated ways in which these 
lessons might prove generative in the future. “Practically… you need to reinvent yourself in this 
line of business,” Jean reflected.  
The strong negative emotions stirred up by the pressures or losses entrepreneurs experienced 
motivated them to claim newfound capabilities: “Because we believe in what we have, we have a 
product that is second to none, we are innovative, we’re creative, and when you are creative and 
innovative and passionate about what you’re doing, the sky is the limit. … What we learned in 
Lebanon and the experience we had in Lebanon … all of it aggregated, but mostly in Lebanon. 
We will definitely benefit from this experience.” (Oscar). Even those who had lost everything 
could reclaim their confidence in themselves: “Wow! I did this. I could. I survived this incident, 
and I survived it well. Therefore, seriously, I am very good. You become confident. Definitely, 
you become more confident.” (Yasser).  
Emotion-focused coping allowed entrepreneurs to see and accept that the individual-venture 
relationship was about to end. As the end became clear, they let go of any rationales they might 
have given themselves previously: “Forget about the money … I don’t want to live in a country 
where … one time this person is shot dead, another time one person gets exploded. Every time 
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something happens, I would be afraid [and wondering] where my son is … why would I want to 
do this to my kids? … I cannot live on hope. One day I have money, the other day I don't have 
money. … Personally, I am leaving. I don't know where yet, but definitely I’m not staying here.” 
(Ghassan).  
Shortening time horizon. Once entrepreneurs realized that they were fast approaching (and in 
some cases, had even exceeded) their threshold of suffering, they would bear no more pain. 
Looking back, the entrepreneurs wished they had exited sooner, in part to minimize the financial 
loss and in part to avoid the personal trauma, ranging from health problems to marriage 
difficulties; many entrepreneurs expressed, “I kept it open longer than I should have.” (Hadi). 
Some entrepreneurs made the explicit decision to exit sooner. The actual losses were substantial, 
and the higher the losses, the more painful their decision to exit: “It was a painful decision. … It 
was painful because we invested $1 million and nothing was returned. So [we lost] all the money 
invested in the project.” (Zach). Some could still keep going but had simply gotten tired of trying 
so hard and going nowhere: “We took the decision after 2011, but the decision inside was 
already taken, because it was obvious, we were not expanding, we were focused on a couple 
things but we were not going left and right. … We had to take a decision.” (Ralph). Those who 
overstayed “were massacred. Twice. Twice is too much. Total loss: $2 million.” (Oscar). 
Typically, the re-personalized exit path unfolded extremely quickly, with exit imminent in days 
or weeks after entrepreneurs realized how miserable they really were. However, it was often a 
by-product of a hidden sense-making process that, for many, had gone on for months or even 
years of unsuccessful efforts to prevent exit: “It’s like having a lymphoma on your back. And it’s 
getting bigger…It’s not cancerous [so far]. You can’t sit the same way. First you were used to 
sitting a certain way, but not anymore. It’s growing, and you can’t control it. You have one of 
two choices. Either live with it with the pain, and never know what will happen, maybe it will be 
cancerous [and you won’t survive]. Or you can have an operation and fix it, suffer for a while, 
remove it, and then live with the scar.” (Oscar). 
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2.4 Discussion 
The dual adaptation pathways we induced from the data reveal that individual-venture 
relationships are malleable enough to overcome even the direst or most dramatic situations, at 
least for some time, while there are enough resources set aside to try something new or different. 
Perhaps the single most significant insight from this qualitative study is that a great deal happens 
before exit takes place. We wind back the proverbial clock, which most studies set at the time 
when the entrepreneur herself/himself makes an exit decision (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Wennberg et 
al., 2010), all the way to the adverse events that precipitate this decision. In so doing, we 
discover that entrepreneurs follow two very different paths to this decision: one deliberately 
slowing down the exit process enough to try as many alternatives as they can afford, and the 
other hastening exit to prevent further personal distress. Some of the actions entrepreneurs may 
take on either path have been touched on before, for example in prior studies of grief and post-
failure recovery (Shepherd, 2003) or in the literature on post-disaster start-ups (Shepherd & 
Williams, 2014; Williams & Shepherd, 2016). What the current framework adds is a fine-grained 
understanding of when and why entrepreneurs choose one pathway or the other. 
As shown in Figure 2.2, all entrepreneurs start with a careful assessment of a specific event. 
Entrepreneurs do not react to the events themselves; rather, they respond based on their 
interpretations of multiple aspects of the event, starting with historical observations, 
remembering how they may have experienced similar events in the past, estimating the ups and 
downs such events are likely to cause to their ventures, and assessing how vulnerable they feel 
given their own predictions. While entrepreneurs consider all four of these aspects for most 
events, they tend to gravitate towards either normalizing a given event and continuing business 
as usual, or sensitizing themselves to the vulnerability other events may cause. For events 
unfolding over extended periods of time, or with escalating consequences, entrepreneurs often 
return to their emergency assessment multiple times, and thus have the option to restart on one 
path or the other, depending on their iterative assessments of the same event. 
Knowing that some entrepreneurs find themselves in an emergency does not tell us much about 
whether they would decide (let alone execute) exit. While prior literature yields detailed 
predictions regarding the time to exit once entrepreneurs have taken the decision to exit 
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(Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017), we know relatively little about when and how such exit 
trajectories might be shaped even before the decision to exit. Indeed, our inductive framework 
suggests that exit trajectories fork while entrepreneurs contemplate when and how they would 
exit if they had to. 
Perhaps most importantly, entrepreneurs engage in a great deal of work before they decide 
whether they have to exit. They lengthen or shorten the time horizon. They engage in problem-
focused or emotion-focused coping. Even the order in which they engage in these adaptive 
processes matters, because emotion-focused coping tends to further shorten the time horizon, 
while lengthening the time horizon affords additional problem-focused coping. Moreover, 
because we have shown that what entrepreneurs do first is foreshadowed by their emphasis on 
either the normality of the event or their vulnerability to it, an important insight of our study is 
that the interpretation of adverse events is critical, because it tends to lead to path-dependent 
decisions and behaviours. 
To further our understanding of the two pathways, and determine whether or why they may 
intertwine at times, we constructed visual maps for each of the 27 entrepreneurs during our 
analysis. These visual maps preserve the associations the entrepreneurs themselves made among 
specific events and their responses, and draw specific attention to the exit pathways and their 
sequencing over time. Most entrepreneurs organized their narratives from the present to the past, 
and typically started with the events they felt were most impactful for themselves, personally and 
individually. However, in order to facilitate comparisons among events, we re-organized these 
associations chronologically, as if there was a logical progression between perceived 
emergencies, the adaptation pathways, and the kinds of exits that followed. In fact, we find no 
evidence of progression. Instead, our data suggest that major discontinuities in the business are 
by-products of entrepreneurs’ responses to those events they deemed emergencies.  
Many entrepreneurs, like Claude (Figure 2.3), felt responsible for the continuation of a long-
lived family business, particularly so when they had a large footprint (infrastructure, employees, 
etc.). Their emergency exit process was largely de-personalized, and they sought to delay exit 
and prolong the status quo—often to assure their employees’ livelihoods. Yet as the pressures 
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intensified, these entrepreneurs exited specific areas or activities and added others. Claude, for 
example, de-personalized exit multiple times before eventually re-personalizing it. 
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Figure 2.3  Emergency Exit for Claude 
EMERGENCY 
Normalizing: We have been living in times of 
war since we were kids. We are used to this 
type of life. We used to hide during the war. 
Vulnerability: In 2004, when they killed 
Hariri, we started to worry. … It was then that 
we realized that this wasn’t a one-time deal, it 
was a constant thing. 
De-personalized Exit 1  
All the warehouses, factory, showroom and workshops are all based here in Lebanon. The whole company’s structure is based in Lebanon, we have been 
here for 51 years.  
Lengthening Time Horizon: Something had to be done, we couldn’t continue as we were. My thinking and my outlook changed.. 
Problem-focused Coping: Since 2004 we had a lot of outstanding payments, this wasn’t the case before. We always had outstanding 
payments but the amount became a lot bigger after 2004. We reduced the team, we shrunk the business. We focused on other brands. We 
changed a lot.  
 
Volatility: After the big shock of the war in 
2006, we had small shocks too with the 
different assassinations and then the war in 
Syria happened so it was going down from all 
angles. We didn’t know what was coming. … 
There are so many incidents that are making 
me close down and leave. 
Vulnerability: You can say that life stopped 
in 2006.  
 
De-personalized Exit 2  
The business started to go down but 2006 was the last straw. During the war in 2006, it was the worst time for us. We fled Beirut and went to Faraya.  
Lengthening Time Horizon: I seriously thought of closing down the business here. … If I didn’t have people working in the factory since my 
father’s reign, I would have closed down the factory long ago. 
Problem-focused coping Therefore, we decided to go international. This was the only strategy! Otherwise, we would have closed the whole 
business if we relied on the business in Lebanon. … Today we are at 80% of the work being abroad while 20% being in Lebanon. We are 
targeting to reach 95% abroad and only 5% in Lebanon. 
Lengthening Time Horizon: I am a businessman, as long I am not losing money I will stay open. The day I lose money, I will close 
down and focus on renting my real estates. That way I will make more money. 
Problem-focused coping: We saw that the business isn’t working here so we decided to go abroad with putting the base here 
in Lebanon and using whatever advantages Lebanon is still offering. … In Lebanon, we are on survival mode for the business. 
Abroad, we are doing amazing. In Lebanon we are just breaking even and covering our costs. The profit is coming from 
abroad. As long as I am doing great abroad with the base and support from Lebanon, I will not close down. 
 
Normalizing: It is all relative. However, 
comparing to Lebanon, Nigeria is better. …  
I prefer to do it in Africa, in Nigeria in 
particular. If you ask me if it is dangerous, I 
would tell you it is extremely dangerous from 
Ebola to Boko Haram to kidnappings. …. It is 
very dangerous. … So one needs to accept 
these to the expense of working there. … This 
is the case with me and many others.   
De-personalized Exit 3  
We cannot work in Lebanon anymore. 
Lengthening time horizon  
If there were a bit more security in Nigeria, it would have been a dream come true. … Africa is a bit dangerous but we do not have a better option. 
…. Besides [the dangers], the potential is there. 
Problem-focused coping: I am so happy that we took that decision to move to Nigeria. It was the right thing to do. … I would have never 
invested in software without Nigeria. I invested in it so I am aware of all aspects of the business there. . 
 
Historicizing: We were affected greatly [by 
the war in Syria], both directly and indirectly. 
Normalizing: It’s all the same, if you came to 
my office a year ago and watched the news it 
would have been the same type of news you 
hear now. 
Vulnerability: The crisis isn’t affecting me 
much now. However, it is a different story if 
ISIS attacks Lebanon. 
 
Re-personalized Exit 4 
It affected me greatly. … This would take up my energy and I wouldn’t be able to work. 
Emotion-focused coping: The day I feel my children are in danger, I close everything and move abroad. This is the only thing that will make me 
leave the country fully. …We already have plan B to go to NYC and plan C to go to Dubai. 
Shortening time horizon: In case one day the war comes to Lebanon, I will move my whole operations abroad too.[…] When they are 1 km 
away from us, we will leave the country on the first plane. 
Emotion-focused coping: I put my energy at work during the day and when I get home, I put my energy on my family. When we 
finish the interview, I will go see my children and spend quality time with them. This is where I like to put my energy. 
Shortening time horizon: Every year I was losing more confidence than the year before. … When you look at the country, you see 
what I am doing makes perfect sense. 
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At the opposite extreme were a few entrepreneurs, like Jean (Figure 2.4), who chose to exit early 
for personal reasons. While the event itself did not require such a precipitous exit in Jean’s case, 
the exit motivated him to reallocate a great deal of his initiative and ingenuity to scoping out and 
building up the business in different contexts, like Europe, Qatar, and Dubai. Jean made multiple 
re-entry moves in response to a single event, which many others (including his own partner and 
many investors) did not even interpret as an emergency at that time. For instance, Jean’s own 
partner, Ralph, elected to stay behind and manage some of the ventures in his stead for many 
years after Jean severed his own relationship with these ventures. 
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Figure 2.4  Emergency Exit for Jean 
EMERGENCY 
Vulnerability: My partner and I decided in 
the minute of the assassination of PM Hariri. 
We decided that it is not going to work 
anymore. 
Volatility: You can feel the drops. I used to 
get all the numbers from the [tourism] 
syndicate about how many people visit. We 
started to witness 20 to 25% drop. … Then 
2006, we had the war with Israelis and 
Hezbollah. Then 2007 we had Nahr el Bared. 
Then 2008. Another drop.  
Re-personalized Exit 1  
My partner told me that things will be ok. Personally, I am a coward: I don't want to die on the street because of a fight. … This scared me. [My partner] 
tried to cool me down. I told him I am leaving. He said ok.  
Lengthening time horizon: If you go back to 2006, when we had the war, all the clubs opened in Faraya, but what is the crowd? 2,000-3,000? 
You cannot base the economy of a country on 2,000 people. By 2007 we ended up with 13 outlets. We were the first group to export a Lebanese 
brand to Europe. … We had one outlet in 2006 in London. … We opened in St. Tropez in 2007. We were super big. 
Problem-focused coping: I moved to Dubai [in 2005, it was a reaction of the assassination of PM Hariri] … So I went to Qatar, Jordan. I 
was trying by hook or crook to tie up with an existing clubbing company and to bring our expertise and name, and we ended up here. … We 
opened our first place [in Dubai], and we were shutting down in Beirut, expanding here, shutting down there, expanding here. … We were 
expanding in Dubai.  
Lengthening time horizon: We had the best locations, best buildings, you cannot find places [like these] every day in Beirut. We wanted 
to keep them. 
Problem-focused coping: In 2007, we stopped expanding. Our [flagship outlet] started losing [money] at the end of 2007. We had a 
negative P&L. I used to buy from our outlets; we were buying the POS system. I was taking the gear from the kitchen, just to reduce 
the losses. Sometimes we used to rent the outlet empty, for arts exhibition, or … a private party. 
 
Vulnerability: When Nahr El Bared incident 
happened, there were no more people going 
out … If you hear there is a bomb that 
exploded, you would not go out. 
Volatility: I used to go to the bank for a loan. 
They used to tell me please send us a forecast 
for the coming year. … You really want 
forecast? … Then one bomb, it would change 
[everything].  
Re-personalized Exit 2  
Until we drowned. We drowned in 2009, because we were not able to pay rent. The bankruptcy was a domino effect. We had 450 employees. We had 
loans. And the operations [overseas] could not sustain. 
Emotion-focused comping: When it comes to such a decision, I cannot take it alone. We called the board and then we decided and of course they 
agreed. … How we can get money? Who is the investor who is willing to give you money? Which bank will give you [a loan]? … Our bank 
account told us then that we need to close. 
Shortening time horizon: When you don't have literally any option, you need to stop loss. Why are you going to drag yourself in more? 
Because you cannot see the light at the end of the tunnel. It is a super dark tunnel. You’d rather stop your losses there, and then you negotiate 
in how you are going to close in the least damage possible;  
 
Vulnerability: The classy people stopped 
coming and I started to get the very low end 
clients, so my business can't work with this 
kind and level of clients. 
Volatility: Afterwards, when someone 
decided it was time to make Hamra district 
working, they started demonstration and 
people started talking. And they started to 
make troubles in the streets. They released 
some trouble makers in the street.. tik..tik..tik..  
 
Re-personalized Exit 3  
We were not living. We were hoping to survive and when you hope to survive … you lose it.  
Emotion-focused coping: It affects your energy because we were not creative anymore. … Practically, you need to reinvent yourself in this line of 
business. But when you were drowning, what kind of moves you can do? You are just want to breathe. 
Shortening time horizon: Bit by bit, we had to shut down because we could not sustain our operations. To come to our place is not a 
necessity. It is not a school or a hospital. It is extra-extra spending, just to have fun and people stopped to have fun,  
Re-personalized Exit 4:  
We started closing in 2008 … getting out of Lebanon (as a company) in 2012.  
Emotion-focused coping: It is not that we are losing. We didn't lose. It was not a mismanagement thing. It was a force majeure. 
Shortening time horizon: I would say [we were] around 700 people then. Today we are around … 300, all located in the UAE. In Lebanon 
we have 4 employees: one auditor, one lawyer, one office boy, one taking care of the HR. 
Vulnerability: The country was not backing 
us up. Zero security, zero social security, zero 
pension, zero everything. We are alone. 
Re-personalized Exit 5:  
Now [my partner] he relocated to Dubai but only two years ago. He was the last man standing. 
Emotion-focused coping: It has been two years since I was shouting: Enough! Enough! What for? What for? It is a waste of energy. Every time I 
go back I feel sad, and then I want to take back the plane and go somewhere else. So it bothers me and then I feel like leaving Beirut again. 
Shortening time horizon: We shut down everything in Lebanon. We just have a virtual office because we still have some staff on our 
company for social security. We still have our lawyers and a virtual office. We reduced the costs to like really nothing and that’s it. 
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Several entrepreneurs iterated between de-personalized and re-personalized exit processes. 
Marwan (Figure 2.5), for example, switched from one path to the other and back again. He 
actually entered Lebanon at a peak of turbulence, and even leveraged it in its brand, so it is not 
surprising that he started off as if the disruption was normal and he had the time and the means to 
troubleshoot any specific challenges he might encounter along the way. However, his view of 
normal turbulence turned out to be very specific, and had one exclusion: civil war among his 
fellow citizens. Once this bridge was crossed, Marwan felt quite vulnerable, not only because 
there were no precedents, but also because the event itself clashed with his personal philosophy. 
As a result, he felt “disgusted” and accelerated the breakdown of the individual-venture 
relationship, even though his business and brand continued to thrive in the inauspicious 
conditions. He had much less trouble with subsequent events, which went back to his idea of 
“normal,” and he gave himself the time to experiment and figure out the best way to leave.
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Figure 2.5  Emergency Exit for Marwan 
EMERGENCY 
Historicizing: [2005] Hariri died and we ate 
shit. 
Start of the business: In 2005, we started the discussion and chat about the [product] idea. … In 2006, I told him. Are you serious or are you joking? He 
said. I'm serious. … Up to that time, I have never had [experience in making this product]. … I started [preparing] during the war. It all began with being 
Lebanese as a brand. … My brands are all about the stories behind them. … The brand that I build is not about marketing, but it is all about the story. All 
about actual reality of what it is going on in real life. … We raised $5 million to build a new [plant] with 10 times the capacity and look at doing global 
domination. 
 
Historicizing: Then ABC explosion, then 
Verdun explosion, then they killed Samir 
Kassir, then they killed Pierre Gemayel.  
Volatility: The Syrian market is hit, and our 
local market here is a joke, where will I sell 
my products? … What the F***?  
Vulnerability: Two months ago, I was going 
to build a factory. What happened? I did 
nothing wrong.  
 
Historicizing: Then Hezbollah came and did 
May 7 civil unrest and siege of Beirut.  
Volatility: F*** off! Leave me alone. Every 
week there is something happening out of 
these events. 
Vulnerability: In one night only, through no 
fault of our own, because of the events. Yes! 
of no fault of our own!! 
De-personalized Exit 1 
I don't have other choice.  
Lengthening time horizon: Up to that point, I was not worried about the impact of the situation on my business ideas.  
Problem-focused coping: It was just me and one of our head sales back then. We sat down and we looked at the map. Do they drink a lot of 
[our product] in Sweden. F***! I don't know. Let’s have a look. Oh yes, they do. Who is there? I don't know. Let’s call the distributors there. 
… I got on a plane and travelled the world trying to sell our [product] and I opened Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland, UK, Spain, 
Portugal, France, Switzerland, Australia, made US bigger. We went to Brazil, Ghana, the UAE, and we closed the year with our exports up 
20%. … Now 90% of my work is export.  
 
 
Re-personalized Exit 2 
I relinquished the chairmanship. 
Emotion-focused coping: I no longer focus my energy on it. … I stopped being proud of my country since May 7 2008. I don't want to leverage the 
brand anymore because I’m not proud anymore of Lebanon.  
Shortening time horizon: You wake up after one month and you find that your company is going to go bankrupt and disappear, the whole 
company and you send your employees home. … We stopped it. If we did it, we would have gone bankrupt. … In retrospect, if I knew that 
May 7 would happen, I would have said F*** you and F*** [the country] then. … What am I still doing here?  
 
Vulnerability: We were exporting to Syria.  
There was a new law early in early 2013 that 
affected our exports. There was a new law that 
prohibited the import of anything without 
prior consent from government.  
 
De-personalized Exit 3 
The Syrian problems started in 2013. Last year, the Syrian market was screwed. It represents 60% of our sales. From November we lost a chunk of sales. 
By January, the market was low because of seasonality and then we had Syria beginning 2013.  
Lengthening time horizon: Since the start of the turmoil in Syria every year we are facing deterioration.  
Problem-focused coping: Since the first day we started, it is all about problems and decisions to make. … And then I travelled to Australia 
…. In 2013 I went 3 times … and said let’s do it here. I moved to Australia. … We wrote a business plan and raised some money. Set up an 
Australian company around September 2013. With Australians. It was my first production outside Lebanon. 
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By using data to theorize the connection between emergencies and entrepreneurial exit, our 
inductive framework draws attention to the many steps entrepreneurs take ‘before exit’, fulfilling 
recent calls to pay close attention to what happens “before, not after failure” (Singh et al., 2015, 
p. 150). Our findings suggest that exit pathways are especially malleable very early on, 
particularly before entrepreneurs have settled on their interpretations of events.  
Our work also shines a spotlight on the individual-venture relationship (foundational to the 
entrepreneurial exit literature) by showing how malleable this relationship can be, even in the 
harshest of circumstances. Specifically, we show the different ways in which entrepreneurs can 
adjust the venture and/or themselves to preserve core aspects of the relationship, so that even in 
cases where we can observe a departure from a given context and/or a closure of the commercial 
establishment, many aspects of the individual-venture relationship carry on.  
Taken together, our findings motivate more theory-building efforts to ascertain what happens 
before exit, especially when exogenous events threaten the continuation of businesses at peak 
performance. Our insights also suggest that exit may be more richly understood as work on 
repairing the individual-venture relationship as recurrent events keep breaking it (Fathallah & 
Branzei, 2017), rather than by isolating or modelling the ultimate consequences of singular 
precipitating events. In our study, the link between emergencies and exit grew clearer the more 
entrepreneurs dwelled on the when and the how of sequences of unexpected events.  
As theories of entrepreneurial exit become more nuanced, and begin to pay closer attention to 
what happens before exit (Singh et al., 2015), there is new theoretical and empirical space to 
articulate prospective explanations of when and how entrepreneurs exit. While theories of 
voluntary exit have long acknowledged that exit can be proactive and purposeful (DeTienne, 
McKelvie, & Chandler, 2015), theories of involuntary exit have so far largely focused 
comparatively more on how entrepreneurs mitigate personal downsides, such as the stigma 
associated with failure, rather than on the steps entrepreneurs take to accelerate recovery. As 
turbulence increases, and entrepreneurs face a greater range of shocks and disruptions, exit may 
(or may not) be unavoidable. Our study suggests that even in response to emergencies, 
entrepreneurs can exert significant choice over exit by engaging in partial and temporal 
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adaptation, within and beyond their existing venture. Our inductive findings demonstrate that the 
individual-venture relationship affords significant degrees of adjustment at both ends. By 
juxtaposing adjustments for their ventures and themselves, entrepreneurs can exert a great deal of 
latitude over the degree and timing of their exit, even when they face dire or dramatic 
circumstances; their idiosyncratic choices, rather than their circumstances, determine how well 
or how long their ventures will outlast adversity. 
By revealing the flexible coupling between emergencies and exit, our study elaborates on the 
construct of exit, offering three distinct extensions (Suddaby, 2010). First, this study broadens 
the scope of the exit construct to explicitly include what happens before exit. In addition to work 
entrepreneurs do on themselves to prepare for anticipated failure (Singh et al., 2015), we show 
that entrepreneurs significantly and repeatedly adjust their venture as well. This give and take in 
the individual-venture relationship allows some entrepreneurs to avoid exit altogether, and 
enables many others to exit with dignity—and even renewed confidence—knowing they did 
everything possible to honour their responsibilities to their many stakeholders. 
Second, our findings draw explicit attention to the temporality embedded in exit. While other 
studies have recently examined the pre- and post-exit dynamics, broadening the chronos view of 
exit beyond the exit event itself, we are just starting to explore the non-linear effects of time. Our 
study shows that some entrepreneurs buy themselves and their ventures more time to problem-
solve in response to emergencies, while others rush for the proverbial emergency exit.  
Third, the many downsides of exit, especially involuntary exit, have spearheaded much more 
attention to its relationships with negative constructs (such as failure and stigma) than to positive 
constructs (such as coping and confidence) (Shepherd & Haynie, 2011). By fleshing out the 
complex relationship between emergencies and exit, we hope to rekindle interest in the ways in 
which pressure to exit may be generative. We are especially excited about theorizing exit as non-
terminal, and as a precondition for positive discontinuities in one’s entrepreneurial journey. 
Finally, we contribute to the emerging literature on adversity, which is beginning to differentiate 
between acute (Bullough & Renko, 2017) and chronic (Powell & Baker, 2014) adversity, by 
underscoring that the progressive accumulation of adversity—setback after setback—creates 
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distinct pressures and exit approaches (Fathallah & Branzei, 2017). When adversity is 
cumulative, entrepreneurs respond to one event at a time; however, they may not always or 
accurately anticipate how one specific disruption may impact their future trajectory. Situations 
initially assessed as manageable can end up being terminal as their impact unfurls; similarly, 
some truly traumatic events end up being quite manageable for some entrepreneurs as they tackle 
one problem and one setback at a time. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Our inductive theorizing using the first-person accounts of 27 entrepreneurs facing recurrent 
adversity in Lebanon extends the literature on entrepreneurial exit to account for what happens 
before exit. We underscore the malleability of the individual-venture relationship and show two 
exit pathways that combine partial and temporal adaptation to repair relationships repeatedly 
damaged by cumulative events that disrupt either side.
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Appendix 2.1  Timeline of the Major Political Events in Lebanon5 
                                                 
 
5 “Gulf states warn citizens against Lebanon travel,” 2013; “Lebanon profile – Timeline,” 2017; Mroueh, 
2015; “Timeline: major attacks in Lebanon since 2005,” 2013; “Timeline: Tension in Lebanon,” 2014.  
 
Date Description of the Event 
1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War 
Feb. 14, 2005 A massive car bomb in Beirut kills Prime Minister Hariri and many others. Immense street 
protests take place as a reaction to the assassination. 
Jun. 2, 2005 Journalist Samir Kassir is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut. 
Jun. 21, 2005 A bomb kills George Hawi, former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party. 
Jul. 12, 2005 Defense minister Elias Murr is among those wounded in a car bomb in Beirut. 
Dec. 12, 2005 An explosion kills Member of Parliament Gebran Tueni. Two other people are also killed. 
Jul. 12, 2006 Israel launches a one-month-long war against Lebanon after Hezbollah captures Israeli soldiers in 
an attack across the border. 
Nov. 21, 2006 Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel is assassinated by gunmen. 
Dec. 1, 2006 A coalition of political parties stages a massive sit-in demonstration in downtown Beirut. A series 
of political protests and sit-ins follows until May 21, 2008. 
May–Sept., 
2007 
Clashes between Islamist militants and the Lebanese military at the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr 
al-Bared. More than 300 people die. 
Jun. 13, 2007 Member of Parliament Walid Eido is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut. 
Sept. 19, 2007 Political party lawmaker Antoine Ghanem is assassinated in an explosion. 
Dec. 12, 2007 A car bomb kills General Francois El Hajj. 
Jan. 25, 2008 A bombing kills Internal Security Forces officer Wissam Eid. 
May 7, 2008 Pro-Hezbollah fighters lock down Beirut and clash with people. 
May 8, 2008 Pro-Hezbollah gunmen take over large parts of West Beirut. Gun clashes lead to many casualties. 
Mar. 15, 2011 The Arab Spring reaches Syria. The conflict eventually develops into a civil war in Syria. In 
Lebanon, one coalition of political parties backs Syrian rebels, while the other coalition supports 
the Syrian regime. 
Summer 2012 The Syrian war spills over to Lebanon through violent clashes in Tripoli and Beirut. 
Oct. 19, 2012 Police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan is killed along with eight other people in a car bomb. 
Dec. 2012 Violent fights breaks out between supporters and opponents of the Syrian president in Tripoli. 
May 20, 2013 Sectarian violence continues to spill over from the war in Syria. Many fights take place in Tripoli. 
Jun., 2013 The main provider of Lebanon’s tourism revenue, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—issues a travel warning for 
citizens thinking of visiting Lebanon, as Syria’s civil war is fuelling violence in Lebanon. 
Jul. 9, 2013 A car bomb wounds at least 53 people in Southern Beirut where many support Hezbollah. 
Aug. 15, 2013 A car bomb in Southern Beirut kills 27 people and wounds 336 others. 
Aug. 23, 2013 Two car bombs in Tripoli kill 42 people and wound hundreds. 
Dec. 27, 2013 Mohamad Chatah, Lebanon’s former finance minister is killed with at least five others in a car 
bomb in a central location in Beirut.  
Apr. 2014 The United Nations announces that the number of Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon is over 1 
million.  
May 2014 Lebanon’s President Suleiman ends his term of office, leaving a power vacuum. Several attempts 
are made in parliament over subsequent months to choose a successor. 
Aug. 6, 2014 Syrian rebels cross to the Lebanese town of Arsal and get involved in clashes. They withdraw after 
being confronted by the military, but take many Lebanese soldiers and police captive. 
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Appendix 2.2  Initial Interview Guide 
Introduction: I am interested in the impact of political instability in Lebanon on the ways in 
which you operate in this context. 
The Impact of Political Instability 
 How does the political instability in Lebanon affect your firm? (firm’s operations and 
strategies)  
 Would your strategy be different if there was no political instability in Lebanon? Why 
and how? 
 How do you cope with this environment? 
 What are the objectives of the business in this unstable context?  
 How does the threat of the country’s political instability differ from other risks and 
uncertainties your organization faces? 
 How does this context influence your strategies – are there any significant differences 
from what you think any business (that operates in politically stable context) needs to 
consider? What resources and capabilities are the most helpful during distress and why – 
and how do they differ from resources and capabilities most organizations need and use? 
Stay or Exit / Motivation and Strategies 
 Are you contemplating future turbulence? What scenarios are you thinking of? For 
example, if a civil war erupts, what is the course of action you might take? 
 What levels of performance will be acceptable to stay in business? What would have to 
happen (in terms of losses, disruption etc.) to cause you to exit – i.e. terminate all 
operations in Lebanon? (Probe: How patient would you be and why? What factors 
determine the final decision?) 
 Why do you stay in those situations? Or why have you exited (in case you have)? 
o Probes: Thinking about Exit could be triggered by: small market, turbulent 
industry (losing customers), losing money because of bad operations, hard to 
manage operation, general economic environment, institutional settings, political 
instability, changes in competitive advantage, intensity of rivalry in market, exit 
of competitors, shortages of resources, strategic-poor fit, getting rid of 
undesired/unprofitable units, shifting resources into units with greater growth or 
opportunity… 
o Probes: Exit barriers: cost to divest: sunk and relocation costs, organizational 
entrenchment, management attachment to previous choices, resistance to admit 
economic failure, personal commitment, trapped by assets, aversion to loss, 
denial, family obligations 
 What event do you recall most vividly as having had a significant impact on business (in 
general, in your industry, on your own organization)? (Probes: what happened, what 
issues did the events create for you, what did you do? Why? What was your thinking at 
the time? What were your objectives?) 
 What event has had the strongest impact on your own operations? 
 How did these events affect you and your business?  
o Civil war  
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o Prime Minister Hariri assassination and the 2005 series of assassinations 
o August War 2006  
o Spillover of the Syrian civil war 
o Series of car and suicide bombs in 2012 – 2013  
 Please tell me about any shifts or changes in your business strategy that may have been 
triggered by any one of these events: 
o Civil war  
o Prime Minister Hariri assassination and the 2005 series of assassinations 
o August War 2006  
o Spillover of the Syrian civil war 
o Series of car and suicide bombs in 2012 – 2013  
 Looking across these events, tell me more about your decisions on staying vs. exiting. 
 What strategies help you continue operating? How are they helpful? (What difference did 
they make?) (What have you done, you think, that has allowed your company to stay?) 
 What has worked for you? What has not worked? What have you learned about how to 
operate successfully in politically turbulent conditions? 
 Have you made any specific decisions about exiting? How would you know when it may 
be better to go than to stay? 
 If a waiting approach has been suggested by the interviewee… when is a wait-and-see 
approach is more expedient? 
 What is your thinking about staying and going now, and how has it changed over your 
tenure with the current organization?  
Stay or Exit / Forms: (specific to probe more discussion, if needed) 
 Have you ever thought of exiting from: the specific venture? Entire business? Industry? 
Country? Region?  
 When does an exit become an option to consider? (Intention to exit) is it always an 
option? 
 What were the reasons at the time? What were you thinking at the time? 
 What would an exit look like?  Forms of exit: liquidate; sell, staged (gradual) or 
immediate, complete or downscaling and downscoping as partial exit?  
 What are the factors that you consider when exit is on the table?  
 How do you feel about the possibility of an exit?    
 Who is involved in the decision? What is the process? 
 How do other stakeholders within the organization (e.g. investors, employees) affect your 
decision to stay vs. exit? How do other stakeholders may limit your ability to make exit 
or stay decisions?  
Understanding the context 
 Do you have operations outside Lebanon? 
 
 If yes, do you compare across contexts?  e.g. Lebanon vs the UAE or Iraq? Take me 
through what dimensions are most important to you across contexts and how they 
compare with your operations in Lebanon.  
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 Within Lebanon, what are some of the key local institutions (rules, regulations, 
organizations) that influence your operations in a positive or negative way? Are some 
institutions missing – what would you like to have in place that is not currently available 
or useful to your own operations or to business in general? 
 
 
To help us contextualize your answers, can you tell us a little more about yourself, professionally 
and personally? 
 
 Tell me first about your professional satisfaction – in your current position and organization. 
 Remind me of your position, main duties, and how long you’ve been in this position 
 How long with the organization overall 
 Remind me of where the organization is right now…Number of employees, total annual 
sales, field of business, year of foundation, number of business offices or branches in 
domestic market. 
 How have these changed since you first joined – how low or high did some of these 
metrics get – were there any major changes associated with some of the events we talked 
about? 
 
 How much time have you spent thinking about the effect of the political/economic 
instability on your business operations? Were there times when you were particularly 
preoccupied with the effect of context? 
 Looking ahead, how do you think the business (and you yourself?) will be a year/5 years 
from now? Are you looking at any major changes in the next few years? 
 
 
 Last, tell me about your personal approach – how do you think about the context of 
Lebanon and what you do here from a personal perspective? Does the continuation of 
your business here influence your family life? In what ways? 
 
 Anything else you’d like us to think about?  
 Thank you. 
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Appendix 2.3  Follow-up Questions – Interview Guide 
1. When you considered shutting down some of your operations, how did you think or talk 
about it? Have you since changed your mind about what it meant – or the way you talk 
about the cessation of operations/locations? 
2. How far back in time did you begin contemplating the shut down? Give me a timeline of 
the main triggers and thinking behind whether or when you may have to close at least 
part of your venture down or relocate it elsewhere? 
a. Do you recall a threshold or tipping point along the journey? 
b. Did the decision suddenly become more (or less) professional vs. personal to you? 
3. In the end, did you exit – if so, when and what exactly did the exit mean (physically, 
geographically, materially, emotionally)? 
a. How did you “date” when the exit actually happened? 
b. How did you delineate where and how the exit took place? 
4. Did you ever felt like you had to choose between your survival or your venture?  
a. Were there scenarios in which your venture could have gone on without you? 
b. If you were not in Lebanon – could the venture have survived without you? (Was 
there something specific then and there that interlinked your fates?) 
5. If an exit was articulated or executed (not just contemplated): Do you recall particular 
moments or decisions along the way when you may have felt relieved it’s all over?  
a. Were there other reactions you noticed at that time?  
b. How do you feel now (how long has it been) about the exit? 
6. Was the exit something you grappled with on your own or did you involve others (e.g. 
friends, competitors, family)?  
a. If others were involved at that time, what roles did they play – specifically did 
they make it easier or harder to exit? 
7. At what point did you start considering alternatives for yourself or the venture? Did you 
look for options while you were contemplating or actually closing down operations? If 
so, what difference did this dual approach (exit and re-entry) make to you personally –  
8. How did you feel back then about alternatives coming online – did it make you feel better 
about yourself and/or the venture?  
a. Did it change in some way the way you related to your venture and if so, what 
was the difference you felt at that time? 
b. Looking back, do you feel the pressure to exit opened up new opportunities for 
you, and if so, how did the exit make a difference to the opportunities you 
contemplated or pursued since? 
9. Comparing the re-entry post exit with the other opportunities you pursued without any 
pressure or constraint before, what would you say was different for you? Did the ‘crisis’ 
model bring out new skills/expectations, or did it help you let go of some old 
skills/expectations? 
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10. What was the best thing you would say came out of contemplating exit? If you actually 
closed down operations, are there any subsequent wins or even breakthroughs that you 
attribute to that forced exit? 
11. Could you give me an update on what you have been up to since we last spoke?  
a. Any changes in your operations at home or abroad?  
b. Any personal revelations or transformations?  
c. Anything else you’d like to share? 
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Chapter 3  
3 No Place like Home? How EMNCs in distressed contexts 
arbitrage resources, values, and opportunities abroad 
 
ABSTRACT 
Through an inductive study of 12 firms over 12 years, we examine how political and economic 
instability at home influences the internationalization of emerging market multinational 
companies (EMNCs). Our central contribution is a framework that outlines how EMNCs 
internationalize under prolonged turmoil, that is, by sequentially replacing the resources, values, 
and opportunities no longer available at home with alternatives they seek and find in foreign 
contexts. We further elaborate on existing theories of institutional arbitrage by inducing how 
each of the three ways in which EMNCs respond to distress qualitatively updates key attributes 
of the home context. 
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3.1 Introduction 
“On a recent flight from Beirut to Addis Ababa, Lebanese businessmen were swapping stories. 
“Business is excellent in Angola,” declared one. “I hear it’s good in Ghana?” inquired another. 
Flights out of Lebanon buzz with optimism. For Lebanese businessfolk, the juiciest opportunities 
are abroad.”        The Economist, March 16, 2013  
3.1.1 Why Home? 
Home contexts shape firms’ global strategies (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Wan & Hoskisson, 
2003), influencing their domestic versus international choices (Zahra, Korri & Yu, 2005), 
performance trade-offs (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 
2008) and patterns of growth (Khan, Rao-Nicholson, & Tarba, Forthcoming; Storper, 1997; Scott 
& Storper, 2003). The (dis)advantages provided by home-of-origin endowments are foundational 
in theories of international business (Elango & Sethi, 2007; Harzig & Sorge, 2003). We know 
that institutional conditions, and changes, within a given context shape or shift firm-level actions 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Liang, Lu & Wang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 
2007; Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008). We also know that firms recognize, and sometimes 
deliberately arbitrage, institutional disparities among different contexts (Marano, Arregle, Hitt, 
Spadafora, & van Essen, 2016).  
The relationship between home context and internationalization is double-barreled. Abundance 
at home broadens firms’ options elsewhere. Firms’ embeddedness within local networks (Guler 
& Guillén, 2010), communities (McKeever, Jack, & Anderson, 2015), and eco-systems (Dahl & 
Sorenson, 2009; Pajunen, 2008) enables and/or accelerates internationalization (Arregle, Miller, 
Hitt, & Beamish, 2013; Goerzen & Beamish, 2003; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kin, 1997). Firms may 
leverage strength at home either by looking for more formal or stricter institutional environments 
that challenge them to develop new capabilities (Witt & Lewin, 2007) and/or exploiting their 
current skills in less formal or institutionally weaker settings (Luiz, Stringfellow, & Jefthas, 
2017; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Scarcity,  (i.e. weak or unstable institutions), (Luo & 
Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007) and/or instability (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Henisz, 2000; Peng, 
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Wang, & Jiang, 2008) at home may reduce or delay internationalization (Gammeltoft, Pradhan & 
Goldstein, 2010; Wu & Chen, 2014), by threatening survival at home (Guillén & Suarez, 2005; 
Ramamurti, 2009) and thwarting firm’s ability to plan ahead (Hiatt & Sine, 2014). However 
danger and distress at home may, on occasion, accelerate internationalization  (e.g., Holmes, 
Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; Stoian & Mohr, 2016) as exposure to uncertain and crisis-prone 
environments increases a firm’s willingness to deal with risk and internationalize to more distant 
or even riskier countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012). Some firms “escape” challenging 
environments altogether (Yamakawa, Peng, & Deeds, 2008), leaving settings where capital 
markets are underdeveloped, or critical institutions (e.g., infrastructure, intermediary markets, 
regulatory systems, contract-enforcing mechanisms, etc.) missing, in search for greener pastures 
elsewhere (Luo & Tung, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007)  
Such extreme conditions, unfortunately, are no longer an exception (Cantwell, 2009; Cantwell & 
Mudambi, 2011; Eden & Molot, 2002). The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2017 
(2017) underscores a rising trend of political disruptions with inter-state conflicts and state 
collapse or crisis making the top five global risks in 2015 and 2016 (HIIK, 2010, 2016). Yet, we 
have limited knowledge on how the internationalization process unfolds as many previously 
stable homes are being buffeted by distress. We therefore ask how political and economic 
instability at home influences the internationalization of emerging market multinational 
companies. 
3.1.2 One’s Place of Business 
Recent literature reveals an increasing preoccupation with how crises, shocks, and disruptions 
may affect a firm’s relationship to the places in which it conducts business (Chung, Lee, & 
Beamish, & Isobe, 2010). Perhaps due to the growing incidence of such disruption and its often-
detrimental effects on global operations (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & Steen, 2010; Jallat & 
Schultz, 2011), most papers focus on minimizing the downsides of adversity by reducing 
exposure (Yamakawa et al, 2008). Getting away from danger has been presented as a strategic 
endeavour (Berry, 2010; Belderbos & Zou, 2007)—firms reconfigure their subsidiaries to 
balance risks across multiple (but differentially risky) host countries. Established multinational 
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companies (MNCs) typically do so by timing or pacing their exit strategies (Dai, Eden, & 
Beamish, 2013; Dai et al., 2017; Darendeli & Hill, 2015; Figueira-de-Lemos & Hadjikhani, 
2014). It is economically rational, and often beneficial in the long term, for MNCs to divest 
subsidiaries located in politically unpredictable environments (e.g., Dai et al., 2013; Darendeli & 
Hill, 2015; Soule, Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2014), and there is robust support for such 
flexibility under different kinds of uncertainty (e.g., Chung et al., 2010; Belderbos & Zou, 2007; 
Belderbos & Zou, 2009). MNCs have the flexibility to close some businesses, relocate or invest 
in new subsidiaries (Berry, 2010; Harrigan, 1981), and/or refocus on core activities (Duhaime & 
Grant, 1984; Markides, 1992; Bergh, 1997; Chang & Singh, 1999).  
Detachment from one’s place of business is never easy (Kibler, Fink, Lang, & Muñoz, 2015; 
Lawrence & Dover, 2015). Foreign subsidiaries are comparatively cheaper and quicker to uproot 
(Alvarez & Görg, 2009), but when crises strike one’s home (Coucke & Sleuwaegen, 2008), 
escape means relocating the company’s headquarters (Meyer & Xia, 2012). Laamanen, Simula, 
and Torstila (2012) deem this “the ultimate international business decision” (p. 187) because it 
challenges the very identity of the firm. Leaving one’s home presents an even greater challenge 
for emerging country multinational companies (EMNCs), either because they may not have the 
choice of “opting-out” of their home-context institutions (Meyer & Thein, 2014, p. 157), and/or 
because doing so may be misinterpreted as giving up on their home countries. Extant research 
documents voluntary headquarter relocation, typically motivated by tax avoidance (Birkinshaw 
Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006; Baaij, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2004). Instances of 
involuntary relocation of headquarters are quite rare, in large part because most firms do 
everything they can to avoid leaving their home in the first place. For example, Luo and Tung 
(2007) explain how EMNCs deliberately offset institutional voids at home by going to 
environments rich in well-developed institutions—especially when dependence on domestic 
norms shortchanges their global prospects (Luo & Wang, 2012; Luo, Zhao, Wan, & Xi, 2011) 
and the new environments are better aligned with their strategic needs (Witt & Lewin, 2007). 
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3.1.3 Institutional Arbitrage 
Boisot and Meyer (2008) define institutional arbitrage as “an exploitation of the differences 
between different institutional arrangements operating in different jurisdictions” (p. 356). They 
document how institutional arbitrage enabled Chinese firms to access better and more efficient 
institutions in developed economies, and how supplementing what they could access at home 
with what they could reach for abroad allowed these firms to better compete with MNCs from 
developed markets on a global scale.  
The notion of institutional arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2008) is relatively recent, and existing 
literature is not yet very clear on the specific forms of arbitrage that firms may pursue (Jackson 
& Deeg, 2008; Luo & Zhang, 2016). We have also little understanding how institutional 
arbitrage unfolds and what determines firms’ arbitraging needs (Luo & Zhang, 2016). We 
contribute by inducing and illustrating three distinct mechanisms of institutional arbitrage, which 
we refer to as resource-centric, value-centric, and horizon-centric arbitrage. To preface our 
qualitative findings, we show how adversity helps a firm figure out what it needs abroad, as well 
as why and when. 
The first, and most discussed thus far, mechanism of institutional arbitrage focuses on the what – 
the resources that a firm (no longer) controls. As resources become scarcer or pricier at home 
(Wu & Chen, 2014), or are not available in the first place (e.g., technology and brands) (Luo & 
Tung, 2007), firms “explore” other contexts in a quest to replace what they need to continue 
operating. 
The second mechanism contemplates the why. As the rules of their environment get interrupted 
or interpreted in different ways, firms need to revise and realign what they stand for. While some 
of these changes are concrete and materialize in operations (Sullivan-Taylor & Wilson, 2009), 
others are more abstract or subtle and engage notions of fit, legitimacy, and even ideology. As 
firms fall out of sync with their home contexts, they may be more inclined to question their 
original beliefs and allegiances. Greater exposure and experience with instability makes some 
firms more willing and able to adjust to what is (no longer) valued in their home country. 
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The third mechanism of institutional arbitrage touches on the when. As the home environment 
runs dry of opportunities, it forecloses firms’ planning horizons (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), and forces 
them to break free from their past and rebuild their future elsewhere.  
Our inductive approach recasts internationalizing out of a challenging home context as a gradual 
and deliberate process, whereby firms progressively engage in distinct types of institutional 
arbitrage deemed appropriate given successive changes in one’s place/s of business. We 
specifically show that EMNCs sequentially engage in resource, value, and horizon arbitrage. We 
further reveal that each type of arbitrage recasts the relationship with one’s home context by 
rendering core attributes more or less pertinent to their internationalization. Taken together, our 
findings advance new inductive propositions on the role of home context, offering a multi-modal 
process model of institutional arbitrage as a step-wise detachment (Boddewyn, 1983) that 
sometimes ends with a firm relocation (Laamanen et al., 2012; Meyer & Thein, 2014; Meyer & 
Xia, 2012; Yamakawa et al., 2008). In so doing, our process model bridges theories of 
attachment (McKeever et al., 2015) and escape (Witt & Lewin, 2007), explaining how different 
modes of arbitrage punctuate firm’s movement along the continuum they anchor..  
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Longitudinal Comparative Case Study Design 
To understand how unrest at home may influence EMNCs’ internationalization, we chose an 
exploratory, longitudinal, multiple-case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). Given our interest in home context in the midst of turmoil, we focused on Lebanon at a 
critical juncture in its history. Within Lebanon, we further focused on the food and hospitality 
industry, which conflict historians suggests bears the brunt of the disruption (Spilerman and 
Stecklov, 2009) and local as well as global account depict in dire terms (e.g. experiencing “a 
regression as high as 10 to 15% a year,” (Uncovering the Lebanese Restaurant Industry, 2014)) 
as we commenced our data collection. By picking the worst circumstances, and holding them 
constant across firms, we rule out the role of adversity per se as a plausible explanation of our 
findings. Specifically, because all firms we studied were steeped in the exact same conditions to 
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begin with, any variance in their internationalization choices could not be reduced to exogenous 
events. There is one caveat: prior research posits that crises can be interpreted and enacted in 
different ways, even by seemingly identical firms. The literature suggests that history affects 
how entities (individuals, ventures, communities) experience adverse events, depending on their 
embeddedness and endowments (Barin Cruz, Aguilar Delgado, Leca, & Gond, 2016; Maitlis & 
Sonenshein, 2010). We therefore included both firms that were well-established before the onset 
of adversity in 2005 and firms that were just starting. 
Comparative designs are also premised on variability along one or more critical theoretical 
dimensions  (Patton, 2002). Because we were interested in internationalization, we purposefully 
sampled firms with one of three types of prior experience overseas: 1) none; 2) exports only; and 
3) established subsidiaries. Arguably the internationalization options might differ across the three 
types of firms, albeit in non-obvious ways. For example, it is not a foregone conclusion that 
firms with more foreign experience would adapt quicker or better to distress, because their prior 
commitments may now hinge on resources that are destroyed or discontinued at home or oblige 
firms to exchanges they can no longer honour. At the same time, having done it before might 
offer helpful lessons, and help some of the ‘veterans’ avoid rookie mistakes. Given the novelty 
of the research question we ask, there are no clear priors in how prior internationalization 
experience patterns subsequent internationalization. Instead we warrant sufficient variability by 
sampling, so we can analytically discern if or how past internationalization choices might (or 
not) affect future moves. 
As we began our data collection, we became sensitive to the multiple attributes of home, with a 
possible contrast between Lebanese-born and Lebanese-based firms. Three quarters of our 
sampled firms were Lebanese-born; one quarter referred to Lebanon as their home, but we soon 
realized it was their second rather than first home. While we did not have any reasons to expect 
(nor did we eventually find) any systematic differences between these two groups, we continued 
sampling until we were able to match these second-home firms (Lebanese-based, but not born) 
on the same three kinds of prior internationalization experience we sampled the Lebanese-born 
firms.  
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All firms we considered were indigenous standalone firms; that is, they had not been subsidiaries 
of either domestic or international companies. While many begun without much of an 
international footprint and none of our respondents described them as multinationals at the 
beginning of our inquiry, by the end of our study, all firms met Casson’s (1982) definition of 
MNCs because they “owned outputs of goods or services originating in more than one country” 
(p. 2), as well as Buckley and Casson’s (1985) definition of the same term because they “owned 
or controlled income generating assets in more than one country” (p. 1–2). To accurately 
describe their changing nature, we refer to them as nascent EMNCs, and explain their 
internationalization as an emergent rather than planned process. By tracking how, and explaining 
why, the same changes in these firms’ shared place of doing business yielded rather different 
internationalization moves as the crises escalated, we induce new theory about the recursive 
relationship between home context and internationalization for indigenous EMNCs (Doh, 2015). 
Table 3.1 introduces our 12 cases using the names of Phoenician and Greek gods and goddesses 
as pseudonyms to disguise the firms.6
                                                 
 
6 Seven of these cases were included in Essay #1 and further analyzed here in Essay #2. Appendix 3.1 
reveals those cases. We also pursued two additional, de novo cases, and then added three contrast cases, 
which were not included in Essay #1. 
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3.2.2 Time-frame, 2005–2016 
While Lebanon has been an on-going theater of disruption for several decades, we focused on a 12-year 
window of a series of severe crises  (“Lebanon Country Profile,” 2016) that clearly demarcated by the 
onset of adversity in 2005 and the return of instability once the Syrian refugee crisis peaked in 2014.  
Appendix 3.2 lists the key events. The 2005 assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the 34-
day military conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, shook up an otherwise prosperous and 
entrepreneurial landscape of businesses, which had long included a mix of multi-generational family 
firms and start-up along with subsidiaries of established MNEs (Jamali & Mirhsak, 2010). Before 
2005, the vast majority of food and hospitality businesses focused within Lebanon, serving a wide 
diversity of tourists pouring in from the region. Growth was thus largely indigenous and premised on 
the much that Lebanon had to offer. By 2016, the Lebanese eco-system was decimated, with the 
majority of establishments pared or even completely closed down. As the Economist opening quote 
vividly suggests, Lebanese-born and based ventures sought and found greener pastures elsewhere, often 
by following their customers no longer travelling to Lebanon and finding ways to serve them in their 
own (relatively more stable) countries.  
By using a combination of retrospective and prospective interviews, our inductive design allowed us to 
document how a common but rapidly changing home context systematically influenced the 
internationalization pattern of 12 nascent EMNCs over an eventful 12-year window.  
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Table 3.1  Descriptions of Case Studies 
 
Firm Domain/Business Private 
Interviews 
Public Accounts Internationalization  
 
L
eb
a
n
o
n
-b
o
rn
 F
ir
m
s 
 
Dione 
 
Food & Beverage (F&B) - 
hospitality services established 
in 1998  
500 employees 
1 (2013) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2010) – 2 (2012) 
3 (2013) – 3 (2014) 
2 (2015) – 2 (2016) 
2005 – No outward 
internationalization. 
2016 – JV in the US & UAE. 
Franchise in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
& Oman. 
 
Ugarit 
F&B services founded in 2003 
180 employees  
1 (2013) 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2003) – 1 (2008) 
1 (2011) – 2 (2012) 
2 (2013) – 3 (2014) 
3 (2015)  
2005 – No outward 
internationalization. 
2016 – JV in the UAE. Franchise in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
Byblus 
 
F&B – hospitality services  
established in 2005 
 130 employees 
1 (2015) 
1 (2016)  
1 (2017) 
1 (2009) – 1 (2011) 
1 (2012) – 4 (2013) 
2 (2014) – 2 (2015)  
2005 – No outward 
internationalization. 
2016 – FDI in the UAE. 
 
Sydyk 
F&B production founded in 
1964  
150 employees 
1 (2015) 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2013) 
1 (2015) 
2005 – 20% of business is exports 
to Saudi Arabia, Qatar & Africa.  
2016 – 80% of business is 
international. New HQ in Nigeria. 
Subsidiary in Ghana.  
 
Cadmus 
F&B production – Family 
business founded in 1979 
350 employees 
1 (2013) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2012) 
1 (2013) – 1 (2014) 
2005 – Export to 20 countries. 
2016 – FDI (WOE) in Jordan. 
Export to 35 countries. Franchise in 
Kuwait, the UAE, & Jordan.  
 
Adonis 
F&B production established in 
2006  
50 employees  
1 (2013) 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2009) – 1 (2010) 
1 (2011) – 1 (2012) 
6 (2013) – 3 (2015) 
5 (2016)  
2006 – Exports mainly to Syria.  
2016 – Exports to new countries. 
(26 countries) – planned operation 
(Chicago). Operation in Australia. 
 
Nomios 
F&B services – Family 
business founded in 1960  
730 employees 
1 (2015) 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2009) – 1 (2011) 
1 (2012) – 1 (2014) 
2005 – Subsidiaries in the UAE. 
2016 – New FDI in the UAE. 
FDI in Saudi Arabia & Jordan. 
Thalassa 
 
F&B services & retail company 
established in 1999 
500 employees 
1 (2015) 
1 (2017) 
2 (2012) 
1 (2013) 
2005 – Subsidiary in Cyprus. 
2016 – Established subsidiary in 
Ivory Coast. Contemplating Iran. 
 
Kothar 
F&B – hospitality services 
founded in 2003 
330 employees  
2 (2015) 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
2 (2006) - 2 (2011)  
1 (2012) - 1 (2013) 
3 (2014) – 1 (2015) 
1 (2016) 
2005 – Subsidiaries in the UAE & 
UK. 
2016 – Relocated HQ to the UAE. 
Contemplating FDI in South East 
Asia, Turkey, & Greece. 
L
eb
a
n
o
n
-b
a
se
d
 F
ir
m
s 
 
Astarte 
F&B services founded in 
Bahrain in 2006 
50 employees 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2012) 
1(2014) 
2006 – No outward 
internationalization.  
2016 – FDI in Lebanon.  
 
Medea 
 
F&B, retail & hospitality 
founded in Venezuela in1965  
500 employees  
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
2 (2015) – 2 (2016) 2005 – Exports to Paraguay & 
Mexico.  
2016 – FDI in Lebanon. 
 
Melkart 
F&B services established in  
Saudi Arabia in 1985 – 
relocated to Lebanon in 1992  
60 employees 
1 (2016) 
1 (2017) 
1 (2007) – 1 (2012) 
2 (2015) – 1 (2016) 
2005 – Subsidiaries in the 
Philippines & Japan. Exports to 
KSA, Jordan, Cyprus, Kuwait, 
Senegal, Spain, & Russia. 
2016 – Projects in Saudi Arabia. 
Relying more on exports & new 
markets: Qatar & Pakistan. 
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3.2.3 Data Collection 
We developed detailed longitudinal narratives for each one of the 12 cases using a combination 
of in-person observations in three consecutive two-month field trips (approximately 2 weeks per 
case), archival sources (89) and analyses (5 expert interviews), in-depth interviews (13, lasting 
between 60 and 120 minutes7) and two follow-ups (18, half-sample in 2016, then full-sample in 
2017)8, including the presentation and validation of the induced framework to all protagonists 
between June and August 2017.  
While each one of our cases spanned approximately the same 12-year window9, data pertaining 
to the 2005-2013 period was collected retrospectively and therefore subject to recall biases 
(Golden, 1992). To mitigate this concern, we took several steps to verify these retrospective 
accounts by triangulating archival data and probes in later interviews, and did not detect any 
inconsistencies between early and later accounts. However, it is possible that protagonists would 
have selectively retained, or discarded, key information during the eight years we did not have 
direct or recurrent contact with them. Should this have been the case, we might have expected a 
distinct pattern of internationalization between firms who moved early and late, and even more 
precisely between those firms, which began to arbitrage after rather than before our first wave of 
direct contacts in 2013. We were on alert for such discrepancies throughout the analysis, but 
found none. Indeed, restricting our analysis to the 2013-2016 yielded the exact same inductive 
findings, despite the significantly reduced subset of internationalization moves undertaken by the 
firms we sampled. 
                                                 
 
7
 7 of these interviews were conducted in person in Lebanon by the first author, four interviews took 
place in person in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the remaining two occurred via Skype.  
8 All except six of the follow-ups which were held on location were conducted remotely via phone or 
Skype. 
9 Two of the cases were founded in 2006. 
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We updated the protocol for each of the different waves of interviews. The 2013 and 2015 
version was used in a broader study of how indigenous firms responded to emergencies reported 
in Chapter 2 and appears on pages 66-68 (Appendix 2.2) of this dissertation. The 2016 and 2017 
follow-ups are included in Appendix 3.3. 
The primary data for the case studies were collected during three consecutive two-month field 
trips in 2013, 2015, and 2016, and included 13 in-depth interviews with 12 organizations (we 
interviewed both co-founders for one organization), as follows. In 2013 we visited 4 Lebanon-
born firms (4 interviews); in 2015 we visited 5 more (6 interviews). In 2016 we added the 3 
contrast cases of Lebanese-based firms (3 interviews). 
The first round of interviews with the firms (in 2013 and 2015) focused on how the political and 
economics instability impacts the firm and what kind of changes the management team made to 
accommodate to the political and security disruptions. In an effort to capture some of the 
emerging insights, our second round of interviews (i.e. first follow-up in 2016 with 6 out of the 9 
cases) added a second protocol, which encouraged a comprehensive and accurate depiction of 
internationalization moves, experiences and rationales, requested comparisons of moves in and 
across time (earlier versus later moves), and sought reflections on any connections between 
going abroad and leaving Lebanon. Both interview protocols were semi-structured, with enough 
commonality to allow us to establish a common and comparable foundation among the firms 
while remaining sensitive to key differences among them. In each field trip, we resorted to 
questions and clarifications to more fully capture nuances in the interviewees’ interpretations and 
tease out differences among their understanding, choices and experiences. We reused the two 
protocols for interviewing the contrast cases in 2016. 
The first follow-up in 2016 focused on connections among emerging constructs, while the 
second follow-up with the full sample (12/12) in 2017 zoomed even further into the recursive 
relationship between home context and internationalization. Each additional layer was analyzed 
with, rather than separately from, all prior rounds and types of data. Each layer unsettled old 
insights, replacing them with new ones. 
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We supplemented the interview data with detailed field notes. Because all the interviews were 
conducted in Arabic, with some informants resorting to English or French for added eloquence, 
the second author did not have instant access to the interviews. The field notes served a dual 
function by crossing the language and the distance barrier, so that authors could process new 
insights in real-time. These field notes neither reduced nor replaced the original accounts, which 
were translated and transcribed as soon as possible, often within a week. Rather, they captured 
themes that recurred within and across interviews. We conducted the follow-ups in English, with 
both authors present and probing. Instead of written field notes we conducted verbal debriefs 
immediately following each interview. These debriefs were more interactive, allowing us to 
compare and contrast our understanding in real-time,  
While in the field, the first author engaged in observation of the studied firms, and the industry 
overall. He added 5 interviews with experts (in 2013); immersed himself in conversations with 
local businessman and women; crossed paths with some of the protagonists in economic forums 
and events he attended, and had brief conversations with them whenever possible. For example, 
he met three of his informants during the June 25 “Appeal against Economic Suicide,” a 
movement with a public symposium that took place in Beirut on June 25, 2015. These 
conversations were rapport-building rather than data-gathering encounters, since it would not 
have been appropriate to ask such sensitive questions amidst their competitors. 
External accounts are particularly helpful for longitudinal case comparisons because they can 
reveal differential trajectories and patterns, over and above differences among protagonists at a 
given point in time (e.g., Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). For each of the 12 firms, we conducted 
comprehensive archival searches of public records and solicited private records including press 
releases, websites, presentations, and brochures. We paid particular attention to public accounts 
given by our protagonists in the local and international media (e.g., magazines, newspapers, 
reports, cases, videos, and social media activity). We added analyst reports and industry articles 
describing differential responses by their competitors. In total, we used 89 corroborating 
documents to triangulate the insights from our interviews with key informants and industry 
experts. We complemented the firm’s interviews and follow-ups with the five in-person, in-depth 
84 
 
 
interviews with industry experts who provided their opinions about different events and firms. 
On average, expert interviews lasted 87 minutes. 
3.2.4 Data Analysis 
Our inductive approach closely heeded Eisenhardt’s (1989) and Eisenhardt and Graebner’s 
(2007) recommendations for multiple case theory building. We constructed detailed case-by-case 
narratives, which captured each firm’s internationalization moves over time (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2009). We then juxtaposed the 12 cases and identified three groups of moves, which 
sought and found resources, values, and opportunities no longer available at home elsewhere. We 
zoomed into each subset of moves to better understand the three kinds of arbitrage, articulating 
and illustrating differences among them. We noticed that firms lacked and pursued resources 
early on and opportunities later on, with an interim stage where they focused on their values 
rather than things or actions. We also noticed that the meaning of home was not static, and 
seemed to get updated once firms switched to a different kind of arbitrage. Attributes ubiquitous 
in prior accounts became rarities in subsequent descriptions, while new ones cropped up 
unexpectedly. Switches from positive to negative, then again from negative to positive, attributes 
of home further puzzled us, especially when there had been no sudden changes in the 
environment per se that might warrant such dramatic re-categorizations. We remained unclear, 
however, on whether the meaning of home was a cause or an effect of internationalization. Our 
follow-ups honed in on the relationships between each kind of arbitrage and the meaning of 
home. We came to understand that the relationship was recursive, with one informing the other 
over time. Internationalization often motivated how one categorized one’s home so that multiple 
attributes of home got added or dropped as firms transitioned from one type of arbitrage to 
another. While it is not necessarily productive to claim that one always comes first, let alone 
causes the other, the co-evolution between home context and internationalization recurrent in our 
12 cases suggests that the meaning of home is not a byproduct of exogenous events in as much as 
reconstructed as firms seek and find greener pastures elsewhere.   
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3.3 Findings 
All firms in our study deemed internationalizing essential to the challenge of surviving the 
disruption at home.  
Dione started brand new business concepts aimed exclusively at international markets: “We are 
living in an unstable country. To survive, you need not only to have one leg outside of Lebanon, 
but 15 legs... Opening in other countries in the region, and hopefully outside the region as well, 
gives us this stability and this gives us a way to keep growing and to know that in 10 years we 
can still be here.” Adonis similarly explained: “We were just starting our international markets, 
but we were not as aggressive. When things got bad here, we became more aggressive in 
international markets. What can [we] do? […] We don’t have other choices.” 
Our data suggest that how firms experience political and economic unrest in their home context 
shapes their internationalization. Because instability at home hindered firms’ operations through 
erratic customer behaviour, questioned their plans, and restricted their prospects, firms sought 
out multiple institutional contexts in order to mitigate the progressive deterioration in their 
resources, values, and horizons at home. All firms started with resource-based arbitrage, and all 
tipped from one mechanism to the next sequentially, but only as they were fast approaching the 
limits of their resources, values, or horizons. Once a given limit had been reached, firms recast 
their relationship with their home context by, respectively, recommitting, rescinding, or 
relocating.   
3.3.1 Recommitting 
Firms rapidly and often radically reoriented their internationalization strategy towards other 
institutional contexts in order to leverage assets under-leveraged at home. This resource-centric 
arbitrage was evident through three mechanisms: conserving resources, compensating for lost 
rents, and complementing risk-return. “Conserving resources” is all about salvaging or saving 
critical assets left undamaged but also unused due to the distress at home. “Compensating for lost 
rents” means using these assets in international markets instead. “Complementing risk-return 
ratios” refers to one-sided expansions of a firm’s portfolio of activities abroad by deliberately 
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selecting deployments where remaining critical resources could be put to their most lucrative 
use.  
The assassination of Prime Minister Hariri in 2005 abruptly impacted Ugarit’s home operations 
as the threat level discouraged local clients from going out and tourists from visiting Lebanon. 
Concerned about the impact of the crisis on its employees, Ugarit pursued alternatives in 
international markets that would safeguard their jobs, through franchising in Dubai: “the name 
gives small royalty fees to the mother company. I might be saving half of the salaries from the 
percentages I’m going to get from there.” Among other markets in the Middle East, Dubai also 
came first on all three criteria: some of their employees (their most critical resource) idled by the 
instability at home could be redeployed there at a favorable risk-return ratio. Ugarit had a distinct 
preference for markets like the UAE that were proximate enough to home, so the firm could 
offer temporary job opportunities, and even growth prospects, to their current employees with 
the goal of encouraging those employees to come back to Lebanon once the situation stabilized. 
Kuwait was off the list because it was a too small market. The Saudi market was sufficiently 
large, but Ugarit decided against it because Saudi Arabia was experiencing political instability of 
its own at that time. Ugarit also opted against entering more distant markets such as North 
America because they were worried that once their employees relocated there, they would never 
come back to Lebanon.  
All nine firms resorted to conserving resources, compensating for lost rents, and seeking risk-
return ratios that complemented current activities in order to salvage their operations and sustain 
presence at home. Table 3.2 summarizes our data on recommitting. The more dependent the 
firms were on the domestic market, the more committed they were to safeguarding their 
relationship with the home context. Their internationalization moves merely redeployed their 
existing assets to other institutional environments where they could temporarily generate better 
yields. These surplus rents earned through subsidiaries abroad were channeled right back into the 
home-based operation, treated as a form of “foreign aid” for their struggling headquarters. Even 
when firms experienced unprecedented success in international markets, they still attributed most 
of their success abroad to the advantages that their home country continued to provide. Even as 
operations thinned out to a standstill, most continued to describe Lebanon as “the showcase.” 
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Despite the worsening crisis in Lebanon, firms like Ugarit remained hopeful that the situation 
would soon get better and they could focus back on operations at home. Second-generation firms 
like Nomios even had plans to resell all of their temporary operations abroad so they would be 
able to expand their operations in Lebanon as soon as the situation stabilized. 
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Table 3.2  Recommitting 
 
 Resource-centric Arbitrage  
 Overall 
Rating* 
Conserving  
resources 
Compensating  
for lost rents 
Complementing 
risk-return ratios 
Result 
Definition  
 
Concrete actions that show, 
salvage, or save assets 
deemed critical 
Calculus of rents lost 
at home and sought 
and found elsewhere 
Comparisons of risk-
return ratios across 
different locales 
 
Rationale  
 
Frugality extends the 
lifespan of critical assets, 
allowing firms to use them 
longer 
Fuller use of critical 
assets helps firms slow 
down the involuntary 
erosion of rents 
Finding alternative risk-
return ratios to gain 
greater control over the 
instability  
 
Nomios ++++ 
 
We will give it at least one more 
year. … We went abroad 
because of [our home operation]. 
This is the pilot. How can you 
close it? 
More employees want to 
leave Lebanon than stay. 
When there are a lot of 
people wanting to leave, 
instead of requesting $1 
to go and work in our 
international outlets, they 
would do so for $0.70. … 
We make the salary 
higher for people who are 
willing to stay, and make 
the salary lower for 
people who want to leave. 
 
Our international 
operations are growing on 
their own. We do one 
restaurant that works out 
well and it makes another 
new restaurant. The 
second makes the third. 
We are not injecting 
money as a big 
corporation. 
We don't want to take a 
huge risk outside … if 
Lebanon gets a quiet 
and stable situation … I 
would sell all my 
international operations 
and … even stop 
travelling for business 
purposes.  
Ugarit ++++ 
 
 
If I don’t take care of my 
employees who have been 
working with me for ten years, 
we will go. This is where the 
franchising idea started. … We 
are securing jobs to return. … 
For me, it was another way. 
Because the person who went to 
Dubai or Saudi Arabia as a 
manager will come back to 
Lebanon.  
Look how much smaller 
Lebanon got. … You 
need licensing, branding, 
franchising, you have to 
open abroad. That way, 
you can survive during 
this crisis. An incentive to 
put our feet outside 
Lebanon [and obtain] a 
certain income. 
 
I took a big risk here 
[which Dubai helps offset, 
financially]. I get a small 
percentage as personnel. 
Plus the name gives small 
royalty fees to the mother 
company. I might be 
saving half of the salaries 
from the percentages I’m 
going to get from there. 
We are thinking of the 
coming days and taking 
precautions. If the days 
go right, no one needs 
anything. … Call it 
Lebanization, call it 
what you want, but it’s a 
bond. … We are 
Lebanese and we are 
coming back. 
Cadmus +++ 
 
 
 We were able to make up 
for our drop in Lebanon 
by exporting to other 
markets. 
.  
We export to over 30 
countries now. 
… which 
helped us in maintaining 
our stability in Lebanon. 
Dione ++ 
 
Lebanon for us is like a 
catalogue. Potential partners 
such as investors from Saudi 
Arabia come to Lebanon to look 
at the concept. 
[New concept] was done 
to grow the brand outside 
of Lebanon. From the 
start, we had the vision 
and the manuals ready 
from the first day we 
were working on the 
brand, so we can take it 
international. 
 
There are more restaurants 
closing this year than 
opening. To be able to stay 
here, you need to have 
antennas elsewhere.  
We are very biased for 
Lebanon, and we 
wanted to be in 
Lebanon; but a year like 
this one is carnage for 
the Lebanese market. 
Byblus +  The political instability 
sped up our expansion 
process to abroad. So 
there is a silver lining to 
[the instability]: it 
motivates you to look for 
different alternatives in 
different markets to apply 
your investment and your 
human capital. 
The cost-benefit analysis 
is better for Dubai. Why I 
would invest here put all 
the investment here when I 
would do better in Dubai. 
However, if the situation is 
still stable here and 
growing, then, yeah, I 
would open one more 
branch here. 
Ideally, I would have 
stable a Lebanon with a 
strong economy and 
tourism sector. If that 
were the case, we would 
invest everything to 
make it a better country. 
[He is still hopeful that 
one day he can return to 
a peaceful, stable 
country.] 
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Adonis + 
 
Had a struggle month to month 
to pay the salaries and the rent. I 
would have been gone bankrupt. 
 
When things got bad here, 
we went more aggressive 
in international markets. 
What can I do?  
Part of what happened in 
Syria forced us to go out 
and export. And so the 
business got geared more 
and more towards export. 
That was the straw that 
broke the camel’s back. 
We built the business on 
the understanding that 
Hezbollah might fight 
with Israel again. … It’s 
when the Lebanese 
started shooting at each 
other that it turned to a 
complete dysfunction. 
 
Kothar + Fear of the unknown, of not 
being able to pay the salaries. 
It’s a big responsibility. When 
you have an employee that is not 
paid, what can be worse than 
this? The business fear, … the 
continuity fear. 
We reduced our exposure 
in Lebanon but we still 
have an office there and 
we still have a few outlets 
there. … Why would you 
stick to the idea of taking 
from outside to cover 
losses inside? for what? 
For ego reasons? Bit by 
bit we had to shut down 
because we could not 
sustain our operations. 
We [eventually] shut down 
everything in Lebanon. we 
just have a virtual office 
because we still have some 
staff on our company for 
social security. We still 
have our lawyers. But we 
reduced the costs to, like, 
really nothing and that’s it. 
We’re not investing in 
any new projects for the 
time being but we look 
at this market as a great 
opportunity as soon as 
the consequences of the 
Syrian war are reduced 
and there is more 
stability in Beirut. 
Sydyk + 
 
There were huge losses. The 
factory stopped. When the 
factory stops; the employee has 
nothing to do with, he has to get 
paid. Everything stopped but I’m 
still paying my employees. I 
don’t want to lose them and they 
all have families. … Everyone 
[in Lebanon] is paying half 
salaries now because there is a 
crisis. I found the right formula 
with my team here to be able to 
grow. That is why we are [still] 
paying good salaries.  
We decided to go abroad 
with putting the base here 
in Lebanon and using 
whatever advantages 
Lebanon is still offering. 
If I wanted to hire 
someone like Head of 
Projects in Africa, it will 
cost me 10 times more 
what I pay him in 
Lebanon. In Africa, I 
need to pay his salary, 
accommodation, security 
and other costs.  
We decided to go out [of 
Lebanon]. I didn’t have a 
choice. To survive, I had 
to diversify. … This was 
the only strategy! 
Otherwise, we would have 
closed the whole business 
if we relied on the 
business in Lebanon. … 
As long as I am doing 
great abroad with the base 
and support from Lebanon, 
I will not close down. 
In Lebanon, I will not 
make it bigger, I will 
keep it as is. However, 
if we need to leave the 
country, we will leave 
the country. … I am a 
businessman. As long I 
am not losing money I 
will stay open. The day 
I lose money, I will 
close down. 
Thalassa + You have almost 1,000 
employees and their families. 
You feel this is the driving force 
… What will they do if we close 
the business? 
 We were planning to go 
into Syria, but the war 
escalated there. Now, I’m 
trying to expand into Iran 
and Africa. I have a large 
team working on the 
Africa project. 
 
It is all affection in 
Lebanon because you 
are the local and it is 
your country … Not 
always 1 plus 1 equals 2 
in Lebanon, they make 
minus sometimes … It 
becomes emotional and 
humanitarian. 
 
* To rate the mechanisms, we assigned each case a score of “+” for use of a particular mechanism. We 
added plus signs to denote how prominently that particular mechanism factored in the public and private 
accounts for that case, relative to the eight others we examine in this paper. 
 
# The text in this table is based on personal interviews, and prioritizes the accurate transcription of those 
interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished grammar or 
syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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In this first stage, firms’ internationalization moves were home-bound: firms pursued, and 
justified, foreign entry as a way to capitalize on their strong ties to their home context and make 
ends meet while their home market was on the mend.  
While all firms engaged in at least one of the three resource-centric arbitrage processes, some 
reached the limits of their critical resources a lot sooner than others. Like Ugarit, Adonis initially 
“jumped” to international markets to keep the business running. “Our local market here is a joke” 
and “I had a struggle month to month to pay the salaries and the rent,” Adonis explained. “I had 
no choice,” he added, “I had to go out to compensate for this net loss.” For Adonis, success 
abroad was quick, and the company soon started questioning its ties to Lebanon.  
3.3.2 Rescinding 
As instability at home started to impinge on foundational values, defined as what is right/good or 
wrong/bad for the organization (Gehman, Trevino, & Garud, 2013), firms began questioning 
their long-term commitment to their home country context by engaging in three related forms of 
value-centric arbitrage: dissonance becomes habit; demonizing “the downs”; and de-valorizing 
“the ups.” Dissonance becomes habit captures repeated instances of incommensurability 
between what firms did and the consequences of their actions: the harder they tried, the less 
satisfactory the outcomes. As firms repeatedly tried, but failed, to find the right combinations of 
actions that were good or right for them, they started condemning the negative consequences of 
the increasingly restrictive home context on previously valued aspects of the operation, that is 
demonizing “the downs”. “So we’re working, it’s true that you’re working, but do you want it or 
not? You’re going backwards,” Ugarit explained. When struggling firms caught a break in the 
turbulence and the business picked-up enough to offer them some respite, firms reflected on the 
more and more limited upside of their efforts at home compared with similar efforts elsewhere, 
which we labelled de-valorizing “the ups”. 
The start-up of Byblus coincided with the onset of the political and economic unrest in Lebanon, 
but the founder and his partner were determined to make a go of it. During the war in 2006, they 
had to postpone the opening of the business and take refuge at Muscat. Soonest the war was 
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over, they returned to Lebanon and hosted “a CFP: cease-fire party.” In 2012, the business 
started to struggle due to a ban on tourists visiting Lebanon from the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC). Byblus had just expanded the year before, so it was ready for more—and not less—
business. The set-back rendered the prior investment useless. While the founder was initially 
quite bullish on the prospects of Byblus, he became “more mature and pragmatic”, and 
eventually grew outright pessimistic: “For now, in Lebanon you feel you can’t improve.”   
Table 3.3 illustrates the use of value-centric arbitrage by the nine firms in our study. Whereas 
resource-centric arbitrage prolonged the survival of the firm in Lebanon by preserving the 
significance of the home context throughout any and all internationalization moves, value-centric 
deliberately downplayed the importance of the home context. Recognizing that doing what was 
good and right for their firm was getting them further and further behind at home, as Ugarit 
noted, firms began decoupling their domestic and international strategies. While most still valued 
their survival within Lebanon and did what they could to continue their operations there, they 
gradually refocused on growth elsewhere independently from what they or might accomplish at 
home. As firms straddled multiple contexts, they leaned less and less on their home context. 
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Table 3.3  Rescinding 
 
 Value-centric Arbitrage  
 Overall 
Rating* 
Dissonance becomes 
habit 
Demonizing  
“the downs” 
De-valorizing  
“the ups” 
Result 
Definition  
 
Repeated instances of 
incommensurability 
between actions and their 
consequences 
Damning accounts of 
negative consequences 
that are unwarranted, 
given the investments 
Decrying the 
progressively limited 
upside of intensifying 
efforts  
 
Rationale  
 
Revising what one has 
long deemed worthy 
based on feedback from 
the home context 
Reluctantly coming to 
comprehend how the 
home context severely 
constrains the value of 
previously cherished 
skills and moves  
Adjusting downward 
the value one places on 
previously cherished 
skills and moves, and 
discarding those that no 
longer yield payoffs 
 
 
Dione ++++ 
 
To be able to sustain from a 
business perspective, you 
need some stability, you need 
to be able to make long-term 
plans. [At present] we only 
make plans for next month, 
cannot make plans for next 
year or for five years. 
 
But when something such 
as the July War in 2006 
happens and you get a slap 
on your face.  
 
 
I don't think Lebanon will 
be stable in my lifetime. … 
We looked at conditions at 
home and realized it was 
time to focus outside. 
 
Then, you start to think 
about new plans and 
look at different markets. 
This is exactly what 
happened. 
Byblus ++++ For now, in Lebanon you feel 
you can't improve. When you 
have no help from the 
government you can't do 
anything. … What did these 
governmental institutions 
provide? Heartache! 
Nothing! They do not 
provide anything well for us. 
… It is easier to say what 
they don't provide. … Here 
you are on your own.  
 
There is no end in sight. 
Personally, I don’t see [the 
security situation] getting 
sorted for years. 
 
When you take $1 of 
currency invested plus 1 
unit of risk plus 1 unit of 
time and resources and 
energy and you assess the 
returns from these three 
things together and you do 
the same exercise for a city 
like Dubai, then the 
formula scientifically, 
quantitatively and 
qualitatively makes it a lot 
better to invest your dollar, 
time, know how, and 
energy in a stable economy 
with a yearly growth and 
high spending power. … 
Everyone I knew here is 
over there now. 
I always contemplate 
future turbulence in 
Lebanon. Why would we 
stay? Well, as long as 
our operations are 
profitable, … we stay. 
… However, there is a 
threshold of instability at 
some point, instability is 
going to increase to a 
point where you don't 
achieve your 
[profitability targets]. 
 
Thalassa +++   If I were based in a 
different country that had 
stability, I would definitely 
double the existing 
business. At least. Without 
exaggeration.  
 
Where I can go? I need 
to expand. … I need 
oxygen. There is no 
oxygen here. … 
Adonis +++ I’ve had enough. 42 years of 
worrying over s*** that I had 
no control over … No, no, 
no. I don’t want any more of 
your challenges, thank you 
very much. 
 
If Australia hadn’t come 
along, and if the US didn’t 
come a long, and nothing 
else came along, … would 
still be fighting in Lebanon 
to make it work. 
It is a day to day challenge 
to get things done in this 
country. … It’s too hard 
and it shouldn’t be that 
hard. 
It was inevitable that we 
leave.  
I’m very lucky compared 
to others. 
 
Kothar +++ The stability, whether it is 
political, security, or 
economical, is key for any 
kind of business and 
especially for ours. … The 
So many times you needed 
to shut down the 
operations, close on many 
weekends and many days. 
How you can make money 
The consequences of the 
political instability were 
very adverse to our 
operations. And they were 
the main reason why we 
The biggest pain at the 
end of the day is to 
leave. It is not easy to 
leave your own country, 
but [for us it was] 
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political instability is the 
major factor that made the 
market as it is today [unfit]. 
and how can you progress 
in an environment like 
this? 
are ultimately going 
outside and looking for 
other opportunities in 
different markets. 
 
necessary. 
 
Sydyk +++ I am by nature an optimistic 
person but when it comes to 
Lebanon I am not. I am very 
happy, the business is 
growing, we are getting new 
exciting projects but I cannot 
trust the country anymore 
from the business sense. 
 
The crisis isn’t affecting us 
much now. If nothing 
major happens here, we 
will not close down the 
business fully. It’s more 
cost effective for [us] to 
stay here. However, it is a 
different story if ISIS 
attacks Lebanon. 
In Lebanon, we are on 
survival mode for the 
business. Abroad, we are 
doing amazing. In Lebanon 
we are just breaking even 
and covering our costs. 
The profit is coming from 
abroad. 
All our eggs were in this 
country. … We’ve been 
here for 52 years and we 
were happy. But if I get 
an opportunity to exit, I 
wouldn’t say no. 
 
Cadmus + 
 
During 2006, … all the ports 
were shut due to the war. … 
We were very worried, as if 
we stop importing our 
factory stops production. 
Also, if we stop exporting, 
we lose our sales and 
revenues.  
We started to have a fear, 
as our international 
customers do not wait for 
your production. … The 
supermarket can’t wait for 
your products if you are 
late in fulfilling the order. 
  
Ugarit + 
 
Here in Lebanon we don’t 
have strategic planning. Here 
we have day-to-day, sorry, 
minute-to-minute, second-to-
second planning. Day-to-day 
is too big. … Your problem 
today is you cannot do a five-
year strategic plan when you 
don’t know your second. 
 
We started thinking about 
[going outside] after only 3 
years from opening [in 
Lebanon], because of 
Hariri’s events. If it would 
have continued like this, I 
think I would have stayed 
another year or two years 
before saying “next.” 
We can’t stay here; we 
have to have a foot outside 
Lebanon. Now, outside 
Lebanon is a bit shaky too. 
But compared to Lebanon, 
everything is great. So, this 
is what made us go outside. 
This is my strategy. I 
don’t know if it’s right 
or wrong. … It’s not an 
escape at all. It’s not 
even the right strategy 
for diversification.  
Nomios + I used to be looking forward 
to coming to Lebanon. It 
used to be stars glowing … 
Now I come back indifferent. 
Every year we are going 
backward. You look 
around and see cats and 
mice walking on the streets 
[once buzzing with 
clients]. You become sad 
about the country. … 
There’s no money in 
Lebanon. Let’s put it this 
way. Imagine we only have 
this restaurant. Would we 
have been able to live like 
this? 
In case the business is 
going down and down, I 
would close this 
restaurant in Lebanon 
and we would continue 
outside, but this is 
something I would hate 
to do because Lebanon is 
the foundation of our 
business … so I prefer it 
won't happen. 
* To rate the mechanisms, we assigned each case a score of “+” for use of a particular mechanism. We 
added plus signs to denote how prominently that particular mechanism factored in the public and private 
accounts for that case, relative to the eight others we examine in this paper. 
 
# The text in this table is based on personal interviews, and prioritizes the accurate transcription of those 
interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished grammar or 
syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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3.3.3 Relocating 
Starved of opportunities due to worsening instability in Lebanon, the nine firms not only 
intensified their search for greener pastures but also began separating their past (at home) from 
their future (elsewhere). As prospects for doing business at home became dimmer, firms 
reframed their internationalization moves as ways to “raise their own bar” from what was no 
longer possible at home to what may still be possible elsewhere. Kothar eloquently explained 
this separation: “Until 2011, there was no decision to leave Lebanon at all; there was still a 
decision to expand in Lebanon. We knew the ups and downs. We knew the instability. We were 
trying to live with it. It was challenging, but at the same time, we were hedging our bets by 
opening more businesses. [But] after 2011, with the Syrian crisis, we came to a point where we 
saw the efforts made … and the problems reached a point where it did not make any sense for us 
to continue … having a base there. And we saw that being based in Dubai gives us a much 
bigger [advantage].”  
Among the nine firms in our study, Kothar and Adonis were particularly effective in separating 
the past from the future. They both ended up relocating their headquarters. Other firms, such as 
Dione and Byblus, clearly prioritized their international expansions but did so without fully 
relocating elsewhere. Nomios pursued opportunities within Saudi Arabia and the UAE to make 
up for shortfalls of opportunity at home, but capped international expansion to two or three 
foreign markets, iterating their readiness to cash out of all these subsidiaries once stability 
allowed them to re-focus on Lebanon. 
We identified three types of horizon-centric arbitrage: renouncing goals, removing limits, and 
rebalancing priorities. Renouncing goals refers to letting go context-specific goals that are no 
longer achievable. Removing limits is about recognizing that the limits imposed by the home 
context are not a reflection on the firm, and might be transcended by going outside. Rebalancing 
priorities captures the work firms do to focus away from dimming prospects at home and orient 
themselves towards brighter prospects abroad. Byblus noticed “a negative aura of fear, the 
unknown, and pessimism” in Lebanon and “a positive aura of growth and expansion” in Dubai. 
As illustrated by quotes in Table 3.4, horizon-centric arbitrage enabled some firms to detach 
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from home and relocate elsewhere, even though all relocating firms in our study continued to 
keep at least a symbolic foothold in Lebanon. For example, Sydyk kept a showroom and a 
factory running there, although the local time budget was significantly compressed from 20% to 
5%. 
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Table 3.4  Relocating 
 
 Horizon-centric Arbitrage  
 Overall 
Rating* 
Renouncing  
goals 
Removing 
limits 
Rebalancing 
priorities 
Result 
Definition  
 
Separating goals 
inherently linked with 
the home context from 
broader prospects and 
possibilities  
Taking account of the 
specific ways in which 
a given context might 
be holding back the 
progression  
Refocusing on what is 
possible beyond the 
home context 
 
Rationale  
 
Accepting contextual 
contingencies and how 
they limit where, 
when, and how the 
firm goes or grows 
next 
Transcending the 
constraints imposed by 
any given context, 
including one’s home 
 
Exploring new 
opportunities afforded 
by the choice of 
different contexts  
 
Adonis ++++ [We were] in an 
uncomfortable seat, I saw 
a nice place; I was like 
“enough of this s***.” 
 
It just struck me when I 
went [to Australia] that 
there is an opportunity 
screaming ahead. … I 
have never felt stronger 
about a business plan. As 
an opportunity, I have 
never anything this 
clearly. 
We will break even in 
Australia from day 1 
because I’m that 
confident. I have already 
pre-sold half of my 
capacity. … Australia is 
such a hospitable, friendly 
place and Melbourne is 
wonderfully multicultural. 
I don’t feel homesick at 
all; everything I need is 
here. … It’s such a big 
[beverage] centre that I 
can ask for any ingredient 
on earth, and it’s already 
in stock an hour’s drive 
from me. We can produce 
whatever f***ing 
[beverage] I want and sell 
it. 
 
I want to go and do 
business there that it has 
lots of opportunities. … 
It’s all about 
opportunities in the end. 
I wasn’t looking for 
them. But I was open to 
them.  
 
 
Kothar ++++ We used to be bigger. 
What happened in 
Lebanon made us smaller 
and gave us an incentive 
to leave and be outside. 
We have downsized our 
exposure in Lebanon due 
to political instability 
while increasing and 
overweighting our 
development in the UAE. 
I knew that it was going 
to be Dubai. Because it 
was the showcase – not 
for the Middle East - it 
was a portal to Europe. 
We saw that being based 
in Dubai gives us much 
bigger growth and much 
bigger opportunities. 
 
 
Now the circle is wider, 
now I can say my brands 
are not only known here 
but also among the 
Indians, Russians, and 
Europeans. This is why 
our horizon is now bigger 
when we’re considering 
things like expansion. We 
are thinking about South 
East Asia, Turkey, 
Greece, or maybe going 
back to London and the 
South of France. 
 
The political situation in 
Lebanon forced us to 
move our headquarters 
from Lebanon to Dubai. 
We moved here and 
decided that most of our 
expansion would be in 
the UAE. One of the 
things at the heart of our 
business strategy is not 
to present ourselves as 
Lebanese, but as a Dubai 
group. 
Sydyk ++++ With the project turnover 
we have, the business 
will grow but this is not 
my aim. I aim at focusing 
on Africa.  
 
Africa is a bit dangerous 
but we do not have a 
better option. We cannot 
work in Lebanon 
anymore, nor can we in 
America or Europe. We 
need to aim to third world 
countries. We either need 
to work in the Arab world 
or Africa. 
We’re already in Nigeria 
and opening in Ghana. I 
hope to take all of West 
Africa especially with the 
brands we work with and 
the amazing team I have 
in place. I have a great 
team. I will move all the 
great employees there. … 
We’re on a different scale 
now.  
 
Before 2006, we were 
focusing 100% on 
Lebanon, now we are 
75% outside Lebanon, 
and targeting 95%. 
 
Lebanon is the managing 
office. We want to 
control the whole 
business that is done 
abroad from here. 
Dione +++ Frankly, we were Of course, with this Opening in other We are already in an 
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 thinking about 
[relocation] for 5 years 
before 2008, but when 
things are growing you 
already have lots of work 
in the local Lebanese 
market, you become lazy, 
you get the attitude that 
we are doing fine, why I 
should think about 
something else?  
The start of 
[internationalization] was 
initiated by the War of 
2006 … We need a back-
up plan. 
 
turmoil, the ongoing crisis 
management is difficult to 
handle on a day to day 
basis. We’ve been good at 
it. But I think we are good 
enough now. We should 
stop and try to get to learn 
how to manage in a stable 
situation. I am looking 
forward to opening in 
some countries where we 
are going to be in a more 
stable environment. It is 
going to be a new 
experience for us. 
countries in the region 
and hopefully outside the 
region as well gives us 
this stability. 
unstable country, I prefer 
not to go to the countries 
which are very unstable, 
when we want to extend 
our legs outside, I prefer 
to do in more stable 
countries. Unless, the 
opportunity like in Iraq is 
huge and is worth it 
because Iraq is an 
emerging market. 
 
 
 
 
Byblus +++ 
 
Since 2010, each year has 
been worse than the last. 
By 2012, we already had 
expanded but there 
wasn’t enough business 
to meet our demands.  
[In March of 2012, the 
GCC (Gulf cooperation 
Council) encouraged 
their nationals not to visit 
Lebanon. Byblus was 
forced to close down 
operations catering to 
foreign tourists that were 
no longer coming to 
Lebanon.] 
 
The market is small. You 
could eventually succeed 
but going abroad is 
quicker. 
 
Even though it’s a bit 
risky, you feel the 
investment, you feel the 
purchasing power, you 
feel the business, 
everyone who’s in 
business wants to open up 
there. So if you succeed 
there you’re already 
succeeding in a place 
where the top layers in the 
world are also trying to 
succeed. 
Lebanon will always be 
the creative and 
emotional hub, but when 
we talk business, it is 
abroad.  
 
Thalassa +++ 
 
 Lebanon is more unstable 
than Africa. The simple 
reason why I want to go 
there [instead] is because 
there is something that 
compensates the 
instability. There is 
money. There is income. 
There is a large market. 
While here, there is 
instability and a small 
market. Scarcity and 
complaints and nags. 
 
I am trying to expand into 
Iran and Africa, because 
Iran has potential. It has a 
big market: 70 million 
people. And Africa, I 
think it is the future. 
There is saying by Ali 
Ibn Abi Taleb: Wealth 
converts a strange land 
into homeland and 
poverty turns a native 
place into a strange land. 
 
Cadmus + 
 
We needed an extra 
factory to relieve the 
production pressure on 
the Lebanese facility. We 
had two options, either 
Lebanon or outside. We 
had already bought the 
land in Lebanon … We 
had the war in 2006, so 
we decided that we need 
the factory outside. 
 
When we invested in 
Jordan, we felt relieved, 
as we were not facing the 
problems we face in 
Lebanon, especially 
problems related to 
economic and political 
stability. 
However, today we 
believe that the entire 
Middle East region is not 
stable. Eventually, 
someday, if we keep on 
growing Inshallah, we 
should put our foot 
somewhere in Europe, 
whether Western or 
Eastern Europe, or even 
Cyprus.  
The international trade 
agreements are much 
better in Jordan [than 
Lebanon]. I can sell 
directly to the US from 
Jordan with no added 
customs on my products. 
My agent in the US will 
be very happy when I 
start to export my 
products to him from 
Jordan. 
Ugarit + 
 
When Jeddah closed and 
no one was coming to 
Lebanon … Dubai was 
the nearest place to put 
the name on. I was there 
for another meeting. I had 
this opportunity. I just 
jumped on it. Crazy 
jump.  
 
I’ve chosen from several 
countries. For example, I 
had the option of Riyadh, 
the option of Kuwait, and 
the option of Abu 
Dhabi/Dubai. Riyadh was 
so much money but yet 
too risky in those days. 
Kuwait: small country. 
I chose Dubai. Dubai is 
the hub which has just 
come out of the small 
crash, and I think in three 
years, it won’t have a 
crash, unless they go in 
the bubble again. That is 
my option and that’s the 
card I’m playing. 
We’re not aggressive. 
We are receptive. … For 
me, the best defense is an 
offense. 
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Nomios + The plans are already 
made. What may change 
is how much more effort 
I invest outside of 
Lebanon. [But] we will 
be the last to take the 
Lebanese flag and leave.  
 
Currently [We are] 
focusing more on the 
international operations 
rather than on Lebanon.  
I will expand outside, but 
not more than these two 
countries. … Riyadh and 
Dubai are the only two 
places in the Gulf where it 
is worth the effort to do 
business.  
 
This is why Dubai and 
Riyadh have become 
important to us, because 
all the tourism had been 
hard hit in Lebanon. All 
our problems turned into 
benefits for Dubai. 
* To rate the mechanisms, we assigned each case a score of “+” for use of a particular mechanism. We 
added plus signs to denote how prominently that particular mechanism factored in the public and private 
accounts for that case, relative to the eight others we examine in this paper. 
 
# The text in this table is based on personal interviews, and prioritizes the accurate transcription of those 
interviews (i.e., maintaining the interviewee’s exact words) over the presentation of polished grammar or 
syntax; accordingly, some “errors” may be present in this regard.
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We labelled this third mechanism horizon-centric arbitrage because firms focused on the 
discrepancy in their time horizons between home and host contexts. Kothar looked back: “The 
biggest loss of all is time! Even if you are not losing money, you are losing time. If you have a 
normal situation and you have a prosperous country, you would be growing. [In Lebanon] we 
were not growing, we were regressing. And this [lost] time, no one would give it back to you.” 
Dubai was full of opportunities, and well-worth his time. There, he forged new partnerships that 
fueled further expansion to Southeast Asia and Europe. Today, Kothar introduces the firm as a 
Dubai-based MNC. They no longer look back at Lebanon; Kothar shut down most of its 
operations there, leaving behind only a small representative office with five employees. Rather, 
Kothar looks forward towards new opportunities opening up within and beyond their new base in 
Dubai. 
Dione was among the first firms in Lebanon (and the first among the nine in our sample) to 
recognize the war in 2006 as the beginning of the end. She described it as a “wake-up call.” “We 
looked at conditions at home and realized it was time to focus outside.” Her team worked to 
obtain a master license for Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Witnessing another crisis in 2007, Nahr el-
Bared, the team decided to initiate a new business concept targeting international markets from 
inception, spinning out a born-global venture: “From the start, we had the vision and the manuals 
ready … from the first day we were working on the brand.” Dione targeted countries in the GCC, 
setting a joint venture in Dubai, and eyeing the U.S. market. Its subsidiary in the United States 
soon became a top priority for the team, securing a US$7.4 million investment to enter the 
market. Even though Dione has maintained a token presence in Lebanon until today, she 
completely rebalanced her priorities: “[In] everything that we do, we don’t look at Lebanon as a 
market anymore,” she underscored. 
3.3.4 Contrast Cases 
The three Lebanon-based but not born firms provided us an opportunity to question whether our 
interpretations of the first-stage findings are specific to having Lebanon as a first home of the 
firm. Melkart was established in Saudi Arabia, Astarte in Bahrain, and Medea in Venezuela. Our 
data indicate that the internationalization trajectories were not a function of Lebanon per se, but 
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rather, a function of the relationship of the firm with its context and what it was considered home 
for the firm at the time. Table 3.5 summarizes the data of the contrast cases. 
 
Melkart relocated its headquarters to Lebanon from Saudi Arabia before the unrest started in 
Lebanon. It already had active international subsidiaries in Japan and the Philippines, and there 
were opportunities then in Lebanon for expansion. However, since 2005, the firm experienced 
multiple setbacks in Lebanon but was able to survive by relying on revenues earned in 
international markets. The founder expressed that disruption had escalated in Lebanon and 
affected the business locally multiple times yet, in all these instances, “[the international 
subsidiaries] were helping the survival of the business in Lebanon.” When business was down in 
Lebanon, the team at Melkart could allocate more efforts and attention to expanding in 
international markets. We noted that Melkart was adopting resource arbitrage patterns, replacing 
resources no longer available in this context with alternatives in other contexts, very similar to 
the strong cases we discussed in the “recommitting to home” stage (e.g., Nomios, Ugarit, and 
Cadmus). The main difference is that Melkart already had some of these alternatives in 
international markets, while Cadmus and Ugarit had none before the unrest. Although Lebanon 
was a second home for Melkart, the company was very much attached to its Lebanese base. The 
founder explained, “It is your base … wherever you go and establish, whether Japan, Spain, or 
the United States, … [Lebanon] is your home. It is your country. It is your base. Always, always, 
your reference is your country. Let me give you this scenario: if things got very bad in Lebanon, 
and the business was affected badly, losing money and is draining us … then what would you 
do? That was a question a TV reporter asked me once … You have to close. We would still 
continue working outside Lebanon, but our base would stay in Lebanon. We would stay in 
Lebanon. We would try to find and manage any business here in Lebanon that could be done 
until the situation is stable.” This attachment to this second home, or to what he describes as “the 
base,” was evident in the recommitting trajectory followed by Melkart.  
Both Astarte and Medea illustrate cases of firms that experienced political and economic unrest 
in their first homes (outside Lebanon), and then came to Lebanon. Astarte was founded in 
Bahrain, and during a political upheaval in 2011, the team decided to venture abroad. Astarte 
decided to come to Lebanon because the founder had some personal ties in the country. Within a 
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year of operating in Lebanon, the company experienced the negative repercussions of the Syrian 
war spillover and its two venues were losing money. Straddling Bahrain and Lebanon, and 
comparing the operations between the two countries, the founder explained that Astarte’s 
operation in Bahrain was thriving at that time because the government offered incentives to 
businesses to survive and the unrest was temporary, while in Lebanon there was no support and 
the disruption was recurrent. We identified a value-centric arbitrage pattern at Astarte, similar to 
the rescinding ties internationalization trajectory of Byblus, Dione, and Thalassa. This path was a 
reflection of the progressive displacement relationship between Astarte and Lebanon. The 
founder expressed, “Putting an X on Lebanon … in Bahrain, it is working well. It is the place, 
the reference.” The Lebanese context became less valued for Astarte, as business was struggling 
there and the team was becoming aware of the inequality of opportunities between the two 
contexts.  
Medea is an extreme example. This EMNC was founded in Venezuela, but the recurrent political 
violence and instability in Venezuela pushed the founders to relocate to Lebanon. We identified 
horizon-centric arbitrage patterns in Medea’s case similar to the situations faced by Adonis, 
Kothar, and Sydyk. While Adonis relocated to Australia, Kothar to the UAE, and Sydyk to 
Nigeria, Medea relocated to Lebanon. Medea replaced opportunities no longer available in its 
first home market due to the distress, with alternatives found in Lebanon. Although the founders 
acknowledged the challenges and recurrent disruptions in Lebanon, one of them explained, “We 
decided to come back to Lebanon as things in Venezuela have become very much challenging. 
… We thought that Lebanon, despite what people say … about Lebanon being dangerous, is not 
that risky.” Medea was investing and expanding in Lebanon, though carefully, to leverage long-
term opportunities and take advantage of an eventual influx of consumers when the war in Syria 
is over and the situation is calm in Lebanon. Avoiding danger in Venezuela, Medea left its old 
headquarters and relocated its efforts and senior management team in the relatively better 
perceived circumstances in Lebanon, while trusting the local management team to lead its 
remaining operations there. Medea’s internationalization trajectory reframed the firm’s 
relationship with Venezuela to one of detachment from the first home.  
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Table 3.5  Contrast Cases 
 
 Resource-centric Arbitrage  
Returnees Rationale Conserving 
resources 
Compensating  
for lost rents 
Complementing risk-
return ratios 
Recommitting 
Melkart 
Contrast 
Cadmus 
Nomios 
Ugarit 
 
If you want to go and make a 
base outside Lebanon in the 
US, you should not come 
back or plan to come back.  
No one would succeed in his 
business if he makes its 
location as a second base.  
 
Our main target 
was to establish our 
main office in 
Beirut and to 
conduct our 
distributing and 
supplying 
operations from the 
capital. 
We used to work 
outside Lebanon to 
secure resources to be 
able to bring them 
back and fund 
[Lebanon-based 
venture] and keep it 
alive. 
Because my work went 
down here, you can give 
more time to this other 
business, and put more 
efforts into its activities. 
When you give it more 
time, it will generate 
more revenues. 
Wherever you go and stay, 
whether Japan, Spain, or USA, 
when you say where is home? 
It is your home. It is your 
country. It is your base. 
Always, always, your 
reference is your country.  
 
  Value-centric Arbitrage  
  Dissonance 
becomes habit 
Demonizing  
“the downs” 
De-valorizing  
“the ups” 
Rescinding 
Astarte 
Contrast 
Byblus 
Dione 
Thalassa 
 
I opened in Bahrain because I 
was living there. … I couldn’t 
expand elsewhere before my 
country. It was something 
important. I wanted to work 
with people who speak the 
same language 
 
 
There’s stress that I 
didn’t live in Bahrain. 
Every second there’s 
stress, will I finish the 
month or not? Will I 
manage this month or 
not? These things, I 
didn’t feel in Bahrain 
at all. Plus, there’s 
instability. And it’s not 
just about bombings. 
Even the employees, 
you can’t know it they 
will come or no, you 
can’t know if they are 
fooling you or not. 
In Bahrain there’s 
something called 
“Tamkeen.” When there 
was instability we got 2 
or 3 months of free rent 
[plus subsidized wages]. 
The “Tamkeen” 
compensated the 
businesses that were 
affected by the 
instability. So you had 
someone to lean back 
on [unlike Lebanon]. 
 
 
I blame myself for not 
taking time to see how 
things are working in 
the country. That’s one. 
Another thing is that I 
blame myself because I 
wanted to deal with 
everyone like I did in 
the Gulf. Everyone as in 
customers, employees 
and suppliers and even 
administrative things. I 
think I’m one of the few 
who didn’t lie to the 
NSSF. 
If you can do business in 
Lebanon, you can do 
business anywhere. 
Starting operations in 
Lebanon was more 
complex than what she 
was used to in Bahrain: 
doing business in 
Lebanon was way more 
difficult on multiple 
levels, including the 
relationship with the 
government, suppliers 
and employees and 
implementing 
requirements for tax 
purposes.  
  Horizon-centric Arbitrage  
  Renouncing  
goals 
Removing 
limits 
Rebalancing 
priorities 
Relocation 
Medea 
Contrast 
Adonis 
Kothar 
Sydyk 
 
Many people ask me why 
Lebanon? There is danger in 
Lebanon. … The country has 
been here for 6,000 years, 
would it all collapse during 
our time? If it does, then what 
can I do? 
In Venezuela today, there is 
danger, risk, armed conflict. 
There is kidnapping and I 
don't like to talk about this, 
but this is the truth. … In 
Lebanon, I don't see risks.  
 
The company in 
Venezuela is 60 years 
old. Our employees 
over there are very 
honest and loyal … of 
course the business 
there went down a lot, 
a lot, a lot, but we still 
have some business 
running, and our 
employees are taking 
care of it. 
It is known that the 
strong capital is 
audacious. … Many 
people make a lot of 
business and buy during 
a crisis, so by the time 
things are back to 
stability, those 
businesses have a head-
start. 
I knew that business [in 
Lebanon] is a bit 
challenging. But I never 
thought that you cannot 
do business here. You 
need to know what you 
are doing. Then you can 
invest in Lebanon as 
you would in any other 
country. 
Lebanon is known for its 
turbulent and chaotic 
nature, with politics being 
at the forefront of the 
unstable environment, but 
our project is for the long 
term. We have come back 
to invest our experience 
and wealth in our 
homeland, to benefit its 
economy and people; and 
just as Lebanese excel 
abroad, we want to shine 
in our home country. 
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3.4 A Model Of Institutional Arbitrage By EMNCS 
In prior sections, we sketched the three kinds of institutional arbitrage that emerged from our 
data through which firms in economically and politically adverse environments internationalize 
by replacing resources, values, and opportunities no longer available at home with alternatives in 
other institutional settings. These processes suggest three corresponding propositions: 
 Proposition 1. Firms that engage in resource-centric institutional arbitrage (i.e., 
conserving resources, compensating for lost rents, and seeking risk-return ratios that 
complement their current portfolios of activities) are more likely to approach 
internationalization as a way to recommit to their home contexts. 
 Proposition 2. Firms that engage in value-centric institutional arbitrage (i.e., habituating 
to dissonance, demonizing “the downs,” and de-valorizing “the ups”) are more likely to 
approach internationalization as a way to rescind ties to their home contexts. 
 Proposition 3. Firms that engage in horizon-centric institutional arbitrage (i.e., 
renouncing goals, regretting limits, and rebalancing priorities) are more likely to 
approach internationalization as a way to relocate from their home contexts. 
Taken together, these three kinds of institutional arbitrage demonstrate a continuum of responses 
to distress in the home country context. Rather than considering the decision to stay or leave as a 
one-time choice (Dai et al., 2013; Darendeli & Hill, 2015), EMNCs that internationalize in 
response to distress iterate between their embeddedness within their home context and their 
ambitions abroad. As their ambitions are progressively restricted by adversity, they do not give 
up suddenly or entirely. Instead, they observe and deal with what is missing or inadequate, one 
setback at a time. In contrast to prior studies, which discuss the holistic picture of institutions at 
home or abroad (e.g., Witt & Lewin, 2007), we find that internationalizing firms piece together 
matching pieces—that is, they look for institutional contexts rich in resources to make up the 
shortfall at home, they seek institutional contexts with better aligned values when the ups and 
downs triggered by instability at home become hard to reconcile with their ambitions, and they 
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are more likely to enter distant, even dangerous, contexts the more starved of opportunity they 
become.  
Our findings are also consistent with earlier arguments by Luo and Wang (2012) that arbitrage 
tends to be specialized (i.e., aimed at specific things) rather than generic. Our inductive 
framework adds two novel insights. First, there is a progression from the concrete (resources) to 
the abstract (values and opportunities). In the early stages of internationalization, EMNCs from 
distressed home contexts focus on material hurdles first; if they successfully overcome these 
hurdles, they slow down or even resettle in their home country. It is only when attempts to make 
up for the material discrepancies fall short that they begin to question the alignment in values, 
and whether or not the ties to their homeland are worth the continuous dissonance between what 
they want to accomplish and what is (no longer) possible. Second, there is a temporal sequencing 
in that resource-centric institutional arbitrage occurs quickly, almost immediately, and can be 
dialed up and down as the adversity intensifies. In our first field trip, we were highly sensitive to 
these instantly effective forms of internationalization, which seemed to occur almost overnight 
with hardly any forethought. Some of our informants told us casually they just got on a plane, 
and 10 or so countries later, they were no longer home-bound. In contrast, value-centric 
institutional arbitrage is slow and progressive. Our informants question and debate what they 
value, and how much they value their home context relative to their own survival and success, 
often straddling one or more alternative contexts for years before they contemplate (let alone 
communicate) a willingness to rescind their ties to home. Finally, horizon-centric arbitrage 
comes last—typically, as a last resort. Our informants described it as coming up for air when 
they could no longer breathe, and going after contexts (sometimes even dangerous ones) on a 
whim in a quest for opportunities that would unleash their growth. 
Interestingly, most of the firms we studied engaged in all three kinds of institutional arbitrage, in 
the same sequence. Even those who, eventually, recommitted to their home contexts grappled 
with values and horizons later on, and even those that ultimately relocated elsewhere had earlier 
reasserted their attachment to the home context, acknowledging the influence it continued to 
have on their EMNCs. But while we found evidence of all three kinds of arbitrage across the 12-
year timespan of our longitudinal case studies, there was hardly any evidence of overlap between 
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these three kinds. The well-punctuated transitions from one kind to another became obvious to us 
late in the analysis when we configured geographical moves by each EMNC: the initial pursuit 
of any given new context was motivated by one (not all) of resources, values, or opportunities. 
Only once the firms had begun operating in that context—and were therefore more aware of the 
institutional complexities at play—did they observe whether or not it fit their other needs. In 
summary, this discrete and sequential approach to internationalization suggests that the home 
context influences the emergence of EMNCs in a step-wise fashion. 
 Proposition 4. Firms that face distress in their home context are more likely to emerge as 
EMNCs when they progressively engage in (a) resource-centric, (b) value-centric, and (c) 
horizon-centric institutional arbitrage.  
Further, our analysis points to the key insight that the relationship with the home context and the 
motivation for internationalization co-vary. EMNCs that are recommitting to their home context 
describe internationalization as home–bound: the more they go abroad, the more they want to 
return and resume growth at home. EMNCs that are rescinding ties to their home contexts 
describe internationalization as straddling multiple homes at once, and switching back and forth 
between the two in sync with the ups and downs of their home operations. Last, EMNCs that are 
relocating interpret their internationalization as an invitation to settle into a new home, one that is 
more fitting to their ultimate aspirations, and also offers them well-deserved respite from a long 
and assiduous struggle to survive. While closely interrelated, how the firm interprets the 
relationship with the home context is conceptually different and clearly distinguished in the 
narratives from the internationalization moves and the firm’s motivation. For example, in one of 
our cases, we observed substantial deliberation over values and whether or not to build a second 
factory in another country, despite the fact that the firm already served 30 different markets. In 
another case, we observed repeated recommitment to Lebanon, despite multiple forms of 
business expansions in multiple countries and regions. However, the association between the two 
is almost perfect in our interview data, in that in the vast majority of instances, there is a direct 
attribution drawn between how one frames home and why one internationalizes. Of course, even 
with longitudinal data, the causality underpinning such attribution is hard to determine. It is 
plausible that informants reconstrued their understanding of what home context meant to them as 
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they internationalized. Our questions and probes helped us reveal that, move by move, a firm’s 
relationship with home at that point in time was a very good indication as to which institutional 
context it may go to next, and, in particular, the reasons why it chose to do so.  
To further unpack this changing relationship with the home contexts, we took a closer look at the 
risk-versus-opportunity frames revealed in the narratives. Attention to these frames was triggered 
by the recurrent observation (puzzling to us at first) that most respondents approached danger in 
new contexts (often higher than in Lebanon) with equally reckless abandon—as long as they 
deemed it worth their while due to the presence of resources, values, or opportunities in the new 
context. 
 Proposition 5. EMNCs are more likely to engage in resource-centric institutional 
arbitrage (i.e., conserving resources, compensating for lost rents, and seeking risk-return 
ratios that complement their current portfolios of activities) when they seek to prolong a 
well-defined home advantage and manage “the devil they knew.” 
 Proposition 6. EMNCs are more likely to engage in value-centric institutional arbitrage 
(i.e., habituating to dissonance, demonizing “the downs,” and de-valorizing “the ups”) 
when they are mindful to inequality in opportunity between different potential homes, 
and consider that their many trials at home immunized them to all sorts of other dangers 
that they now felt fit to bear. 
 Proposition 7. EMNCs are more likely to engage in horizon-centric institutional arbitrage 
(i.e., renouncing goals, regretting limits, and rebalancing priorities) when they adopt an 
all-or-nothing frame whereby they had nothing more to lose at home but everything to 
gain elsewhere, and seek to avoid any and all further dangers to the best of their ability. 
We also went back to the data looking for instances where a particular type of institutional 
arbitrage backfired—that is, instances where firms not only failed to reclaim resources, values, or 
opportunities, but ended up worse off for trying. We found that recommitting to the home 
context led to overconfidence in the prospects of stability and repeated deferrals of giving up, 
which, in some cases, added a sense of defeat (getting further behind the harder one tried to hope 
for the best). We also found that rescinding ties with their home contexts made EMNCs more 
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likely to randomize their entries and pursue next chances without much analysis. Further, we 
found home-straddling EMNCs to be prone to taking multiple options at once, hoping that at 
least one would work out. Last, we observed that while relocation was costly, and firms that 
relocated had forgone familiar skills and ways of doing business in the process, there was an 
appreciation of the fact that the new home afforded not just greater stability, but also a fuller set 
and sense of prosperity, making them feel that they are settling in for a better, longer future. 
3.5 Discussion 
We reveal a step-wise pathway of internationalization in response to distress at home. Our three-
stage, sequential framework, shown in Table 3.6, shows that EMNCs arbitrage among home and 
abroad institutional contexts to make up shortfalls in resources, values, or opportunities at home. 
Our propositions inform the growing intersection of home country contexts and 
internationalization by EMNCs (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo & Wang, 2012; 
Ramamurti, 2009). We extend prior literature on the internationalization of firms from emerging 
economies (Bonaglia, Goldstein, & Mathews, 2007; Goldstein, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007) and 
answer calls to study how firms “become” MNCs (Ramamurti, 2012). 
A more fundamental contribution speaks to the rapidly unfolding literature on institutions and 
internationalization, specifically the ways in which institutional contexts are compared and 
contrasted as firms internationalize. Prior literature has only begun to examine which institutions 
matter to firms from specific contexts (like China) (e.g., Luo & Wang, 2012) or to a specific 
multinational ‘giant’ (Luiz et al., 2017), but has not yet explained why different institutional 
arbitrage may matter at different times, nor how attention to specific (even specialized) 
institutions may be predetermined by one’s home country. Instead of taking the country of origin 
for granted, we show how changes in the relationship a firm has/maintains with one homeland 
may radically reorient its internationalization. In addition, we reveal an important silver lining of 
disruption at home, showing that it may hasten internationalization for firms that may not have 
gone global yet, or otherwise. 
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Our work also enriches our understanding of firms’ and MNCs’ relocation (Birkinshaw et al., 
2006; Jenkins, Steen, & Verreyne, 2015; Laamanen et al., 2012; Meyer & Xia, 2012). As firms 
progressed through the three paths, they diminished their ties to home, rather than relinquishing 
them abruptly. Even firms that relocated from their first home did not abandon their homeland; 
they still kept some ties to the first home country through smaller subsidiaries.  
Weak or unstable institutions may encourage internationalization (Luo & Tung, 2007) or 
constrain foreign expansion (Wu & Chen, 2014). We argue that, initially, firms in distress resort 
to internationalization as a potential solution (a means rather than an end), and would follow 
different paths based on the constraints they face at home. Some EMNCs end up going to 
stronger institutions (Witt & Lewin, 2007), while others relocate to weaker institutions (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2012; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008) premised in large part on what is lacking at 
home.  
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Table 3.6  Framework of Institutional Arbitrage by EMNCs from Distressed Home 
Contexts 
When subject to recurrent disruptions in their home country, EMNCs pivot on assets undamaged 
by the crisis by rapidly—and often radically—reorienting their internationalization strategy 
towards institutional contexts where they can leverage these assets. 
Internationalization 
Path 
Recommitting Rescinding Relocating 
Motivation  Home-bound Home-straddling Home-settling 
Relationship with 
Home Context 
Dependency Displacement Detachment 
Opportunity Frame Home advantage Inequality  Anything is better 
than nothing 
Risk Frame The devil you know Immunity to danger Danger avoidance 
    
Institutional 
Arbitrage 
Resource-centric Value-centric Horizon-centric 
Mechanisms Conserving resources 
Compensating for lost rents 
Complementing risk-return 
Dissonance becomes habit 
Demonizing “the downs” 
De-valorizing “the ups” 
Renouncing goals 
Regretting limits 
Rebalancing priorities 
Trade-offs  
& Traps 
Overconfidence 
Deferral leads to defeat 
Randomness of chance 
Failing forward 
Foregoing the familiar 
Settling for better 
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3.5.1 Limitations 
Ours is a single-context study, and despite the historically significant comparison of multiple 
internationalization moves unfolding over time, inductive references are limited to Lebanon. We 
adopted an innovative design by examining three cases of Lebanese-based (but born elsewhere) 
businesses, and replicated the tripartite pattern of findings for these firms. This qualitative 
validation is important on two counts: first, the robustness is reassuring, showing that one’s 
adoptive home can be as influential as the place where a firm was initially born; second, the three 
contrast cases originated in three very different contexts (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Venezuela), 
yet spoke of similar relationships to their adoptive context as Lebanese-born firms, suggesting 
that what a firm identifies as current home is most influential for internationalization. Of course, 
future studies could examine MNCs from different emerging settings with comparative designs 
that privilege heterogeneity over homogeneity in cases. A logical next question would be 
whether different kinds of adversity at home (i.e., political vs. economical, chronic vs. acute, 
etc.) have stronger or longer-lasting effects on EMNCs’ internationalization. 
3.5.2 Contribution to theory 
These limitations notwithstanding, our findings extend theories of institutional arbitrage (Boisot 
& Meyer, 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), by beginning to show a nuanced and cascading series of 
comparisons among institutional contexts. In our study, these comparisons are triggered by 
shortfalls, and are calibrated by simultaneous attention to risk and opportunity differentials. The 
accounts we analyze in this study go significantly beyond the state of the field, which debates 
whether or not singular dimensions or the plurality of institutions (Schneider, Schulze-Bentrop, 
& Paunescu, 2010; Witt & Lewin, 2007) in a given context matter, to reveal that firms orient 
themselves towards different institutional matches depending on what they need the most at a 
given point in time. We complement the current work that focuses on outward FDI as a signal of 
institutional arbitrage (e.g., Luo & Wang, 2012) by delineating different mechanisms of 
institutional arbitrage and their robust progression.  
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We also contribute to research on home country contexts in general (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008; Luo & Wang, 2012; Ramamurti, 2009), and emerging country contexts, more specifically, 
by showing that despite its dire consequences, distress may play a catalytic role in moving 
cohorts of organizations towards greener pastures. We answer calls to pay more attention to 
changes in institutions and environments to understand “the period effects” on the 
internationalization of EMNCs (Ramamurti, 2009), including the initiation and acceleration of 
this process. Yet it is not adversity per se that predetermines where firms will look to go to next, 
nor their reasons for going; if adversity did serve this purpose, the firms in our study would have 
adopted very similar internationalization approaches, or undertaken the same moves simply 
because they were confronted by the exact same events at once. Rather it was the way firms 
reconstrued their own relationship with their home country context that oriented their next 
moves; this is the most revelatory theoretical takeaway of our inductive work. As a firm realized 
that a certain form of institutional arbitrage did not fit its needs anymore, it updated and 
redefined its relationship with one homeland; looking for a new matching of foreign institutional 
environment. This updated relationship of the firm with its home context reoriented the firm to 
the next form of institutional arbitrage.  
We note that institutional escapism (Witt & Lewin, 2007; Yamakwa et al., 2008) and 
institutional arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007) have not been well nuanced. 
We find that institutional arbitrage is triggered by constraints and challenges at home, consistent 
with previous research. However, not all EMNCs are “escaping” their home country when they 
adopt institutional arbitrage. In fact, our findings show that some firms pursue arbitrage (i.e., 
resource-centric arbitrage) to recommit to and save their presence at home. Escapism is also a 
matter of degree, and our data show that a more “dramatic” escape appears only at a later stage 
of institutional arbitrage (i.e., horizon-centric arbitrage), when firms contemplate relocating.   
3.5.3 Contribution to practice 
There has been a steady surge in interest in emerging country contexts, and an unfortunate 
increase in the types of adversity buffeting these contexts. Yet we know relatively little about 
how firms continue operating under chronic or cumulative distress, especially when they are 
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already operating in a restrictive or underdeveloped institutional environment to begin with. 
Attention to how setbacks inform institutional arbitrage is also important, as firms from better-
studied contexts (e.g., China) may also face some type of turbulence. However, these insights are 
even more informative and encouraging for contexts affected by recurrent crises, like 
Afghanistan or Bangladesh (where most wonder how businesses survive at all, let alone 
internationalize).  
Our study suggests that internationalizing moves can be instrumental in prolonging a good life 
for businesses operating in bad settings. Even if some of these moves may not succeed, they 
broaden a firm’s set of capabilities, better preparing it for the next wave of adversity at home or 
the next attempt to escape. Despite the conventional wisdom that firms wishing to 
internationalize must contemplate this move only after they have established a strong and 
successful presence at home, we argue that there are instances when firms need to 
internationalize earlier or faster. Perhaps the most intriguing practical takeaway is that 
institutional arbitrage influences how a firm reconstructs its own relationship with the homeland. 
Firms may recommit (at their peril) to progressively worsening contexts when they construe their 
relationship as one of dependency, while others willingly detach from reasonably good 
circumstances and leave for what they deem greener pastures. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Extant theories of internationalization have predominantly developed based on the following 
assumptions: (1) political or economic turbulence affects the host contexts of firms’ subsidiaries 
more often than the home context of the parent(s), (2) internationalization proceeds and relies on 
a relatively stable home context, and (3) the process of internationalization optimizes the mix of 
foreign markets to help firms attain or sustain a global competitive advantage.  
Our findings challenge and complement these positions by showing how distress in a firm’s 
home context can become a powerful force for the decision to internationalize—or to expand 
much earlier or differently than the firm might have otherwise intended. While economic crises 
and political turbulence can have dire consequences on firms (Oh & Oetzel, 2011), driving some 
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to escape (Stoian & Mohr, 2016), leaving one’s home is hardly an easy (let alone quick or 
automatic) decision. Our findings show that firms facing distress at home engage a complex, 
nuanced, and multi-stage process. They carefully and iteratively compare resources, values, and 
horizons across contexts; as these get depleted at home, they attempt internationalization moves 
to replenish them. When these moves fail, or even backfire, the firms switch to another kind of 
institutional arbitrage. How one relates to worsening conditions at home becomes defining of 
what a firm becomes and systematically patterns its internationalization moves and emergence as 
an EMNC. We offer propositions that flesh out the interdependence between EMNCs’ home 
contexts and their early internationalization, and show an overarching positive insight—that 
adversity at home may drive firms towards greener pastures. 
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Appendix 3.1  Data Overlap and Acronyms 
We examined 12 firms, in total, in Essay #2, seven of which are also analyzed in Essay #1. 
Below are the overlaps and corresponding acronyms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
10 There are discrepancies between the number of employees reported for each venture in the two essays: 
consistent with the respective research questions, Essay #1 includes only domestic employees (or just 
international if the firm had exited Lebanon) while Essay #2 includes all employees (both domestic and 
international).  
Essay #1 
Entrepreneur(s) 
Essay# 2 
Firm 
Domain/Business10 
 
Claude 
 
Sydyk 
Food and beverage (F&B) 
production firm founded in 
1964  
150 employees 
 
Jean + Ralph  
 
 
Kothar 
F&B services firm founded in 
2003 
330 employees  
 
Amer 
Thalassa 
 
F&B services and retail firm 
established in 1999 
500 employees 
 
Maggie 
 
 
Ugarit 
F&B services firm founded in 
2003 
180 employees  
 
Marwan  
 
 
Adonis 
F&B production firm 
established in 2006  
50 employees  
 
Nader  
 
 
Nomios 
F&B services firm founded in 
1960  
730 employees 
 
Zach 
 
 
Byblus 
 
F&B services firm established 
in 2005 
 130 employees 
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Appendix 3.2  Timeline of the Major Political Events in Lebanon11 
                                                 
 
11 Sources: “Gulf countries issue travel warnings for Lebanon,” 2015; “Gulf states warn citizens against Lebanon travel,” 
2013; “Lebanon profile – Timeline,” 2017; Mroueh, 2015; “Timeline: major attacks in Lebanon since 2005,” 2013; 
“Timeline: Tension in Lebanon,” 2014.  
Date 
 
Description of the Event 
1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War 
Feb. 14, 2005 A massive car bomb in Beirut kills Prime Minister Hariri and many others. Immense street protests 
take place as a reaction to the assassination. 
Jun. 2, 2005 Journalist Samir Kassir is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut. 
Jun. 21, 2005 A bomb kills George Hawi, former leader of the Lebanese Communist Party. 
Jul. 12, 2005 Defense minister Elias Murr is among those wounded in a car bomb in Beirut. 
Dec. 12, 2005 An explosion kills Member of Parliament Gebran Tueni. Two other people are also killed. 
Jul. 12, 2006 Israel launches a one-month-long war against Lebanon after Hezbollah captures Israeli soldiers in an 
attack across the border. 
Nov. 21, 2006 Industry Minister Pierre Gemayel is assassinated by gunmen. 
Dec. 1, 2006 A coalition of political parties stages a massive sit-in demonstration in downtown Beirut. A series of 
political protests and sit-ins follows until May 21, 2008. 
May–Sept., 2007 Clashes between Islamist militants and the Lebanese military at the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr 
al-Bared. More than 300 people die. 
Jun. 13, 2007 Member of Parliament Walid Eido is assassinated in a car bomb in Beirut. 
Sept. 19, 2007 Political party lawmaker Antoine Ghanem is assassinated in an explosion. 
Dec. 12, 2007 A car bomb kills General Francois El Hajj. 
Jan. 25, 2008 A bombing kills Internal Security Forces officer Wissam Eid. 
May 7, 2008 Pro-Hezbollah fighters lock down Beirut and clash with people. 
May 8, 2008 Pro-Hezbollah gunmen take over large parts of West Beirut. Gun clashes lead to many casualties. 
Mar. 15, 2011 The Arab Spring reaches Syria. The conflict eventually develops into a civil war in Syria. In 
Lebanon, one coalition of political parties backs Syrian rebels, while the other coalition supports the 
Syrian regime. 
Summer 2012 The Syrian war spills over to Lebanon through violent clashes in Tripoli and Beirut. 
Oct. 19, 2012 Police intelligence chief Wissam al-Hassan is killed along with eight other people in a car bomb. 
Dec. 2012 Violent fights breaks out between supporters and opponents of the Syrian president in Tripoli. 
May 20, 2013 Sectarian violence continues to spill over from the war in Syria. Many fights take place in Tripoli. 
Jun., 2013 The main provider of Lebanon’s tourism revenue, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates—issues a travel warning for 
citizens thinking of visiting Lebanon, as Syria’s civil war is fuelling violence in Lebanon. 
Jul. 9, 2013 A car bomb wounds at least 53 people in Southern Beirut where many support Hezbollah. 
Aug. 15, 2013 A car bomb in Southern Beirut kills 27 people and wounds 336 others. 
Aug. 23, 2013 Two car bombs in Tripoli kill 42 people and wound hundreds. 
Dec. 27, 2013 Mohamad Chatah, Lebanon’s former finance minister is killed with at least five others in a car bomb 
in a central location in Beirut.  
Apr. 2014 The United Nations announces that the number of Syrian refugees registered in Lebanon is over 1 
million.  
May 2014 Lebanon’s President Suleiman ends his term of office, leaving a power vacuum. Several attempts are 
made in parliament over subsequent months to choose a successor. 
Aug. 6, 2014 
 
June, 2016 
Syrian rebels cross to the Lebanese town of Arsal and get involved in clashes. They withdraw after 
being confronted by the military, but take many Lebanese soldiers and police captive. 
Suicide bombers, allegedly Syrians, strike Lebanese village; aggravating already strained relations  
between Lebanese and more than 1 million Syrian refugees in the country.     
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Appendix 3.3 Follow-up Questions - Interview Guide  
 
2016 Follow-up Guide  
The Impact of War and Conflict 
 How does the chronic conflict in Lebanon affect the strategies of the firm? How do you 
adapt? 
 What are the options of the firm when it faces new political turmoil? 
 What resources are the most helpful during distress and why? 
 Can you tell me about the business strategy you followed during Summer 2006 (The War 
between Lebanon and Israel)? 
 What are the objectives of the business in this unstable context? To survive or grow? 
Incentives to Internationalize 
 What were the main motives of the firm when it contemplated to venture into 
international markets?  
 What factors did help the company to internationalize? 
 What were the major barriers for the firm when the management considered 
internationalization?  
Internationalization Behaviors 
 Name and total number of countries the company has international activities with (in 
order, first to last) and year of internationalization. Percentage of total annual sales 
coming from international sales 
 How do you identify and exploit international opportunities? Can you provide me with an 
example? 
 How do you identify your internationalization strategy? Risk-seeking or risk-escaping? 
Why? 
 What are the entry modes that you currently use in the internationalization of the firm? 
 Would your internationalization strategy be different if there is no political instability in 
Lebanon? Why and how? 
General information about the company and the respondent 
 Position of the respondent, years with the company, main duties 
 Number of employees, total annual sales, field of business, year of foundation 
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Closing Questions 
 What would be your suggestion to the Lebanese SMEs that are suffering from the 
local/regional political instability?  
 Do you have anything else you would like to tell me or is there anything I should have 
asked you that I neglected to? 
 
2017 Follow-up Guide  
Overview: Can you recall some of the international moves that made you seriously rethink your 
relationship with Lebanon? 
 
Question 1: Please give us one or two examples of specific international expansion moves that 
made you more (or less) committed to Lebanon as a context for you to do business? How did 
these moves challenge or complement some of the prior meanings you associated with Lebanon 
as home? 
  
Question 2: Please give us one or two examples of specific international expansion moves that 
made you feel there are differences between your own values and what was (or was no longer) 
possible in Lebanon at that time. What values would you have to give up on if you stayed? What 
values would you preserve, or even gain, if you go outside? 
  
Question 3: Was there a specific turning point when you felt like going far away and never 
looking back? If so, did you eventually look back – and what did you rediscover in Lebanon that 
you might have missed or not fully appreciated before? 
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Chapter 4  
4 Time To Say Goodbye: A Systematic Review of What 
Happens before Exit 
 
ABSTRACT 
This essay presents a systematic review of the decisions, actions, and processes that take place 
from the contemplation of an entity’s exit through its execution and implementation to the 
finality or irreversibility of the exit. We review 90 articles that were published in top 
management journals across the literatures in strategy, international business, and 
entrepreneurship over the last 21 years, and elaborate on two dimensions: partiality and 
temporality. The analysis of prior studies draws attention to the importance of further specifying 
the partiality of exit (i.e., what parts of a given entity are being discontinued vs. preserved) as 
well as the temporality (i.e., the timing of terminating the parts). We offer a framework to 
organize the literatures and discuss new avenues for future research. 
131 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Whether, when, and how to exit are all critical questions for any entity (DeTienne, 2010), from 
the smallest entrepreneurial firm to the largest multinational, in good times and in bad. Exit often 
carries negative associations, like failure (Cardon, Stevens, & Potter, 2011), for a given firm 
(Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004) or individual (Shepherd, 2003). Exit can befall even promising and 
ambitious firms (Tornedon & Boddewyn, 1974) and is often costly, traumatic, and embarrassing 
(Wan, Chen, & Yiu, 2015). Exit can even be stigmatizing to oneself (Shepherd, 2003), and 
sometimes, to one’s peers (Durand & Vergne, 2015). The significance of exit lingers long after, 
influencing outcomes from rigidity and retrenchment (McKinley, Latham, & Braun, 2014) to 
rebirth (Walsh & Bartunek, 2011) and to parent companies’ performance (Ioannou, 2013). 
Failure can also carry over to distant future endeavours because it helps individuals make sense 
of, and learn from, their mistakes and setbacks (e.g., Shepherd, Wiklund, & Haynie, 2009; 
Ucbasaran, Shepherd, Lockett, & Lyon, 2013).  
There have been several reviews of organizational failure (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004), 
corporate divestiture, (Moschieri & Mair, 2008) and, more recently, entrepreneurial and small 
business exit (DeTienne & Wennberg, 2014; Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010). 
Taken together, this body of work suggests that decision makers may choose and control, at least 
in part, their exit pathways, deciding on the scope of exit (technology, market, industry, or 
geographic region) (Bowman & Singh, 1993; Decker & Mellewigt, 2007). They also exert some 
agency in determining when to leave (Elfenbein & Knott, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2009).  
Although exit has been studied extensively, it is almost exclusively presented as an event that 
punctuates different stages in the life of an organization (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004) or its 
founder (Holland & Shepherd, 2013). However, focusing on exit as an event overlooks variations 
in what may happen after (Ucbasaran et al., 2013) and what may happen before. 
This paper systematically reviews the exit literatures in strategy, international business, and 
entrepreneurship to understand what happens before a complete exit becomes final and 
irreversible. Because we tackle multiple types and levels of exit across these three literatures, we 
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position this review to examine entity exit. As entities exist and exit at all levels of analysis, this 
review applies to any and every unit—be it of a market, subsidiary, business unit, organization, 
small venture. etc.—insofar as they retain decision and/or behavioural control over their exit. 
Taking an entity-level perspective allows us to include partial definitions of exit as the 
termination of a part of the whole, as well as processual definitions of exit that examine the 
breakdown of a given relationship between a given entity and some other concept, whether 
between a founder and one’s venture, a corporate firm and one of its business units, or a 
multinational enterprise (MNE) and its foreign subsidiary. Our reach is deliberately broad and 
agnostic with respect to what the entity is, partly because we have a much narrower scope of 
studies which reveals what takes place before an exit decision or action, and partly because our 
prior work suggests that both the partiality and the temporality of exit may be independently 
and/or jointly relevant (see Essay #1 for entrepreneurial exit and Essay #2 for headquarters exit). 
Our systematic review starts with the prior that entity exit is decomposable by parts and over 
time. From the literature review, we induce multiple facets and factors underpinning these two 
overarching dimensions (i.e., partiality and temporality). We elaborate on what we know about 
each for entities at different levels of analysis. We then combine the two and reflect on the 
clustering of prior work in each of the four quadrants, with a three-fold intention. First, we 
aggregate previous findings looking for insights in terms of what happens before exit. Second, 
we compare and contrast these insights across disciplines to reveal hidden patterns or surface 
counterfactuals that may deepen our understanding of what comes before an entity undertakes 
the critical decision or action of exit. Last, we are interested in the white spaces – what aspects of 
partiality and temporality (or their intersection) we have not yet explored, and suggest an 
ambitious future research agenda to learn more.  
Understanding exit from this dual perspective—that is, as a set of parts that can recombine into 
old or new wholes, and as a temporally unfolding process—can inform the literature on exit in 
three ways: (1) by shifting attention from an on/off, one-time event to a deliberate undertaking; 
(2) by underscoring that exit is often carefully thought of, planned, and executed long before a 
given decision or action; and (3) by revealing the malleability of the part-whole relationship and 
its importance for whether an exit decision or exit may be observed to begin with.  
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4.2 Definitional Issues and Scope of the Review 
We take a cross-disciplinary approach to comb through as many distinct ways to theorize and 
test exit as possible. However, with this advantage comes the challenge of creating, as a starting 
point, a common strawman definition of what the exit of an entity encompasses.  
In strategic management, business exit has been understood as a restructuring activity involving 
a diversified firm’s divestiture—usually in a form of the sale, in part or totality, of one of its 
subsidiaries, business units, or divisions of a company (Decker & Mellwigt, 2007; Sharma & 
Manikutty, 2005) to adjust its ownership and business portfolio (Brauer, 2006). Firm or business 
exits have been labelled accordingly as divestitures, business exits, or divestments. 
In international business, exit is examined as foreign exit or divestment. It refers to the MNE 
withdrawing from a subsidiary operation (Benito, 1997, 2005; Chung, Lee, Beamish, Southam, 
& Nam, 2013) and it is considered a significant corporate-level decision (Soule, Swaminathan, & 
Tihanyi, 2014). International divestments are quite common and could include a broader 
definition, from pulling out of a market or downsizing foreign operations to switching to lower 
commitment modes of operation (Benito & Welch, 1997; Wan et al., 2015).  
In the entrepreneurship literature, the focus is on the relationship between an individual 
entrepreneur and one’s venture, and on distinguishing between exit and failure. In particular, 
business exit has been understood as an intentional and voluntary exit decided by the owner-
managers (DeTienne, 2010), whereas business failure has been understood as the forced exit of a 
venture when it becomes insolvent and cannot continue under the current ownership and 
management (Shepherd, 2003), or is considered economically and/or subjectively unviable 
(Coad, 2014; Ucbasaran et al., 2013).  
As we want to include as many studies that examine exit as possible in this review, our definition 
is broad but builds on previous definitions. We define entity exit as a discontinuity in the set of 
activities previously understood and undertaken by a given entity (e.g., subsidiary, business unit, 
division, or venture) and/or as stipulated by another entity that is in a direct relation with that 
entity (e.g., the parent organization, owner-manager, or entrepreneur). This definition covers all 
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decisions and/or actions—from partial disengagement, such as any reduction in the activities 
and/or ownership of the firm (Benito & Welch, 1997; Simões, 2005), to total disengagement or 
cessation of business operations (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 2013).  
In this review, we include studies on firm failure because it is a distinct form of exit (Jenkins & 
McKelvie, 2016). Further, in the literature and across disciplines, there is a distinction between 
forms of exit. For example, there are studies of the firm being liquidated, bankrupted, or closed 
on a permanent basis, sold in its entirety, partially divested, or passed on to a different owner 
(Coad, 2014; Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 2015; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). We include all these 
types of entity exit in the review. 
4.3 Review Methodology 
4.3.1 Article Selection Criteria 
We employ a systematic review methodology, as proposed by Tranfield, Denyer, and Smart, 
(2003), similar to reviews published in the Journal of Management (e.g., Keupp & Gassmann, 
2009; Ucbasaran et al., 2013). We selected top management journals in the field of strategy, 
entrepreneurship, and international business. Our intention was not to be exhaustive of all 
articles published, but to assess the most high-quality, well-scrutinized, rigorous research 
produced in the last 21 years (from January 1996 to April 2017). These articles can be 
considered validated knowledge, and are likely to have the highest impact on management 
research (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Bachrach, & Podsakoff, 2005). A summary of each step of our 
methodology, including specific purpose, process used, and outcome, is provided in Table 4.1. 
On the basis of this methodology, a population of 186 articles was retained for review. From our 
initial readings of the 186 articles, we started to become attentive to the temporal nature of the 
exit phenomenon and the partiality of any entity that is in contention for exit (we discuss these 
two dimensions in the next section). However, these dimensions were not very clear in the 
articles, so we decided to focus on these two dimensions and try to develop them in the review. 
We believed that these two dimensions would contribute to our understanding of exit and 
provide the most interesting research questions for moving the literature forward. We then 
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started coding the articles based on the temporal nature before the exit event, and the partial 
nature of exit. We kept only articles that we were able to code for the two dimensions. The final 
population was 90 articles that we reviewed in detail.
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Table 4.1  Summary of Methodological Review Procedures 
Step  
 
Purpose and Process 
 
Outcome 
Step 1: Journal 
selection  
Identify top journals in management including strategy, 
international business, and entrepreneurship fields.  
 
18 high-quality 
journals12  
 
Step 2: Keyword 
generation 
Select search words from our early familiarity with exit 
research. 
 
Check the main articles for keywords used and add them to the 
list.  
 
Identify other synonyms from the thesaurus. 
 
14 keywords: exit, 
failure, mortality, death, 
decline, bankruptcy, 
closure, distress, 
termination, divest*, 
contraction, downsizing, 
demise, discontin* 
Step 3: Keyword 
search 
Perform a comprehensive keyword search of article title, 
abstract, or keywords in journals identified in step 1. 
 
Title search in Business Source Complete database for 
keywords identified in step 2 with ‘review’ in abstract and 
‘business’ in all text, with no limit to journals or dates.  
 
Cumulative total: 2,119 
articles 
Step 4: Identify core 
papers and narrow 
down the pool of 
articles for analysis  
Develop a set of screening criteria (exclusion and inclusion).  
 
Exclude articles if they belonged to one of the following 
categories: (a) the articles examine individual act or choice of 
exit that is not connected to a business organization (e.g., an 
employee or leader exit); (b) the focus was on unambiguous 
exit, so exit leaves no room for interpretation (there is no 
information about what happened before and/or after) and there 
is a lack of agency in the exit; (c) the focus is not on 
organization that is exiting; or (d) the keywords were 
mentioned only in passing. 
 
Having passed the above exclusion criteria, an article had to 
fulfill at least one of the following criteria to be included: (a) it 
examines or describes exit as a process (or part of a process); 
(b) it offers some insights into what happens to the organization 
before and/or after the exit; (c) it offers some discussion on 
how exit is delayed, avoided or prevented; and/or (d) it offers 
some insights on how exit is interpreted.  
 
186 articles retained for 
first review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 5: Code for two 
dimensions  
Keep articles that offer some insights into the temporality 
before exit event and partiality of exit. 
90 articles retained for 
detailed review 
                                                 
 
12 List of journals: “Academy of Management Journal,” “Academy of Management Review,” “Administrative Science 
Quarterly,” “Entrepreneurship Theory And Practice,” “Global Strategy Journal,” “International Small Business 
Journal,” “Journal of International Business Studies,” “Journal of Business Venturing,” “Journal of Management,” 
“Journal of Management Studies,” “Journal of Small Business Management,” “Journal of World Business,” 
“Management Science,” “Organization Science,” “Organization Studies,” “Small Business Economics,” “Strategic 
Entrepreneurship Journal,” “Strategic Management Journal.” 
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4.3.2 Analytical Dimensions 
4.3.2.1 The temporality of exit 
Through multiple iterations across the 90 studies, we came to understand exit as a process that 
unfolds over time and goes through different stages. The exit process starts when a signal of 
change (i.e., trigger) takes place and the decision maker has to respond by contemplating a 
probable exit. Contemplating exit could be a result of a negative event, such as a crisis, disaster, 
or other trigger that puts the organization in distress. In addition, decision makers consider exit 
from their current business when better opportunities arise relative to current ones (Moschieri & 
Mair, 2008). There are many different causes and triggers for exit, but key among all predictors 
are the gaps or lapses in performance (Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2004).  
We realized that the exit process can be reverted, slowed down, or accelerated depending on 
multiple choices of the decision maker, and conditioned by firm and environmental factors (Cefis 
& Marsili, 2011); this is not to say that an exit decision can easily be stopped or transformed, but 
there are many mechanisms and subprocesses that take place before the exit is executed or 
complete. 
We decided to cover research that tackles an entity’s exit from the contemplation of the exit 
through its execution and implementation to the finality or irreversibility of exit. Henceforth, we 
do not review articles that examine the performance of any entity after exit, nor do we cover 
research that focuses on what happens to entrepreneurs after failure or exit (for a review, see 
Ucbasaran et al., 2013).  
We noticed that the exit decision is an important milestone in the overall process. When decision 
makers realize the need to respond to contextual change, they face the dilemma of whether to 
exit an entity or not (Buchholtz, Lubatkin, & O’Neill, 1999). The exit decision is made in 
relation to past decisions and future decisions or outcomes (Shimizu, 2007), and is not 
necessarily a one-time event, but can be part of a decision-making process that is evolving 
(Shapira, 1997). If management decides not to exit at one point in time, the decision still needs to 
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be constantly reevaluated as environmental and organizational contingencies change (Shimizu, 
2007). The exit decision can also be separated conceptually and analytically from the 
organizational decline that often precedes it (Pike, 2005), and from the execution of exit that 
follows after (Moschieri, 2011). For example, there are many organizational contingencies and 
managerial influences that determine when organizations make the decision to exit an entity, 
with some decisions considered early or late (Tangpong, Abebe, & Li, 2015). Moreover, 
managers of publicly listed companies announce the divestiture (i.e., exit) of certain business 
units; however, there is a process that follows the announcement of exit that deals with how and 
when the business unit is divested (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). The announcement of the exit 
decision is considered “not the end of the story” (Fothergill & Guy, 1990; Pike, 2005). We use 
the decision to exit as an anchor point in the exit process to organize the literature and make 
sense of the current research.  
4.3.2.2 The Partiality of Exit 
We further noticed that entity exit does not necessarily mean that the entity will disappear and 
die (Coad, 2014): in many cases death can be prevented (Trahms, Ndofor, & Srimon, 2013) or 
resisted (Erkama & Vaara, 2010). An entity may be partially saved (Damaraju et al., 2015; 
Durand & Vergne, 2015), partially divested (Brauer, 2006; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015), or partially 
disengaged from (Rouse, 2016; Shimizu, 2007). There is also quite a wide spectrum of how exit 
is manifested and a variety of alternatives to entity exit (Brauer, 2006). We decided to focus on 
the different parts or portions of the whole entity that can continue and/or be reconfigured during 
the process of exit. Restricting exit to only those circumstances when a whole entity disappears is 
overly restrictive, and misses out on the wide variety of exit decisions and actions that only 
affect a subset of an entity’s parts or activities (Buchholtz et al., 1999). The partiality dimension 
captures the variety of responses that fall between the polar categories of “business as usual” and 
“complete exit” (Meyer & Thein, 2014). 
Due to limitations in quantitative datasets and/or analytical challenges, most researchers only 
acknowledge these parts in passing (e.g., Mata & Freitas, 2012). Yet as Vidal and Mitchell 
(2015) recently noted, divesting partial units of a firm provides a more fine-grained adaptation 
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than a high-risk full exit. Further, forms or cases of partial exit might logically and pragmatically 
precede further stages of complete divestments (Damaraju et al., 2015). For instance, the 
termination of some manufacturing activities could be a prelude for complete liquidation 
(Simões, 2005). Even when exit involves a single individual like a manager and an entrepreneur, 
the entity engages in several different types of activities, many of which can be escalated or de-
escalated from (McMullen & Kier, 2016) without challenging the continuance of the entity. For 
example, decision makers can de-escalate their commitment to a firm without withdrawing from 
it completely (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006), or they can disengage partially from an 
entrepreneurial venture (Rouse, 2016). A partial abandonment adds flexibility to any exit 
decision and action, but proves especially relevant to entities in transition or distress (Sauer, 
1993). 
4.3.2.3 Framework   
The two analytical dimensions of the exit—temporal and partial—offer complementary insights 
on entity exit. We combine these two dimensions using a 2x2 framework, shown in Figure 4.1. 
As previously discussed, the decision to exit was an important anchor in the literature, and we 
were able to code the articles according to whether they belonged to the “before” or “after” this 
decision took place. We made a further distinction for the partiality axis, distinguishing between 
the objective and subjective aspects or attributes associated with the parts of the whole.  
Many studies, in particular quantitative ones, equate the decision to exit with the event of exit. 
An exit decision could, and should, be separated both conceptually and analytically from both 
any preceding decline (Pike, 2005) and any subsequent event (Moschieri, 2011; Moschieri & 
Mair, 2008). When exit events (that are observable and recorded) are collapsed into the exit 
decisions, scholars underrepresent the spectrum and nature of the exit phenomenon.   
Most scholars look at exit as a unity, as something that either happens or does not happen. Here, 
we argue that exit is partial, and before it becomes final and irreversible, it manifests through 
both objective and subjective considerations (Ocasio, 1995; Shimizu, 2007).  
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Prior research also compresses the two dimensions. For example, we often think of escalation of 
commitment as a temporal process only, especially its persistence characteristic, but it is also a 
partial mechanism. One can escalate commitment objectively by throwing good money after bad, 
and subjectively by being psychologically attached to it. On the other hand, managers de-commit 
to a firm objectively by comparing its performance to the organization portfolio, and subjectively 
by distancing themselves from the firm and de-identifying with its previous decisions (Hayward 
& Shimizu, 2006). One may still move to a decision to exit in relatively quick terms (i.e., 
temporal dimension), but not divest the largest resources (i.e., partial dimension). While 
objective and subjective considerations have not been often or easily separated thus far, we 
rigorously coded and classified studies as one or the other according to the main conceptual 
arguments and/or insights made in the article. This approach helps us reveal distinct ways in 
which decision makers attempt to control the decision or action of exit, as well as which portions 
of the entity are in contention for exit.  
Crossing these two dimensions yields four distinct quadrants. Quadrant I represents research 
before the decision to exit and includes objective considerations for partial exit; Quadrant II 
represents research before the decision to exit and includes subjective considerations; Quadrant 
III represents research after the decision to exit and includes objective considerations; and, 
Quadrant IV represents research after the decision to exit and includes subjective considerations.  
4.3.2.4 Coding Method 
Each article was assigned to one of the quadrants. However, a couple of articles touched 
conceptually on more than one quadrant. Our process involved a set of iterative steps with 
multiple review points and comparisons across the articles. The 90 articles were reread, and we 
identified and coded for different subthemes within each quadrant. We then organized those 
subthemes into more overarching themes. Table 4.2 shows the coding structure. Since scholars 
usually did not explicitly state their assumption of partial exit, we inferred the classification 
based on a set of definitions we developed from our reading of the literature. In the next section, 
we identify the different themes and subprocesses that precede and follow an exit decision, and 
shed light on the repertoire of objective and subjective factors in the partiality of exit.  
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Figure 4.1  Organizing Framework for Research on What Precedes Exit 
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Table 4.2  Coding Structure 
Studies Sub-theme Theme Category 
Belderbos & Zou (2009); Berry 
(2013); Chung et al. (2013); Dai et 
al. (2013); Dai et al. (2016) 
Real options and foreign 
subsidiaries exit  
 
 
 
Real options decision  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before Exit Decision and 
Objective Considerations 
  
Damaraju et al. (2015) Real options in strategic 
divestment alternatives 
Elfenbein et al. (2017) Time to take an exit decision 
– Rational delay  
Berry (2010); Coucke & 
Sleuwaegen (2008) 
 
Operations exit from home 
 
 
 
Exit and relocation decisions (home 
vs. host) 
 
Mata & Freitas (2012); Nummela et 
al. (2016) 
Foreign subsidiaries exit and 
relocation elsewhere  
Figueira-de-Lemos & Hadjikhani 
(2014); Meyer & Thein (2014) 
Sleeping strategy in host 
countries as a mid-way 
between stay and exit 
Boyne & Meier (2009); Davidsson 
& Gordon (2016); McKinley et al. 
(2015); Schmit & Raisch (2013); 
Tangpong et al. (2015); Trahms et 
al. (2013); VanWitteeloostuijn 
(1998) 
 
Organizational decline and 
turnaround  
 
 
 
 
Retrenchment and refocusing 
decisions as turnaround attempts  
Dawley et al. (2002); Mayr et al. 
(2017); Lee et al. (2007) 
Post-bankruptcy turnaround  
Brauer (2006); Decker & Mellewigt 
(2007); Feldman (2013); Lieberman 
et al. (2017); Moschieri & Mair 
(2008); Vidal & Mitchell (2015) 
 
 
Strategic divestitures  
 
 
Divestitures as strategic and 
reorganizing decisions 
Buchholtz et al. (1999); Burgelman 
(1996); Hayward & Shimizu (2006); 
Hsieh et al. (2015); Santangelo & 
Meyer (2011); Shimizu (2007) 
Organizational 
responsiveness to the need to 
exit and  
(de)-commitment decisions 
(objective determinants) 
 
 
 
Decision making: Objective 
considerations 
 DeTienne & Cardon (2012);  
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DeTienne et al. (2008); DeTienne et 
al. (2015); Gimeno et al. (1997); 
Wennberg et al. (2010) 
Entrepreneurs’ threshold of 
performance and intentions to 
exit (objective determinants) 
Hayward & Shimizu (2006); 
Kisfalvi (2000); MacKay & Chia 
(2013); Miller & Chen (2004); 
Pajunen (2008); Shimizu (2007); 
Wennberg et al. (2016)  
 
Organizational level exit 
decisions under uncertainty 
(subjective determinants) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision making: Subjective 
considerations 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before Exit Decision and 
Subjective Considerations 
  
Cater and Schwab (2008); DeTienne 
& Chirico (2013); Feldman et al. 
(2016); Sharma & Manikutty (2005) 
Family firms exit decisions 
(subjective determinants)  
Cardon & Kirk (2015); DeTienne et 
al. (2008); Gimeno et al. (1997); 
Holland & Shepherd (2013); Khelil 
(2016); McMullen & Kier (2016); 
Miller & Sardais (2015); Morgan & 
Sisak (2016); Shepherd et al. (2009); 
Shepherd et al. (2015); Singh et al. 
(2015) 
Entrepreneur’s exit decision, 
persistence and decision 
avoidance 
(subjective determinants) 
Brigham et al. (2007); Collewaert 
(2012); DeTienne (2010) DeTienne 
et al. (2015) 
 
Entrepreneurs’ exit intentions 
and planned strategies 
(subjective determinants) 
Durand & Vergne (2015); Meyer & 
Thein (2014); Soule (2014); Wan et 
al. (2015) 
Exit decision as a signal  
 
Social and peer influences on exit 
decision  
 
Blake & Moschieri (2017); Durand 
& Vergne (2015); Meyer & Thein 
(2014); Soule (2014) 
Peer pressures on exit 
decision 
Balcaen et al. (2012); Damaraju et 
al. (2015); Fortune & Mitchell 
(2012); Lieberman et al. (2017); 
Mata & Portugal (2000) Vidal & 
Mitchell (2015); Zheng et al. (2015) 
 
Forms of exit 
 
Choices of exit modes: Objective 
considerations  
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Elfenbein & Knott (2015); 
Lieberman et al. (2017); Norman et 
al. (2013); Nummela et al. (2016); 
Yamakawa & Cardon (2017) 
 
Speed of exit  
 
 
Time to exit 
 
 
 
After Exit Decision and 
Objective Considerations 
 
Almus (2004); Carreira & Teixeira 
(2011); Moulton et al. (1996) 
Shadow of death as exit 
approaches 
Bergh & Sharp (2015); Burgelman 
(1996); Graebner & Eisenhardt 
(2004); Moschieri (2011) 
 
 
How exit is executed  
Exit implementation and structuring  
Chang (1996); Miller & Yang 
(2016); Nachum & Song (2011) 
 
Exit as part of the firm’s 
trajectory 
 
 
 
Interdependencies of exit moves 
 Brauer & Wiersema (2012); Gaba & 
Terlaak (2013) 
 
Mimic exit moves 
Akther et al. (2016); Dehlen et al. 
(2014); DeTienne & Chirico (2013) 
 
Forms of exit – family 
businesses 
 
 
 
Exit disengagement modes –
subjective considerations  
 
 
 
 
 
After Exit Decision and 
Subjective Considerations 
 
DeTienne (2010); Graebner & 
Eisenhardt (2004); Kammerlander 
(2016); Leroy et al. (2015); Rouse 
(2016) 
 
Forms of exit – 
entrepreneurial ventures 
Erkama & Vaara (2010); Walsh & 
Bartunek (2011) 
Organizational members 
responses to the exit decision  
Resisting the exit 
 
* Please note that some articles overlap between the quadrants. 
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4.4 Review of the Literature  
4.4.1 Quadrant I: Before Exit Decision and Objective Considerations 
In this quadrant, we review the literature that discusses how decision makers grapple with a 
decision to exit, and resort to objective considerations in making the decision. In these studies, 
scholars ask about the decision to exit, rather than when or how the exit is executed. Yet many 
studies operationalize the exit decision as the exit event, compressing the temporal distance 
between exit decision and actual exit execution. In this quadrant, we focus on the real options 
logic because it dominates the objective considerations in making exit decisions. We then 
provide an overview of the literature about exit and relocation, turnaround attempts, divestitures 
as strategic and reorganizing decisions, and the decision-making process.  
4.4.1.1 Real options decision  
A longstanding literature in strategy and international business has addressed the exit decision 
from a real options perspective. Times of war (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2013; 2017), economic 
crises (Belderbos & Zou, 2009; Chung et al., 2013), and environmental instability (Berry, 2013) 
create a dilemma for the MNE as to whether to exit or stay because both actions have costs and 
benefits attached to them. When organizations need to consider exit due to poor performance, 
risk of adversity, or any negative feedback from the environment, evidence shows that they tend 
to delay the decision to exit by considering other alternatives (Buchholtz et al., 1999; Shepherd 
et al., 2015), especially that there are multiple exit barriers that make an exit decision a challenge 
(Decker & Mellewigt, 2007). In contexts of uncertainty, the real options perspective may explain 
many firms’ decisions, as it offers a rationale to wait, delay the exit decision, and remain 
flexible.  
A majority of this literature examines diversified firms operating in different markets locally and 
geographically. Despite macroeconomic adverse conditions, an MNE might decide to wait and 
hold on to a subsidiary if it offers an option value—especially during uncertainty, when current 
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circumstances might change (Belderbos & Zou, 2009). However, adversity and uncertainty in a 
host market might reach a certain threshold when the MNE starts discounting the option value 
because of a substantial increase in the costs of staying, and eventually decides to exit the 
subsidiary (Dai et al., 2017). Firms need to know when to exit in a timely manner (Dai et al., 
2013; 2017), and this is contingent on this option value of keeping the business running in this 
market; for example, the subsidiary would be of high value, even if it is underperforming, when 
it includes hard-to-replace assets (Dai et al., 2017), or has complementary activities and 
operations to those of other sister subsidiaries in the portfolio of the MNE (Berry, 2013; Chung 
et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2017). MNEs with larger portfolios (across different locations) are less 
likely to exit their foreign subsidiaries, and prefer to wait as they can shift activities from one 
subsidiary to another in times of uncertainty (i.e., the MNE has built-in redundancy and 
flexibility in a portfolio of options across those subsidiaries and locations) (Belderbos & Zou, 
2009; Chung et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2017).  
Those decisions are considered rational decisions on partial exits as they affect only a subset of 
subsidiaries in certain markets, out of a larger portfolio of the MNE. Many times, these decisions 
could be made to get rid of subsidiaries that have become a burden on the portfolio. How 
managers assess opportunities and threats plays a role in making these decisions, and sometimes 
an exit decision becomes the only option to avoid catastrophic losses (Dai et al., 2017). 
Damaraju et al. (2015) apply real options rationale to both the decision to exit (Quadrant I) and 
the question of how exit will be executed (i.e., mode; Quadrant II). We discuss this study further 
in Quadrant II, but it is important to note that this research highlights more diversity in exit 
decisions by proposing an additional option: a partial divestment (i.e., spin-off/equity carve-
outs). Partial divestment is a choice that must be counterbalanced to complete divestment, or to 
non-divestment decisions. Nevertheless, the authors find that a decision for a partial exit has less 
real options value than those of not divesting or completely divesting, due to the complexity of 
implementing the partial divestment (Quadrant II) after this decision has been made.  
In this quadrant, we did not find research that empirically investigates the time it takes 
organizations to make an exit decision. The closest study is Elfenbein et al. (2017), in which the 
authors discuss exit delays by conducting an experiment with entrepreneurs/managers with 
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equity stakes and advisors with no stakes. Both groups had to make an “exit or stay” decision 
with an underperforming firm. As expected, decision makers do not make a sudden and prompt 
decision to exit. When decision makers delay an exit decision, due to the uncertainty of future 
outcomes, the authors label this delay as rational delay: it is the option to wait, as in a real option 
logic. However, the authors noted that when entrepreneurs/managers own an equity stake in the 
venture, they tend to take more time than non-owner advisors, over and above a rational delay, to 
make an exit decision; owner-managers need more certainty that the business is unprofitable 
before exiting (Elfenbein et al., 2017). 
4.4.1.2 Exit and relocation decisions (home vs. host) 
Domestic firms face more challenges than foreign firms when making exit decisions as managers 
and owners are more attached to locally based operations, which usually represent older 
businesses or legacy operations (Feldman, 2013). There has been more focus in the international 
business literature to examine exit from a foreign subsidiary, and in strategy literature, focus on 
exit from a market or business unit as one of many in a diversified portfolio of the organization. 
However, there has been little research that examines how multinational or diversified 
organizations consider exiting home-based businesses. One of the few studies of this nature, 
Berry (2010), examines how opportunities in foreign markets (such as lower-cost production and 
new market opportunities) might motivate firms to exit operations from home. Moreover, 
Coucke and Sleuwaegen (2008) looked into the impact of globalization and entry of new 
competitors as threats to local firms that need to respond by considering an exit option. The main 
argument is that domestic firms might need to resort to “partial entity” exit by divesting 
production activities (Berry, 2010) or offshoring (Coucke & Sleuwaegen 2008), and relocate to 
foreign locations.  
These decisions are partial because they do not entail complete exit decisions of an entity, but 
they may be necessary so the parent organization could survive in its own domestic market. Exit 
and relocation became common during the 1997 Asian financial crisis as firms could weather 
challenges they were facing in certain subsidiaries and/or locations (Chung et al., 2013). At the 
same time, when better global market opportunities arise, firms might decide to divest some 
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peripheral businesses of an entity at home to allow more time and attention for new activities in 
other markets (Berry, 2010). This form of partial exit from the home market to reallocate 
resources and relocate into new business in foreign markets has not been well developed in the 
literature, though it is becoming a more common exit phenomenon (Chung et al., 2013; Mata & 
Freitas, 2012). Instead of looking at those exit decisions as uniform, Mata and Freitas (2012) 
acknowledge the diversity in exit decisions, such as multinationals partially exiting their 
operations from Portugal—the focal country of their study—with or without relocation of the 
divested operations elsewhere in the world, and the partial exit of purely domestic firms by 
offshoring their operations abroad. Although, Mata and Freitas (2012) note that these partial 
exits are different from complete exit decisions and have varying implications on the parent 
organization, they are unable to account for these exit decisions empirically.   
Comparing purely domestic firms to foreign firms and to domestic-based multinationals, Mata 
and Freitas (2012) find that MNEs are more flexible to make an exit decision due to the 
footlooseness advantage of “being foreign.” In other words, firms are less emotionally attached 
to their foreign subsidiaries than to their own domestic businesses, especially as those exit 
decisions are made at headquarters rather than at the subsidiary level (Mata & Freitas, 2012). 
MNEs resort to more flexible exit decisions by comparing conditions across different 
subsidiaries in different locations continuously, and then decide whether they should exit a 
certain subsidiary and maybe relocate somewhere else. Often, they move a business from one 
location to another, to an extent where foreign subsidiaries’ presence becomes temporary in 
some locations (Coucke & Sleuwaegen, 2008; Mata & Freitas, 2012). Although foreign firms 
may require longer periods of activity in order to make a decision to exit (due to large entry 
costs), they are still flexible and can make an exit decision more easily than domestic firms, 
especially when environmental conditions change in a host country or elsewhere (Mata & 
Freitas, 2012). Examining international new ventures’ exits from international markets, 
Nummela and colleagues (2016) argue that exit from a market is only a temporary problem for 
MNEs, as they can fall back on revenues from other markets. However, international exit could 
be more severe for international new ventures that have little or no domestic revenues 
(Nummela, Saarenketo, & Loane, 2016).  
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Adding to the diversity of exit decisions, we identified research on exit that postulates that MNEs 
can resort to a middleground exit choice that falls in between the two extreme decisions of 
“business as usual” (i.e., continue) and “full exit: (i.e., complete discontinuation of operations 
and the most radical response to environmental pressures) (Meyer & Thein, 2014). A low-profile 
strategy (Meyer & Thein, 2014) or sleeping strategy (Figueira-de-Lemos & Hadjikhani, 2014) 
provides a more fine-grained response to changes in the foreign macro environment. Low-profile 
strategy is about continuing a presence in a market but reducing commitment and visibility (e.g., 
lower commitment modes, low-profile branding, or serving the market indirectly through 
partners in other locations) (Meyer & Thein, 2014). Further, highlighting the diversity in 
commitment decisions (e.g., divestment, total market exit, or preserving the status quo 
commitment), Figueira-de-Lemos and Hadjikhani (2014) argue that in highly uncertain 
environments, the MNE may become unable to make major decisions regarding an entity exit 
(here, a subsidiary exit) and adopt a sleeping strategy, in which it tends to decrease its tangible 
assets (e.g., production plants, subsidiary ofﬁces, and transportation vehicles) and commit in a 
more intangible way (e.g., personnel, education, advertisement actions, managers’ meetings, or 
relationships inside and outside the ﬁrm) to reassess its current tangible commitments. Low-
profile and sleeping approaches shed light on the aggregated parts of a subsidiary in these 
contexts, and help to explain how a parent MNE can decide to exit some parts of the entity while 
preserving other parts by committing intangibly. 
4.4.1.3 Retrenchment and refocusing decisions as turnaround attempts  
In the context of decline and low performance, there is always reluctance to make the decision to 
exit. In particular, many exit barriers (Decker & Mellewigt, 2007) discourage firms from 
engaging with an exit decision. Decker & Mellewigt (2007) identify three main barriers to 
business exit: structural or economic (e.g., resources, ownership concentration, inertia due to age 
and size); strategic (e.g., relationships with other businesses of the firm); and managerial (e.g., 
information asymmetries or conflicting goals that dissuade management from making a decision 
to exit even though it is justified economically). In the short run, most probably, the management 
will simply decide to continue with an underperforming firm.  
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As firms experience low performance and exit becomes a probable consideration, managers and 
entrepreneurs often resort to failure-avoidance activities. These turnaround attempts can buy the 
organization some time before making the exit decision (in the case of failed attempts), or avoid 
the exit decision altogether (in the case of successful attempts). Turnaround is defined as a 
recovery in performance after a period of organizational failure (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). The 
management literature has examined different causes of decline, as well as various responses, 
firm actions, and outcomes of organizational decline and turnaround (for a review, see Trahms et 
al., 2013).  
Van Witteloostuijn (1998) identifies four responses to organizational decline: immediate exit 
(when profitability falls below zero), turnaround success (firms move from negative to positive 
profits), flight from losses (after a period of losses, the ﬁrm decided to leave the market), and 
chronic failure (negative profits, but firm stays in the market). The scenario of immediate exit is 
a compression of this “before exit” quadrant, as the decision is taken abruptly here once the 
organization perceives the need to respond to the decline. One approach to avoid failure is to 
undertake partial exit by closing some entities or downsizing capacity; however, this approach 
can only work if the entity and capacity are divisible. Otherwise, the firm faces a yes-or-no exit 
decision that can be delayed (i.e., in the long run, a case of chronic failure) or reversed (i.e., in 
the case of turnaround success) (van Witteloostuijn, 1998). 
Turnaround is a sequence of activities to avoid the ultimate decision of a full exit, or what is 
considered as failure (Boyne & Meier, 2009). Trahms et al. (2013) describe strategic and 
operational actions as firm attempts for a turnaround. Strategic actions involve leveraging new 
markets and products, while operational actions include asset and cost retrenchment (Trahms et 
al., 2013). Retrenchment is a reduction in the size and scope of a business by fully or partially 
exiting one or more entities, such as exiting difficult markets, deleting unprofitable product lines, 
selling assets, outsourcing, and downsizing (Boyne & Meier, 2009, p. 843). Retrenchment that 
includes divesting or exiting a certain entity could impact the viability of the organization on a 
corporate level. In other words, a partial exit from one of the markets or one of the subsidiaries 
becomes a solution to avoid a complete exit or collapse of the organization because it helps to 
cut losses and generate resources for better use (Boyne & Meier, 2009). 
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Managerial considerations are important in those decisions. For example, appointing new 
managers will increase the likelihood of a retrenchment decision because they are less attached 
to the business units or subsidiaries of the organization (Boyne & Meier, 2009). Moreover, mid-
level managers can play a role in those decisions, sometimes guiding the top management team 
in exiting certain businesses and markets, and entering new/different ones (Burgelman, 1996). 
Although divesting certain assets and/or exiting entire businesses and markets could help the 
firm to turn around, there are inconsistent findings in the literature about the effectiveness of 
retrenchment (Trahms et al., 2013; Wennberg at al., 2010). Retrenchment is not always helpful 
in addressing the organization’s decline; in fact, it might push the firm to decline further (Boyne 
& Meir, 2009). Divesting assets and exiting markets may signal that the firm is struggling, and 
push it into a downward spiral (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). How effective retrenchment is for 
recovery is contingent on its early adoption as part of a turnaround attempt (Filatotchev & Toms, 
2003; Tangpong et al., 2015). Tangpong et al. (2015) find evidence that early (i.e., within two 
years of decline) market exits and divestments are effective turnaround attempts, while early 
layoffs and late retrenchment have adverse effects. This study shows how the timing of various 
partial exit decisions (e.g., exit from certain markets or layoffs) has a differential impact on the 
organization’s survival. The timing of retrenchment actions (i.e., the “when”—whether they are 
taken early vs. late) is just as important as the type of actions taken in declining ﬁrms (i.e., the 
“what”). Although the study does not examine why and how certain timing has been adopted by 
firms (i.e., why early or late decisions were made), we can assume that organizational 
contingencies and managerial influences should determine this timing decision (Tangpong et al., 
2015; Trahms et al., 2013).  
Other studies show that the most effective turnaround attempts are combinations of both strategic 
change and operational retrenchment (McKinley et al., 2015; Schmitt & Raisch, 2013); however, 
it is not evident whether the integration of both is effective in cases of severe decline. When 
managers need “to stop the bleeding,” they may have fewer resources and attention to invest in 
integrating both approaches (Schmitt & Raisch, 2013) 
Another interesting but underresearched topic is the turnaround of firms after filing for 
bankruptcy. Although bankruptcy represents an indication of a failing ﬁrm and a major step 
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towards organizational death (Moulton & Thomas, 1993), there are studies (albeit few) that 
looked at reorganization and successful turnarounds after filing for bankruptcy (e.g., Dawley, 
Hoffman, & Lamont, 2002; Mayr, Mitter, & Aichmayr, 2017). Bankruptcy could be an 
opportunity for reorganization and a special form of turnaround: “the ultimate turnaround 
challenge” (Dawley et al., 2002).  
Most studies equate bankruptcy with failure or a total exit event. Yet, our conceptual framework 
helps to contextualize these studies in this quadrant (before exit decision), as there are cases 
when organizations file for bankruptcy to buy more time and defer the decision to exit (Lee, 
Peng, & Barney, 2007). Meanwhile, some organizations can reorganize and turn around 
effectively, bouncing back and avoiding an ultimate exit or failure. Lee et al. (2007) argue that 
institutional changes supporting easier reorganization for firms after filing for bankruptcy would 
be conducive to many organizations. Chapter 11 bankruptcy provides an option value for a firm 
to revive and, even in cases of out-of-court settlement bankruptcy, firms may or may not cease, 
based on the outcomes of the negotiations (Lee et al., 2007). 
Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1993) has been used as the common measure to assess a firm’s 
financial health and the likelihood that it will file (or refile) for bankruptcy protection (Dawley et 
al., 2002). Firms with high strategic choice—determined by re-deployable resources—or low 
environmental constraints were able to refocus and benefit from the extra grace period they 
received from filing for bankruptcy, improving their Z-score (Dawley et al., 2002).  
There are a variety of outcomes of firms’ turnaround attempts, but current research does not 
distinguish well among them. The outcomes in increasing order of success are: failure 
(liquidation), reorganization bankruptcy, discounted sale, limping along, recovery, and sharp 
bend recovery (Trahms et al., 2013). Nevertheless, there are scenarios of firms that are able to 
survive and avoid exit despite being economically unviable, outlasting more efficient firms in the 
long run. These organizations have been labelled as “permanently failing organizations” (Meyer 
& Zucker, 1989), “living dead” (Ruhnka, Feldman, & Dean, 1992), “chronic failures” (van 
Witteloostuijn, 1998), and “failure-avoidance organizations” (McGrath, 1999); they are not 
making the decision to exit and are feigning “immortality.” Sometimes, decision makers are 
willing to keep a failing entity alive for non-economic reasons, such as emotional or social ties. 
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They are willing to accept a low level of performance for a long time before even considering an 
exit decision (Gimeno et al., 1997). Some actors try to turn them around, some are not 
successful, and some are not willing to try because they have no pressures to improve the 
organization’s performance. For example, Boyne and Meier (2009) examine public organizations 
that face no competition and are not threatened by more superior rivals. When actions are not 
taken to improve performance, these organizations become “permanent failures” (Meyer & 
Zucker, 1989). Similarly, when firms file for bankruptcy, they are able to postpone their exit 
decision during the reorganization stage, though technically they are bankrupt. However, Lee et 
al. (2007) note that, in the long run, these already-bankrupt organizations’ chances of survival 
are not high.  
4.4.1.4 Divestitures as strategic and reorganizing decisions  
In the previous section, we discussed retrenchment as a form of divestment that is triggered by 
negative feedback from the environment and/or when firms are in distress. Yet it must be noted 
that firms also resort to divestments (or divestitures) for strategic purposes that were triggered by 
better opportunities, rather than distress. Divestment is part of the resource orchestration of an 
organization, a phenomenon that draws upon the conceptual work of resource management 
(Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) and asset orchestration (Helfat et al., 2007; Trahms et al., 2013). 
This stream of research in strategic management examines divestitures (Brauer, 2006) as 
adjustments of the ownership and portfolio of the firm via different forms, such as spin-off, 
equity carve-out, split-up, or unit sell-off. It is the decision for “disposal and sale of assets, 
facilities, product lines, subsidiaries, divisions and business units” (Moschieri & Mair, 2008, p. 
399). Divestiture is considered a tool (one of many) of corporate strategy and restructuring (for a 
review, see: Brauer, 2006; Moschieri & Mair, 2008). This form of exit decision could enable an 
organization to reconfigure resources within the corporate portfolio (Capron, Dussauge, & 
Mitchell, 1998; Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Karim & Mitchell, 2000), leverage better 
opportunities elsewhere (Brauer, 2006), or remove an underperforming firm (Chang, 1996). Poor 
firm performance (and not necessarily a firm in distress) at the business unit and/or parent level 
has been shown to be the strongest predictor of divestiture (Brauer, 2006). Businesses in weak or 
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declining industries are first to be considered for divesting, including legacy firms that have 
become unrelated to other businesses in the portfolio (Feldman, 2013). 
Firms face multiple challenges before, during, and after divestiture (Brauer, 2006), and the 
decision to exit a business unit or subsidiary has been compared to a “divorce” between the 
organization and the exited entity (Brauer, 2006). However, most of the relevant research has 
focused on the antecedents and consequences of divestitures, with very few studies on the 
process of divesting (Brauer, 2006; Moschieri & Mair, 2008).  
Once managers realize the need to divest a firm, they tend to first redeploy internally rather than 
sell or liquidate the firm (Lieberman, Lee, & Folta, 2017). Borrowing from research on the 
resource-based view, scholars show that if the resources of the divested entity are related to the 
organization’s resources, redeploying internally inside the portfolio makes the exit process faster 
due to lower sunk costs, shorter redeployment delays, and a larger portion of the investment 
being recovered (Lieberman et al., 2017). There is also evidence that firms try to reap some 
benefits before abandoning a business, and try to recombine it with other business units as a first 
step towards the exit decision. In this way, the parent organization might be able to extend the 
life of this business and deter its full exit (Karim, 2006; Decker & Mellewigt, 2007). This is a 
form of a partial exit decision in which a firm achieves the goals of an exit decision, but recovers 
some of its investments and stays involved with the divested entity. It is an interesting exit 
decision in that some parts of the relationship between the parent and the entity are kept while 
others are lost. In addition, research shows that longer-tenured CEOs are more emotionally 
attached to their entities and will first try to restructure internally to achieve the performance 
threshold, rather than directly consider a full exit decision (Feldman, 2013).  
Building on resource reconfiguration, Vidal and Mitchell (2015) differentiate between partial and 
full divestiture. Partial divestiture takes place when a portion of the unit, a product line, or a plant 
from an ongoing business unit is sold, liquidated, or spun off. The authors find that partial 
divestiture is particularly common in cases of increasing performance as a proactive 
reconfiguration strategy. On the one hand, divesting partial entities allows a more fine-grained 
adaptation (Montgomery & Thomas, 1988). On the other hand, divesting full entities is a higher-
risk activity, but one that could allow for more immediate and extensive change—especially in 
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cases of low performance (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). The authors also mention other alternatives 
in partial exit decisions, such as the choice to divest smaller entities to fine-tune a growing 
business, whereas divesting larger ones could support declining business.   
4.4.1.5 Decision making – Objective considerations 
The exit decision is a process in itself.  Divesting a business is not an impulsive decision, but it 
unfolds as a series of actions in response to forces that might induce the divesture or discourage 
it (Buchholtz et al., 1999). For instance, Burgelman (1996) shows how middle-level managers at 
IBM contributed to resolving the dilemma that top managers had about whether to exit its core 
dynamic random access memory business. The responsiveness of the organization to the need to 
divest is one of the first steps in considering an exit decision.  
Top managers have to decide how the underperforming entity fits with the corporate portfolio of 
the organization in terms of performance (Hayward and Shimizu, 2006), resources (Feldman, 
2013; Lieberman et al., 2017), and activities (Belderbos & Zou, 2009) before making a decision. 
They also look for cues to justify a decision to continue with an underperforming business 
(Hsieh, Tsai, & Chen, 2015). In the case of undertaking new actions in a location where they 
have performed poorly, MNEs look at their competitors’ performance as cues to justify their 
decision to continue (Hsieh et al., 2015). This study complements previous work that has 
examined the decision to persist irrespective of external cues (e.g., Shimizu. 2007; Hayward & 
Shimizu, 2006). Borrowing from the escalation behaviour and competitive dynamics literatures, 
Hsieh et al. (2015) find that firms are more likely to commit (i.e., stay and continue) if small 
competitors have positive performance and larger competitors have high action volume, whereas 
they become more willing to de-commit to these businesses if larger rivals are incurring losses. 
The study shows that there are rational and objective deliberations of a firm’s escalation 
behaviour to a losing entity, and not always cognitive and personal bias explanations for this 
behaviour.  
On the other hand, Hayward and Shimizu (2006) examine de-commitment and de-escalation of 
commitment, arguing that the two are different constructs. In fact, firms might de-escalate their 
commitment to a losing course of action, but not necessarily de-commit or exit the entity 
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(Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). Furthermore, we interpret the sequences and degrees of these 
decisions in the literature, as CEOs could start with de-escalation and perhaps then move to de-
commitment (or not). This de-commitment to a certain entity could be considered a partial 
decomposition of the exit; then, after de-committing, CEOs can decide to exit or not. In fact, 
when the environment becomes less uncertain, some CEOs might recommit to underperforming 
entities and try to turn them around (Hayward & Shimizu, 2006). 
Adding to the nuances of commitment and de-commitment in exit decisions, Santangelo and 
Meyer (2011) argue that most studies look at exit as a radical form of de-commitment. However, 
there are instances of commitment decreases within an entity’s ongoing operations, such as the 
instances we reviewed earlier and presented as partial exit decisions: low-profile strategy (Meyer 
& Thein, 2014) or partial divestitures (Vidal & Mitchell, 2015).  
Our usual understanding of escalation of commitment is based on the temporal aspect of it, when 
the decision to exit is delayed and firms continue persisting by recommitting to a certain course 
of action. The conceptual framework in our review provides the additional lens of partiality to 
understand that there are both material and rational (i.e., objective) elements and emotional and 
cognitive (i.e., subjective) elements of the escalation of commitment. Escalation of commitment, 
while so often used, has insufficiently been problematized in the literature. An organization can 
escalate its commitment differently in objective terms versus subjective terms. The decision to 
escalate commitment creates the illusion that the firm is not exiting but, in fact, it is incurring 
excessive costs both objectively and subjectively. We discuss the subjective elements in 
Quadrant II, but from objective considerations, reinvestment in the failing entity is a temporary 
buffer against the probability of exit (Wennberg et al., 2010), and firms may objectively decide 
to recommit to a certain course of action (Hsieh et al., 2015).  
At the individual level, some entrepreneurs set their intention to exit the firm before an exit 
decision is required (DeTienne, 2010). In cases of an intended exit path rather than forced 
failure, entrepreneurs would also decide in advance the form of the firm’s exit (DeTienne & 
Cardon, 2012; DeTienne et al., 2015). Exit strategy is the mode through which the entrepreneur 
intends to exit, and is a precursor to the actual exit decision (DeTienne et al., 2015). There are 
multiple exit strategies that allow an entrepreneur to remain involved in the entity, such as one’s 
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high involvement in family business succession) (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). Factors such as 
entrepreneurial experience, industry experience, level of education, and age of the entrepreneur 
inﬂuence the speciﬁc exit path chosen (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). For example, entrepreneurs 
with greater industry experience are more likely to stay involved with the business and keep a 
partial ownership when they intend to sell the entity to employees. DeTienne and Cardon (2012) 
show that exit is more than a dichotomous choice, noting that entrepreneurs have many potential 
exit paths available to them. In this review, we show that exit strategies and intentions are 
actually decided before the exit decision; however, the exit routes (i.e., the actual form of exit) 
belong to our themes in Quadrants III and IV, after the decision to exit has been made. 
In the case of low economic performance, entrepreneurs and owner-managers have variant 
thresholds of performance—reflecting different aspiration levels—and when performance falls 
below a certain threshold, the entity will be dissolved or sold. Particularly in small and new 
ventures, the difference in thresholds could be partially explained by objective factors such as the 
human capital of the owners, their alternative employment opportunities, switching costs to other 
occupations (Gimeno et al., 1997), and personal investment (e.g., time, money and energy) in the 
entity (DeTienne et al., 2008). We discuss the decision to persist and the more subjective 
considerations in greater detail in Quadrant II. 
4.4.1.6 Future research directions  
Although the literature in this quadrant examines the decision to exit, most of the studies (in 
particular, the real option studies) adopt the exit event likelihood as the measure of the decision. 
We argue in this review that “exit decision” and “exit execution” are conceptually different. We 
acknowledge the limitations of the data and the challenges to operationalize the decision to exit, 
but it is important for future research to distinguish between the decision to exit, and its 
execution.  
Real options are fundamentally about whether the organization would decide to exit, but studies 
do not acknowledge that there is a time to decide to exit and a (separate) time to exit. . We 
believe future studies should be careful to distinguish conceptually between the likelihood of exit 
and the speed of exit, and elaborate on their choices in operationalizing exit decision (Quadrant 
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I), exit execution (Quadrant III), speed to make an exit decision (Quadrant I), and speed to exit 
execution (Quadrant III).  
Moreover, we need to differentiate between those who “own the option” (i.e., those who make 
the decision to terminate—in this case, the corporate team at headquarters) and those who “are 
the option” (i.e., those who work in the entity being terminated) (McGrath et al., 2004, p. 96). 
Our Quadrant IV calls attention to the very few studies at the unit level (after the decision), but it 
is important to understand how actors at the unit level engage with the exit before the decision, 
and how they interact with the parent firm during this decision-making process. For example, a 
foreign subsidiary has triple embeddedness—corporate, local, and sectoral (Simões, 2005)—and 
it would be interesting to unpack exit decisions at each of these different levels.  
In addition, there are different causes or triggers of exit decisions, and distinguishing between the 
triggers and the time needed to make exit decisions could be a compelling avenue for future 
research. For instance, organizational decline takes longer than a crisis, and thus, managers have 
more time to react to decline, whereas they need to take immediate action in the case of a crisis 
(McKinley et al., 2014). There is also an opportunity to understand how firms set exit strategies 
in cases of contingency, and how they can design some checkpoints/“stage gates” or assess 
thresholds to exit (Dai et al., 2017; Mata & Freitas, 2012). 
Whenever firms decide not to exit, the literature frames this decision as persistence. We argue 
that a decision not to exit does not necessarily mean effortful persistence, but could be just a 
waiting/“inaction” decision. To persist is an active response, whereas to wait is more passive and 
relates to a delayed action. Further, persistence has different layers. Hsieh et al. (2015) note that 
persistence with a location may or may not imply persistence with the existing strategies in that 
location. Future research that clarifies these issues would contribute significantly to 
exit/persistence decision making.  
Conceptualizing relocation as a partial exit has the potential to contribute to both theories of 
internationalization and firm exit. Some firms decide to relocate assets, subsidiaries, and value 
chain activities of their entities to other locations and leave some of them at home. We need a 
better definition of relocation that reflects the nature of partial exit from home.  
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Moreover, turnaround research should shed more light on successful attempts that saved firms 
after they had filed for bankruptcy. The reorganization of firms after Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
represents a turnaround challenge that has not been well understood. What are the differences 
between the turnaround attempts of firms that have already filed for bankruptcy and those that 
have not?  
4.4.2 Quadrant II: Before Exit Decision and Subjective Considerations  
In this section, we review studies that focus on the subjective elements of how decision makers 
in firms and actors grapple with exit decisions. We begin by examining the decision-making 
process as individuals and organizations contemplate or avoid exit decisions, and then review the 
social influences that impact those decisions.  
4.4.2.1 Decision making – Subjective considerations 
How individuals and organizations make exit decisions has attracted considerable scholarly 
attention among both management (e.g., Gimeno et al., 1997; Shimizu, 2007) and 
entrepreneurship scholars (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2008; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Wennberg et 
al., 2010; Shepherd et al., 2015). Here, we review, in particular, the subjective elements of this 
decision process. We note that the decision to automatically continue with a business does not 
require much deliberation, but when there are changes in the context—whether at the level of the 
environment, firm, or individual—actors start considering whether they want to abandon the 
entity or not (Carver & Scheier, 2013; Holland & Shepherd, 2013). Most scholars examine the 
decision to persist as a mirror image of the decision to exit. The biggest challenge in this area is 
to be able to identify whether persistence represents a rational course of action (Quadrant I), a 
subjective and biased decision, or a character-driven choice (Quadrant II) (Kisfalvi, 2000). 
The decision to exit is often linked to models of decision making under uncertainty and risk (e.g., 
Shimizu, 2007; Wennberg et al., 2016). Studies show that, in times of business distress, how one 
changes attention to survival and aspiration reference points influences risk preferences and 
decision to grow, persist, or exit (Miller & Chen, 2004; Wennberg et al., 2016). For example, as 
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organizations near bankruptcy, they are more willing to take risks (Miller & Chen, 2004), and 
when older, they are more willing to pursue growth to restore performance rather than cut costs 
and consider terminating the venture (Wennberg et al., 2016).  
Shimizu (2007) notes that a combination of the following three factors influences the decision to 
either exit or retain an underperforming business: (1) the individual risk preferences predicted in 
prospect theory, (2) the organizational alternative-seeking behaviour predicted in behavioural 
theory and (3) the individual, group, and organizational defensive tendencies predicted in the 
threat-rigidity thesis. The author argues that negative performance triggers the decision to divest 
the business unit; however, as more losses accumulate, the likelihood of an exit decision tapers 
off because threat-rigidity effects prevail and paralyze the organization. 
Examining the exit decisions of family firms provides insights on many subjective aspects. 
Similar to other organizations, family firms facing organizational crisis tend to avoid exit and 
resort to turnaround practices to preserve the business (Cater & Schwab, 2008). In particular, the 
altruistic motives and long-term orientation of the family members will extend the timeline for 
the firm to be able to implement turnaround strategies. Cater and Schwab (2008) show that 
family businesses are more patient and willing to persist due to these subjective motives to 
preserve the business in the family, and are willing to incur personal sacrifices. However, other 
family characteristics, such as strong ties to the business and emotional attachment, may restrain 
turnaround challenges because family members may hinder those changes (Cater & Schwab, 
2008), leading to extensive inertia (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). Family businesses are willing to 
adopt cost retrenchment but avoid asset retrenchments that involve divesting an entity and/or 
avoid major strategic changes (Trahms et al., 2013). This approach may cause more challenges if 
the turnaround attempt requires a major asset retrenchment or strategic action. Family firms 
controlled by smaller families and based in a more individualistic culture are hypothesized to be 
more efficient in making those retrenchment decisions; hence, they should respond faster to the 
need to divest and/or to turnaround attempts (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005).  
Even when better economic opportunities arise, family firms prefer to preserve legacy and 
maintain their dutiful tasks (e.g., preserving employment to workers and family members), rather 
than exploit these opportunities (Feldman et al., 2016). If a family firm ultimately decides to 
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divest an entity to exploit an economic opportunity, the financial value should be high enough to 
offset the costs of sacrificing the non-economic family considerations (Feldman et al., 2016). 
At the individual level, underperforming entrepreneurial ventures with similar objective 
economic performance react differently due to individual differences among entrepreneurs 
(DeTienne et al., 2008; Gimeno et al., 1997). Personal values and experience with adversity 
(Holland and Shepherd, 2013), motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic) (DeTienne et al., 2008), and 
personal satisfaction (Gimeno et al., 1997) influence the subjective threshold of performance that 
entrepreneurs will accept to continue the business. For example, there are instances when an 
entrepreneur persists with an economically failing firm because it preserves the entrepreneur’s 
social status or acceptance (Khelil, 2016). Empirically, Gimeno et al. (1997) compared firms that 
exited with ones that did not (i.e., exit event) to unravel the predictors of persistence of 
underperforming entrepreneurial firms. To examine individual-level persistence decisions, more 
recent studies resorted to experiments and conjoint studies (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2008; Holland 
& Shepherd, 2013).  
Escalation of commitment has been used as one of the most common theoretical explanations as 
to why entrepreneurs or managers persist (DeTienne et al., 2008; Pajunen, 2008; Shepherd et al., 
2009). Scholars simply argue that the determinants of commitment to a course of action (e.g., 
self-justification, norms for consistency, preference for future uncertain loss over sure loss) offer 
sound explanations as to why actors decide to persist with an underperforming firm rather than 
exit. 
A recent study shows that long before entrepreneurs decide to escalate commitment, they are 
already trapped in a mindset that dissuades them from making an exit decision, even when it is 
needed (McMullen & Kier, 2016). Entrepreneurs are usually focused on seeking opportunities, 
which entices them not to think of exit or plan an exit or contingency strategy (McMullen & 
Kier, 2016). In the event of changing conditions, the mindset of the actor is already focused on, 
and attentive to, how to complete the goal, as opposed to questioning whether the goal should be 
completed/exited. This promotion focus to achieve something delays the realization that one 
needs to exit or stop and, by this time, one is still investing in the venture, in a failing course of 
action. Entrepreneurs may not realize that a decision must be made about whether to persist or 
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not (McMullen & Kier, 2016). McMullen and Kier (2016) note that in lab studies, individuals are 
asked to make a decision, but in the field, individuals may not know that there is a need to make 
a decision.  
We can also borrow more from the literature in cognition to understand how entrepreneurs and 
managers make an exit decision. For example, on the one hand, fear of failure might encourage 
an entrepreneur to adopt failure-avoidance strategies and make more sacrifices (Cater & Schwab, 
2008) to avoid exit. On the other hand, fear of failure can be de-motivating, discouraging 
investment (Morgan & Sisak, 2016) and de-escalating commitment.  
The decision to exit an underperforming business is not necessarily the opposite of an escalation 
of commitment, as often described in the literature. In fact, Hayward and Shimizu (2006) 
investigate how CEOs de-escalate from a certain commitment and then de-commit to a certain 
business. This decision-making process shows how the exit decision is partial. One can first de-
escalate a previous commitment to a certain business endeavour and then de-commit to the 
entity, and possibly—but not necessarily—decide to exit the business.  
The de-commitment to a course of action can take place when one attributes the cause of the 
problem to other managers, and hence de-identifies with this business unit and becomes less 
psychologically attached to it. It is important to note that managers could de-escalate 
commitment to a certain business as a means to correct poor decisions and low performance of 
the firm, and need not withdraw from the business unit entirely (Hayward & Shimuzu, 2006). 
CEOs might choose instead to wait before making an exit decision, because in general, mental 
accounting of individuals is more biased towards escalating commitment rather than de-
committing (Hayward & Shimuzu, 2006). 
Moreover, there are emotional explanations for delaying entrepreneurs’ exit decisions, in 
particular, procrastination and anticipatory grieving (Shepherd et al., 2009). In such cases, the 
entrepreneur is delaying the decision to act, trying not to think about the decision that must be 
taken. A nuanced distinction is important here, because, in this case, it is a matter of “not 
deciding” rather than “deciding to persist”—a distinction that has not been clarified in the extant 
literature. Procrastination is related to the act of avoiding response to an emotional threat, while 
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anticipatory grieving leads to delay as a way to help oneself to emotionally prepare for the 
impending loss (Shepherd et al., 2009) or avoid being stigmatized (Singh et al., 2015). 
It would be helpful for managers and entrepreneurs to have “stage gates” where they can assess 
the performance of the firm progressively and decide whether to continue or not, especially in 
light of changing conditions and new feedback (McMullen & Kier, 2016; Shepherd et al., 2015). 
However, the entrepreneurship literature focuses more on existing exit intentions and strategies 
of entrepreneurs, when the exit is desirable and planned in advance (e.g., DeTienne et al., 2015). 
These exit decisions take place when the business is performing well but the entrepreneur 
decides to exit for non-economic reasons, including personal circumstances (Shepherd et al., 
2015).  
Entrepreneurs have various motivations for exiting the firm. One can decide to exit the firm due 
to lack of fit between one’s decision-making style and the organization’s demands (Brigham et 
al., 2007), or conflict between the entrepreneur and investors (Collewaert, 2012). In these 
instances, entrepreneurs might decide to exit the business (e.g., sell or liquidate) prematurely 
based on a volitional decision that was made ahead of time.  
Further, when exit strategies are set in advance by entrepreneurs, they delineate different planned 
routes to exit. We were particularly interested in partial exit strategies in which entrepreneurs 
(DeTienne et al., 2015) or family business owners (DeTienne & Chirico, 2013) plan to pass on 
the business to family members or employees (i.e., stewardship exit). These planned exit 
strategies reflect the intention of the entrepreneur and/or owner-manager(s) to stay involved to a 
certain degree with the entity, and take care of the firm and/or family continuity (DeTienne & 
Chirico, 2013; DeTienne et al., 2015).  
4.4.2.2 Social and peer influences on exit decision 
Some studies in strategy and international business examine exit decisions in light of subjective 
social influences. When organizations operate in an industry that is stigmatized due to the 
wrongdoing of other firms (Durand & Vergne, 2015), or in a country that faces global social 
movement pressures and global sanctions (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Soule et al., 2014), they need 
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to consider exiting from these markets to signal their disassociation from the industry (Durand & 
Vergne, 2015) or the country (Meyer & Thein, 2014; Soule et al., 2014) and save their 
reputation. Organizations may not have experienced direct adversity or low performance yet in 
these markets, but they decide to exit prematurely to avoid risks. In the context of uncertain 
environments, exit decisions “diffuse” between similar organizations within a particular network 
(Soule et al., 2014). In other instances, an MNE might decide to divest from countries that are in 
the same region or have similar political, economic, and cultural conditions as the host country 
(where the MNE experienced a dispute with the host government that resulted in an exit 
decision) (Blake & Moschieri, 2017). In this case, there is a “contagion” effect among sister 
subsidiaries of the same MNE, but in different markets, where the MNE prefers to exit 
prematurely to circumvent any future challenges (Blake & Moschieri, 2017). It is interesting that 
these exit decisions are made due to “spillover” effects from stigmatized peers (Durand & 
Vergne, 2015), “diffusion” within the network of intergovernmental organizations to which the 
firm belongs (Soule et al., 2014), and “contagion” from other sister subsidiaries in neighbouring 
countries (Blake & Moschieri, 2017). These exit decisions are not considered necessary or 
urgent; however, due to social influences and to prevent future challenges or damage, the 
organizations make these decisions prematurely.  
Moreover, firms do not need to divest all their operations in these markets. In fact, all the exits 
observed from the stigmatized industry were partial exits that were enough to signal (1) the 
dissociation of the firm from the market and (2) that it follows more socially accepted goals 
(Durand & Vergne, 2015). Other firms may resort to partial exit through “low-profile strategy” 
by reducing visibility and commitment but still continuing operations (Meyer & Thein, 2014). In 
other cases, organizations might avoid the exit decision from international markets, as they do 
not want to lose their image or question their identity as an MNE that operates across numerous 
countries (Wan et al., 2015). If needed, organizations might partially decrease their involvement 
in international markets by first divesting smaller entities, units, or subsidiaries that generate less 
positive publicity (Wan et al., 2015).  
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4.4.2.3 Future research directions  
Developing an empirical understanding of the decision to persist remains a challenge for 
researchers. Scholars adopt lab studies and experiments by asking participants to make a 
decision. However, in the field, managers and entrepreneurs are not explicitly asked to make a 
decision (McMullen & Kier, 2016). It is important to understand when actors feel the need to 
make a decision and how they make a decision to persist. Furthermore, the decision making 
changes over time as the decision to exit is not a one-time event: managers and entrepreneurs 
keep on reevaluating environmental changes and organizational contingencies that affect their 
decisions over time. More research is needed to understand how they make those decisions 
longitudinally (e.g., Miller & Sardais, 2015) and why and how they move from a decision to 
persist to a decision to exit, and maybe revert back to a non-exit decision. In addition, it is 
important to examine whether some entrepreneurs rely on effectual decision making (Sarasvathy, 
2001) when they contemplate exit decisions; this is an interesting issue because we would 
assume that if entrepreneurs rely on effectual decision making, they would be faster in making 
the decision to exit. 
It is sometimes hard to distinguish between rational effects and more individual, cognitive, and 
psychological effects in making an exit decision. Future studies that explore these differences 
could be highly valuable, especially when researchers have access to managerial frames of firms 
making divestment decisions (Damaraju et al., 2015).  
As mentioned earlier, we believe that persistence has to be more nuanced than being the opposite 
of a decision to exit. Scholars define persistence as an “effortful action” (Cardon & Kirk, 2015) 
and “repeated efforts in the face of adversity” (Markman et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2007). The 
opposite of a decision to exit is simply “not to exit”, and this could be either a case of a “wait-
and-see” attempt (i.e., preserving the status quo) with no effortful action, or a decision to act and 
persist (i.e., resisting). Future research should discern between persistence and other alternatives 
to the exit decision. 
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There are many mechanisms that revolve around the decision to exit, and there is a need for 
further clarity and differentiation among the reasons to persist, exit, or not make (i.e., delay) a 
decision.  
Moreover, exit can be used as a signal to preserve a certain image or impression of the 
organization (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Wan et al., 2015). Many times, these exits are executed 
partially or temporarily just to pretend or signal something. Future research should better 
articulate these decisions of partial exit that are used to give the appearance of an exit, when in 
fact the firm has not completely exited. At the same time, there might be some decisions that 
give an appearance that the firm has not exited, when in fact it did.  
4.4.3 Quadrant III: After Exit Decision and Objective Considerations  
We believe that the literature, in general, does not distinguish between exit decision and exit 
execution; hence, most studies compress Quadrant III and IV of our review. Yet, we were still 
able to review some articles that focus on what happens once the decision to exit has been made, 
and before the complete exit of the entity. In this section, we discuss studies on exit modes, 
timing, implementation, and structuring, and interdependencies of exit moves.  
4.4.3.1 Choices of exit modes 
The decision to exit encompasses more than a choice between termination and persistence, as 
decision makers have a number of choices on modes of exiting and how to implement the 
process (Shepherd et al., 2015). Even distressed firms that must exit follow a two-stage decision: 
first, either decide to exit voluntarily or be forced into a court-driven exit (e.g., bankruptcy); and 
second, choose to exit—in the case of voluntary exit—either through voluntary liquidation or 
sell-off (Balcaen et al., 2012; Mata and Portugal, 2000). Depending on multiple factors, firms 
would prefer and value a certain route to exit over other forms. However, the common wisdom 
stands that selling the business/entity is a better option than liquidation, and both are better 
options than forced bankruptcy (Balcaen et al., 2012; van Witteloostuijn, 1998; Zheng et al., 
2015). 
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There are also forms/modes of partial exit that ease the exit process. For example, Lieberman et 
al. (2017) show that it is more optimal for organizations to redeploy internally rather than 
liquidate the underperforming entity in the external market, arguing that internal redeployment 
quickens the exit process. By adopting a partial form of exit by redeploying some of the entity’s 
resources internally, an organization incurs lower sunk cost and shorter redeployment delays 
(Lieberman et al., 2017).  
On the other hand, partial exit of a business by selling a portion of it was found to be less 
valuable than full exit when the organization is facing an immediate challenge (Vidal & 
Mitchell, 2015). Vidal and Mitchell (2015) show that partial exit is valuable when the 
organization is trying to leverage new opportunities and the exit is being implemented for 
strategic purposes, freeing resources for future use. The authors argue that a partial divestiture 
needs more attention and time from managers to be able to disintegrate an entity’s operations 
that are up for divestment; hence, partial exits are less valuable in times of immediate challenges 
(Vidal & Mitchell, 2015). Moreover, once an exit decision has been made, a firm could have the 
choice whether to divest larger or smaller entities (Duhaime & Baird, 1987; Vidal & Mitchell, 
2015). 
Damaraju et al. (2015) make the distinction between two forms of partial exit: spin-offs and 
equity carve-outs. Spin-offs take place when the equity in the newly formed entity/firm is 
distributed to the existing firm’s shareholders, whereas equity carve-out happens when the equity 
in the newly formed entity is issued to new shareholders (Brauer, 2006; Damaraju et al., 2015). 
Adopting a real options lens to choose the mode of divestment, the study finds that, in times of 
uncertainty, partial forms of divestment have less real options value than not divesting or 
completely divesting. This work echoes similar findings of Vidal and Mitchell (2015) that partial 
exits are complicated and less valuable in conditions of high uncertainty. The values of spin-offs 
and equity carve-outs lie in being staged divestments, and they could be the first stage of a 
further exit, such as additional spin-off/carve-out, complete exit (e.g., liquidation or sell-off), or 
non-exit (e.g., bringing back the entity/business into the parent company) (Damaraju et al., 
2015). 
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In the case of a distressed business, voluntary liquidation and bankruptcy are two fundamentally 
different exit modes (Balcaen et al., 2012). Bankruptcy is considered a forced form of exit 
(Balcaen et al., 2012); however, in Quadrant I, we showed that bankruptcy could also be 
considered a decision to prolong the longevity of the business while managers try to reorganize. 
In case a company exits voluntarily, it can decide to liquidate piecewise (i.e., when assets are 
sold as individual assets) or sell the entire entity (Balcaen et al., 2012; Zheng et al., 2015). 
Many factors affect a firm’s choice of exit mode. For example, how old the firm is and how 
much it holds in cash and debt will impact whether it would exit through liquidation or sale 
(Balcaen et al., 2012). An entity’s managerial and organizational capabilities influence the 
choice between an acquisition (where managerial capabilities can be saved and transferred) and a 
dissolution (where functional and managerial capabilities are selected out) (Fortune and Mitchell, 
2012). Further, institutional factors affect exit modes. For instance, in countries with weak 
institutions, a sell-off of a distressed entity is a challenging task for the owners because the 
market is underdeveloped for such a transaction (Zheng et al., 2015) 
4.4.3.2 Time to exit 
Recent research examines the time to exit after the decision has been made (Elfenbein & Knott, 
2015; Lieberman et al., 2017; Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017). This emerging body of research 
attempts to understand why some firms are slower to make an exit relative to others, especially 
when the speed of exit might have financial, economic, social, and psychological implications on 
the firm and its managers (Shepherd et al., 2009). 
In examining distressed ventures (Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017) and organizations in industry 
shakeout (Elfenbein & Knott, 2015), studies focus on “time to exit” as a construct to understand 
the time between the exit decision and the exit event of a firm. There are different time delays to 
exit, during which exit is still incomplete, partial, and in the making. Even in a situation of 
distress when exit is impending, how fast the firm exits is still, ultimately, a matter of choice 
(Balcaen et al., 2011; Cefis & Marsili, 2011).  
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Investments made in the entity prior to economic distress influence how fast an entrepreneur will 
exit his/her venture (Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017). Exit delays occur when there are greater 
investments of the entrepreneur’s time and money prior to the point of distress (Yamakawa & 
Cardon, 2017). However, the greater the number of employees, the faster the exit; in this case, 
Yamakawa and Cardon (2017) suggest that entrepreneurs might have to exit this entity early due 
to the larger costs of the salaries they incur.  
Reviewing banks’ exit behaviours, Elfenbein and Knott (2015) distinguish between three types 
of exit delays: rational, organizational, and behavioural. Adopting the Marshallian exit (i.e., the 
point at which expected economic profits from operating the business fall below zero) as a 
reference point, the authors argue that rational delays arise absent of behavioural biases. They 
find evidence of rational delay when firms are uncertain about their true costs relative to others. 
Firms do resort to rational delays to get additional signals about their underlying or future 
profitability. The study also finds evidence of behavioural delays—on top of rational delays—
when biases influence how firms interpret new information and performance signals (e.g., self-
serving attribution and confirmatory biases). A third factor affecting exit speed is organizational 
delay, which concerns agency problems (Jensen, 1993) and how non-owner managers engage in 
self-serving behaviour and delay exit for their own benefit. 
Moreover, the form of exit chosen has implications for how fast the exit process is. Redeploying 
inside the business portfolio (Lieberman et al., 2017), and full (rather than partial) divestiture 
(Damaraju et al., 2015; Vidal & Mitchell, 2015) speed up the exit process.  
Another area of the literature examines the behaviours of firms as they approach exit. The main 
question here is whether there is a “sudden death,” or whether firms exit slowly (Moulton et al., 
1996) as a “shadow of death” (Griliches & Regev, 1995) develops. For example, scholars show 
that downsizing can serve as an adjustment to cut costs and try to save the company in a 
turnaround attempt (Gandolfi & Hansson, 2011; Norman et al., 2013), or to prepare the entity for 
an already-decided exit (Almus, 2004). In fact, laying off employees could be only a 
postponement of the exit event (Coucke & Sleuwaegen, 2008). Carreira and Teixeira (2011) 
support this argument by finding that exit does not happen by a “stroke of misfortune” (Carreira 
& Teixeira 2011, p. 338), and that productivity lowers and employee numbers decrease in the 
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years leading to an exit. There is evidence of the phenomenon of the “shadow of death sneaking 
around the corner,” and it starts approximately three years before exit (Almus, 2004, p. 189). 
We find very few articles that mention “sudden bankruptcy” (e.g., Balcaen et al., 2012), and 
there has been no elaboration on this phenomenon. To sell or liquidate, parent firms have at least 
some partial control of these exits (Balcaen et al., 2012; Leroy et al., 2015). Even in cases of 
distressed ventures/entities, parent organizations are still able to control the time to exit 
(Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017). 
A very promising area of research is the exit of international new ventures (Nummela et al., 
2016) as these firms enter quickly into new markets, but we know less about their exit processes. 
Adopting Benito and Welch’s (1997) definition of exit from international markets, Nummela et 
al. (2016) show the diversity in the exit pathways of international new ventures as some firms 
partially exit from markets and stay involved in international operations, but in different forms of 
entities, while others completely withdraw. The exit process is multi-staged (Pauwels & 
Matthyssens, 1999) and can evolve slowly or rapidly (Nummela et al., 2016). Firms might 
slowly exit international markets by gradually decreasing their involvement and reducing market 
spread or switching their operation modes (Benito & Welch, 1997). 
4.4.3.3 Exit implementation and structuring 
One aspect of the exit process is how exit is implemented and structured after the decision has 
been made (Moschieri & Mair, 2008). In particular, the divestiture process in strategy could be 
complicated and lengthy because there are multiple parties involved (Bergh & Sharp, 2015) and 
the implementation process can impact the performance of the divested entity (Moschieri, 2011).  
Burgelman (1996) is one of the early/few studies that looks at exit as a process, starting from the 
dilemma of the decision to the implementation of the exit; it is a study that exit researchers 
always cite as a template for future research to understand the richness of the exit process. 
Burgelman (1996) shows that exit is a process that evolves continuously within the organization 
and is less centrally driven. Middle-level managers play a role not only in shaping the decision of 
the top management team about the exit decision, but also in implementing the exit and making 
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other choices, such as resource allocation and reallocation (Burgelman, 1996). Resources and 
managerial actions both play a role in shaping an exit process (Burgelman, 1996). Bergh and 
Sharp (2015) add to those factors the role of outside blockholders in pressuring the organization 
to exit underperforming businesses and influencing the process by shaping the exit mode. 
Drawing from agency theory, the authors find that outside blockholders with larger shares in the 
business unit can exercise their self-interest over managers. 
Investigating the divestitures of underperforming and well-performing business units within a 
corporate portfolio, Moschieri (2011) finds that how the divestiture is implemented and 
structured—and especially, how top managers frame this exit—will impact the performance of 
the divested unit. When unit managers understand the reason for exit as a sense of opportunity, 
and have a perception that they can manage the divested unit once it is independent, they tend to 
perform better. In cases of exiting through a sell-off, the relationship between the seller and 
buyer is critical for the success of the process (Grabener & Eisenhardt, 2004). Grabener and 
Eisenhardt (2004) note that a sell-off from a seller perspective, or acquisition from a buyer 
perspective, is a courtship and a process of mutual agreement between both parties. There are 
timing, strategic, and emotional factors in this process, and organizations selling their entities 
look for an ideal fit in terms of organizational rapport and combination potential of the buyer 
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). In the case of an involuntary exit, Moschieri (2011) notes that 
the process would be different, but does not investigate this case. 
As we previously covered, there are different forms of exit and many of these are partial rather 
than complete exit. Looking at Moschieri’s (2011) case studies of divestitures, we notice that 
they are all partial in a way. In most cases, the parent firm kept shares and relationships with the 
divested unit. This study demonstrates that our efforts to better elucidate the partiality of exit are 
crucial, as the phenomenon is more common than may be expected.  
The duration of the divesting operation in Moschieri’s (2011) study took between six and 18 
months. The pace of exit and retrenchment, whether it unfolds slowly (i.e., over an extended 
period of time) or quickly (i.e., in a more compressed manner) could have an effect on the 
performance of the organization (Tangpong et al., 2015).  
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4.4.3.4 Interdependencies of exit moves 
A stream of research examines exit actions of firms as part of their evolution and/or strategic 
trajectory (Nachum & Song, 2011)—in particular, relative to their entry actions (Chang, 1996; 
Mata & Portugal, 2000; Miller & Yang, 2016). Organizations with multiple firms in their 
portfolios enter markets as expansion, and exit as contraction, to maintain a healthy portfolio as 
part of the diversification and refocusing process (Chang, 1996; Miller & Yang, 2016). Exit and 
entry are considered alternative moves that shape the portfolio of a firm in opposing directions 
(Benito, 1997). In these cases, exit becomes a partial behaviour within the overall portfolio of the 
organization as it adjusts the fit among the different firms and markets where it operates 
(Nachum & Song, 2011).  
There is a sequence between entry and exit when organizations enter businesses of similar 
resource profiles and are more likely to divest lines of business of different profiles (Chang, 
1996; Miller & Yang, 2016), with both sometimes occurring within one year (Miller & Yang, 
2016). There is also evidence that how the firm entered the market or business (i.e., entry mode) 
affects how it exits (i.e., exit mode) (Mata & Portugal, 2000).  
Furthermore  firms might imitate the exit moves of their competitors when they have limited 
information on which markets to exit, as well as when and how (Brauer & Wiersema, 2012; 
Gaba & Terlaak, 2013). Gaba and Terlaak (2013) investigate the effects of different 
environmental uncertainties on mimic exit behaviours. Using herding models, the authors find 
more nuances to the common belief that uncertainty increases imitation: they find results that 
uncertainty fosters imitation only when it is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm. In contrast, uncertainties 
that are common to all ﬁrms actually reduce reliance on observational learning.  
If we compare this study to Hsieh et al. (2015) in Quadrant I, we can distinguish between two 
forms of imitation in exit based on objective consideration. Gaba and Terlaak’s (2013) study 
shows that an organization’s exit moves are an imitation of competitors’ moves to reduce 
uncertainty. However, Hsieh et al. (2015) show that organizations use cues from others (e.g., 
turnover and sales indicators) to justify their own decisions of escalating commitments and avoid 
an exit decision (i.e., before the decision to exit).  
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Further, in Gaba and Terlaak’s (2013) study, exit moves are based on objective considerations 
where exit may not be necessary but organizations imitate peers and prematurely exit similar 
markets. In contrast, studies in Quadrant II (Blake & Moschieri, 2017; Durand & Vergne, 2015; 
Soule et al., 2014) show that social and peer pressures motivate organizations to contemplate exit 
quickly so they can prevent an impending failure.  
The framework of our review helps us to discriminate between seemingly similar exit 
behaviours, such as “mimic exits,” that have different explanations. Quadrant I sheds light on 
imitation as a mechanism to justify objectively a decision to persist (Hsieh et al., 2015), with 
Quadrant II showing mimic pressures as a mechanism for a subjective decision to exit quickly 
and avoid an impending catastrophe (Durand & Vergne, 2015; Soule et al., 2014). While, 
Quadrant III presents imitation as an automatic objective mechanism that shapes firms’ 
premature exit moves, when they may not have been necessary (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013).  
4.4.3.5 Future research directions 
Quantitatively, scholars can only test the binary nature of the exit event, rather than the decision. 
This problematizes how little differentiation there is in this literature between the decision to exit 
and the actual execution of exit. We believe that there are processes of entity exit, after the 
decision has been made, that are still not theorized. 
When the organization decides on a form of partial entity exit, such as redeploying internally 
(Lieberman et al., 2017), we do not know how much of the initial firm/entity is kept unchanged 
in terms of resources, capabilities, and business model. Does the organization need to redeploy 
all of its entity back internally to be able to achieve a faster exit process? Are there cases when a 
part of the entity is redeployed internally, while the other part is sold or liquidated? What part of 
the entity is kept, and what part is sold? Moreover, there are opportunities to examine a 
combination of partial and complete exits, such as a large partial exit and smaller full exits 
(Vidal & Mitchell, 2015), or an exit scenario when a portion of the entity is sold, another 
liquidated, and another reinvested (DeTienne & Chirico, 2013). What determines the act to 
divest larger firms versus smaller firms? How does one decide on a hybrid form of exit and 
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execute it? We believe addressing those questions could develop our understanding of different 
nuances of partial exits. 
Furthermore, we need to understand what happens at the level of the divested entity (i.e., 
business unit, Moschieri, 2011), and how much managers at the divested firm can play a role in 
the exit process after a decision has been made. How do the divested entity and the parent 
organization interact and collaborate during this stage of the exit process?  
In the case of a distressed venture, the issue of whether the exit is voluntary or not is still unclear. 
We need more conceptual clarity around the notion of choice (Gaba & Terlaak, 2013) and 
volition in the exit process. It would be interesting to understand how much the degree or illusion 
of volition over the exit would influence the exit process and its speed.  
As mentioned previously, another promising area of research is the exit process of international 
new ventures (Nummela et al., 2016) as these firms enter into new markets quickly, but we know 
less about their exit processes. Questions that address exit processes of ventures in the 
technology sector, which is very dynamic and turbulent, would be timely.  
4.4.4 Quadrant IV: After Exit Decision and Subjective Considerations 
At the levels of family (e.g., Akther, Sieger, & Chirico, 2016; Dehlen Zellweger, Kammerlander, 
& Halter, 2014), entrepreneur (e.g., Rouse, 2016), and organizational members (e.g., Walsh & 
Bartunek, 2011), research shows that there are multiple subjective considerations that intervene 
within the exit process once a decision has been made. The themes we describe next are 
subjective considerations of partial exit in which actors try to cheat death, and stay engaged with 
the entity to a certain degree.  
4.4.4.1 Exit disengagement modes - Subjective considerations 
The exit mode or route chosen is a reflection of many subjective considerations, such as identity 
and emotional factors; like the theme in Quadrant III, this research theme looked at choices of 
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exit modes, but the focus of the research here is on the subjective factors and, more specifically, 
the incomplete and non-final nature of the exit disengagement modes.  
Research in family business shows that families decide on exit forms that safeguard the 
relationship between the family and the divested entity to preserve the identity with the business 
(Dehlen et al., 2014; DeTienne & Chirico, 2013). DeTienne and Chirico (2013) examine both the 
exit of the core business and that of a satellite business in the family firm. They suggest that a 
stewardship-based exit (e.g., family succession) is preferred over financial reward (e.g., sale) or 
cessation-based modes (e.g., liquidation), due to the family’s socio-emotional wealth and 
motivation to preserve the core business/its longevity in the family. Entrepreneurs of older firms 
are more emotionally attached and would resist exit by passing the business to an outsider, 
favouring an internal succession (Dehlen et al., 2014). However, family owners are more willing 
to act like investors when the entity to be divested is non-core (e.g., satellite firm in the 
portfolio), and would consider selling or liquidating the entity (DeTienne & Chirico, 2013).  
On the other hand, Akther et al. (2016) draw on the social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989) to show that once a family decides to exit an underperforming firm—in this case a satellite 
business as part of its portfolio—it is more willing to “shut down” the entity rather than sell it. 
The shutdown is considered a partial exit, as the family closes down the operations and keeps the 
assets. In a way, the family is avoiding an exit event and feigning an exit when actually, a total 
exit has not taken place. In this case, the family can reopen or resuscitate the entity in the future 
if it wishes. Shutting down a satellite firm instead of selling it is a temporary pause for the firm 
and a promising turnaround attempt, as it saves the organization some economic and 
psychological costs (Akther et al., 2016). The family prefers to sacrifice financial rewards 
associated with the sale option, just to preserve the family identity and support the continuity of 
the business (Akther et al., 2016). 
Entrepreneurs have some control over whether the firm will continue after they remove 
themselves from the firm and how much they want to be involved after the exit (DeTienne, 2010; 
DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; Leroy et al., 2015). Leroy et al. (2015) show that entrepreneurs 
driven by their personal intentions (i.e., entrepreneurs’ perceived sense of volition towards 
selling) have a substantial impact on deciding whether their ﬁrms will be sold or liquidated. 
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Although selling is a complicated task, entrepreneurs should be motivated and committed to 
make this transition successful for the firm (Leroy et al., 2015; Grabener & Eisenhardt, 2004; 
Kammerlander, 2016). In fact, entrepreneurs do not abruptly exit and disengage from the firm. 
There are both physical and psychological disengagements, and the psychological exit takes 
more time, and influences the commitment of the entrepreneur to the venture after the exit 
(DeTienne, 2010; Rouse, 2016). Entrepreneurs who identify strongly with their organizations 
struggle to emotionally and cognitively withdraw from the business after they exit the firm 
(Rouse, 2016). Those entrepreneurs put the needs of their organizations over their own and they 
stay engaged with the new entity (whether it was sold or went public) in varying degrees (Rouse, 
2016). This partial exit might ease the sense of loss (Rouse, 2016), which is quite complicated as 
it is a result of one’s own voluntary action to exit (Rouse, 2016). However, one’s involvement 
with the “new” entity may dilute over time (DeTienne & Wennberg, 2014).  
Entrepreneurs may even be willing to accept a discount on the value of the firm and sell rather 
than liquidate it so they can assure the continuity of the business (Kammerlander, 2016). There is 
also evidence that long-tenured manager-owners care more about the business continuation and 
adopt less economic and rational decisions while exiting the business (Kammerlander, 2016). 
This finding supports the earlier work of Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) that the party exiting 
the business cares about how the entity is transferred to the new owners, how many subjective 
considerations (e.g., perceptions of fit and emotional factors) influence the choice of the buyer, 
and how the exit process evolves.  
4.4.4.2 Resisting the exit  
Members of the entity experiencing the exit or demise do not usually accept the exit easily, and 
many resist the decision or try to reverse it before the final exit execution takes place (Erkama & 
Vaara, 2010; Walsh & Bartunek, 2011).  
Employees would first resist the decision of corporate management to close the business, 
resorting to different arguments—from rational claims to emotional and moral implications 
(Erkama and Vaara, 2010). Members of the organization would try to justify the viability of the 
business and delay the exit event as much as possible (Erkama & Vaara, 2010). Local managers 
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are dually embedded in the unit to be shut down, and in the corporate organization that made the 
decision to exit. They may argue for a faster exit process in favour of corporate management, 
while resisting and delaying the exit in favour of the business unit’s employees (Erkama & 
Vaara, 2010).  
Examining the process of an organizational death and rebirth, by reinventing an afterlife for the 
organization, Walsh and Bartunek (2011) describe the process of disintegration, demise of the 
old entity, and then recreation of a new entity. The authors examine the exit process starting from 
the announcement by the organization's leaders that the entity will be closing. Anger and other 
emotions of organizational members played a major role in the disintegration period when they 
first tried to rescue the entity, and then saved what they valued when death became impending, 
before recovering and starting a new entity (Walsh & Bartunek, 2011).  
4.4.4.3 Future Research directions  
This Quadrant IV is not well developed in the literature and we would encourage more 
qualitative and longitudinal research that examines how entrepreneurs and managers act after an 
exit decision has been made. It would be interesting to study cases where an exit decision that 
has already been made is reversed, or cases where actors delay the process even after they have 
decided to exit.  
Future research should also investigate the case of portfolio entrepreneurs and portfolios in 
family firms when they have to exit more than once during their tenures, and many times, 
consider exit and entry at the same time. This portfolio theme of exit has been well examined in 
the field of strategic management and international business, but extending it to the 
entrepreneurship and family business field would be very valuable to our understanding of exit in 
different types of portfolio businesses. 
Furthermore, more studies are needed to understand the interaction between the implementation 
and execution processes of exit from an objective consideration (at the corporate level), and the 
subjective resistance of managers and employees at the entity that is being divested. 
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4.5 Implications 
In contrast to the prevalent explanations in the literature of the determinants and consequences of 
firm exit (failure and death), we were interested to understand what happens before the exit. 
Because different disciplines have examined exit at different levels of analysis (i.e., market, 
portfolio, business unit, individual entrepreneur), we decided to adopt a broad definition of entity 
exit that captures any discontinuity in the activities and involvement as previously understood 
and undertaken between the parent or decision makers and the entity that is in contention for 
exit. We reviewed research on processes and mechanisms that begin from the triggers for, and 
dilemma of, whether an exit decision should be taken to the finality of the exit execution. We 
complement studies that investigate what happens after firm exit (Ioannou, 2013) or failure 
(Ucbasaran et al., 2013), but turn these on their heads to look at what happens “before exit.” The 
studies we reviewed collectively challenge the conceptual purity or simplicity of the exit 
phenomenon.  
We induced two dimensions from the literatures across strategy, international business, and 
entrepreneurship. First, the temporal dimension shows that exit is a process that unfolds over 
time (Aldrich, 2015; Cefis & Marsili, 2011), and we anchor it by the decision to exit to 
distinguish between mechanisms that take place before the decision to exit and those after the 
decision. All of these subprocesses and mechanisms happen before the final exit has been 
executed. We argue that time should be more explicitly addressed both conceptually and 
empirically in exit research, particularly to distinguish between the period before the exit 
decision and that after the exit decision. Because of time’s potential to affect the who, what, 
where, how, why, and when (Zachary et al., 2015) of entity exit, we think it is crucial that future 
research address the temporality of entity exit.  
Although we acknowledge the few efforts made with regard to time-sensitive concepts, such as 
“delays” (Shepherd et al., 2009) and empirics such as “time to exit” (Eflenbein & Knott, 2015; 
Yamakawa & Cardon, 2017), the role of time has not been well integrated theoretically and 
empirically to understand exit. We think it is unwise not to distinguish between the temporal 
mechanisms and modalities of the exit decision-making dynamics and those of the exit 
implementation after the decision. Equating the exit decision with the exit final execution 
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compresses much of our understanding of the exit process. In addition, future work is needed to 
understand how responses to a threat of exit evolve and combine over time (e.g., wait and see, 
persist and adapt (turnaround), decide to exit, then disengage or reengage). Scholars could 
examine how long decision makers are willing to persist or attempt the turnaround of distressed 
ventures. Once they decide to exit, what factors influence the time to execute the exit?  
Second, the partial nature of exit shows that an entity exit is not a uniform phenomenon, but 
there is great underlying variety in how exit is manifested. Exit does not always mean that the 
entity will disappear: often, organizations and individuals adopt a partial exit that falls in 
between the two polar categories (Meyer & Thein, 2014) of “business as usual” and “complete 
exit.” These partial manifestations of exit deserve their own theoretical attention (Buchholtz et 
al., 1999). We show that, irrespective of what the entity is, when it is in contention for exit, some 
lower-nested parts within the entity are preserved, exited, and/or changed. There are both 
objective and subjective considerations that influence how decision makers attempt to control the 
entity’s exit. For example, some firms resort to a spin-off form of exit, where shareholders keep 
ownership with the newly formed entity after exit; other firms might partially divest their assets 
from a market to signal dissociation. The exit can range from scaling back production or closing 
the smallest plant first to progressively exiting other firms and maybe exiting larger firms 
(MacLachlan, 1992). Similarly, manager-owners sell their ventures but stay involved to various 
degrees with these ventures. Future research should examine the lower levels of aggregation of 
an entity that is in contention for exit, and understand what is kept, changed, and/or lost, 
shedding light on the unevenness of the exit process. Further, we should seek to understand how 
the exit process differs when decision makers exit product markets versus factor markets (Hsieh 
et al., 2015), or developed foreign markets versus emerging markets.  
The main insight of this review is that there are many mechanisms and subprocesses that happen 
before exit is finally executed (i.e., what is more commonly known in the literature as the “exit 
event”). Our conceptual framework starts grouping those themes to orient researchers towards 
“what is happening when” in our current understanding of entity exit. When we classify studies, 
we are not assuming that we have pure objective or pure subjective considerations that can be 
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separated, but rather, we want to take stock of the studies that conceptually address or provide 
insights on similar issues of exit.  
The framework is a conceptual organization tool, which aims to show that, in order to fully 
understand what happens before exit, we need to consider all four quadrants. For example, 
organizations might resort to real options objective reasoning in making an exit decision, but the 
exit process might be poorly executed and subjectively resisted. We approach exit in a piecemeal 
fashion to show what we know and orient researchers to which quadrant of the exit phenomenon 
they are addressing in their studies, and which parts they are not. However, our main argument is 
that future scholars should always consider the two dimensions of exit: temporality and partial 
nature of exit.  
The media has covered stories of many firms exiting ventures, markets, industries, countries, or 
regions. During the financial crisis in 2008, the exit rate increased quickly for a few years as the 
recession dragged on (Aldrich, 2015), and given the growing incidence of natural and manmade 
disasters, systemic upheavals of nations and industries, and the forced exit of firms finding 
themselves in the middle of conflicts and crises, firms are often compelled to grapple with the 
odds of unwanted (yet sometimes unavoidable) exit. Recently, some British firms are 
considering exiting and relocating due to the government’s planned withdrawal from the 
European Union (Castle, 2017), and some MNEs operating in the United Kingdom are already 
contemplating exit, “retrenching their operations, laying people off, discontinuing operations, 
and keeping expansion plans on hold” (Cumming & Zahra, 2016, p. 688). Many more firms have 
exited Syria due to war and conflict. In times of political and economic turbulence, most of the 
large MNEs relocate to other nations, a partial exit phenomenon as the entity exits one location 
and enters a new one, preserving some parts of the entity while changing others. This 
phenomenon of exit and relocation is becoming more common, and deserves more attention in 
the management field. However, smaller and local ventures struggle and try to resist as long as 
they can in their domestic context due to limited options, emotional attachment, and fewer 
resources. How do these firms manage to resist and delay exit, and when is it time to “stop the 
bleeding” and let go? All of these concerns are timely questions that would help us not only to 
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better understand current phenomena, but also to develop our theoretical knowledge of the exit 
process. 
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of defunct organizations found new 
organizations to sustain valued elements of 
organizational life. Model suggests that 
this process unfolds through four periods 
of organizing: disintegration, demise, 
gestation, and rebirth. 
 
Decker & Mellewigt, 
(2007)  
AMP 
Review of business exit 
after Michael Porter’s work 
 
 
Review   
Lee, Peng & Barney 
(2007) Entrepreneur-friendly Real options perspective 
Conceptual  
At a societal level, an entrepreneur-
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AMR 
bankruptcy law  friendly bankruptcy law, informed by a 
real options logic, can encourage more risk 
taking and, thus, more entrepreneurship 
development by limiting downside risks 
and increasing upside gains. 
Author(s) & Year 
 
Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
 
Method Key Findings 
McKinley, Latham, & 
Braun (2014) 
AMR 
Decline-induced responses 
of innovation or rigidity tha 
lead to turnaround or 
further decline.  
 
Organizational decline 
and turnaround 
Conceptual 
Four scenarios that can unfold when 
organizations either innovate or respond 
rigidly to organizational decline. Two of 
the scenarios are downward spirals that 
threaten an organization with possible 
death, and two of the scenarios are 
turnarounds.  
Gimeno, Folta, Cooper 
& Woo (1997) 
 
ASQ 
Persistence of 
underperforming firms  
Threshold model of 
entrepreneurial exit 
 
Human capital  
 
Quantitative  
1,547 entrepreneurs 
of new businesses in 
the U.S. 
Questionnaires  
 
Organizational survival is determined by 
two main dimensions: (1) the 
organization's economic performance and 
(2) the organization’s threshold of 
performance.  
Considering organizational exit as a 
choice. 
 
Graebner and 
Eisenhardt (2004) 
ASQ 
Seller side of the 
acquisition  
Acquisition 
Corporate governance  
Case studies  
Inductive study 
Acquisition is a process of mutual 
agreement between buyer and seller and 
encompasses timing and strategic and 
emotional factors, not just price 
Brigham, De Castro & 
Shepherd (2007) 
 
ETP 
Entrepreneur’s satisfaction 
and intention to exit. 
Organizational 
behaviour Person-
Organization fit, 
Cognition 
Survey responses 
from 159 owner-
managers in small 
high-technology firms 
Higher satisfaction and lower intentions to 
exit for owner-managers whose dominant 
decision-making style complemented the 
levels of formalization and structure in 
their firms. 
 
Collewaert 2012 
ETP 
Angel investor-
entrepreneur relationship 
Conflict perspective Survey data from 65 
angel investors and 72 
Entrepreneurial intentions to exit are 
higher for entrepreneurs who face more 
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and intentions to exit. entrepreneurs 
belonging to 54 
ventures located in 
either California or 
Belgium. 
task and goal conflicts.  
Importance of taking into account investor-
entrepreneur relations when studying their 
respective exit processes. 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Davidsson & Gordon 
(2016) 
 
ETP 
Persistence of nascent 
entrepreneurs through 
macroeconomic crisis 
Nascent 
entrepreneurship 
research stream. Notions 
of perceived 
environmental 
uncertainty and 
opportunity confidence 
Natural experiment-
panel data about 
nascent entrepreneurs 
in Australia. 
A major macroeconomic crisis may trigger 
four alternative responses: disengagement, 
delay, compensation, and adaptation.  
 
No direct effect of the crisis on nascent 
entrepreneurs.  
DeTienne & Chirico 
(2013) 
 
ETP 
Exit strategies of family 
firms 
 
Exit strategies,  
threshold theory and the 
socioemotional wealth 
perspective 
Conceptual  Extrapolating different exit strategies  
 
Holland & Shepherd 
(2013) 
 
ETP 
Entrepreneurial Persistence  Decision making – 
individual values 
Conjoint experiment The persistence decision policies are 
heterogeneous depending on the level of 
adversity experienced and the individual 
values held by the entrepreneurs.  
 
Miller & Sardais (2015) 
 
ETP 
How entrepreneurs 
reconcile the Paradoxical 
demands of the job 
Optimism, realism, 
persistence and 
adaptation.  
Tracked an 
entrepreneur's real-
time confidential 
communications with 
his closest consultant 
(one of the authors) 
during the last 6 
months of an 
ultimately 
unsuccessful venture 
An intrinsic quality of an entrepreneur is 
the ability to manage paradox, largely by 
bifurcating time—by making temporal 
distinctions. An entrepreneur 
simultaneously can be optimistic and 
realistic, and persistent and adaptive. 
 
Sharma & Manikutty 
(2005) 
 
Divestment decisions in 
family firms 
 
Literature on 
divestment, culture and 
its dimensions, and 
Conceptual Develops a framework to understand the 
influence of community culture and family 
structure on divestment decisions in family 
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ETP family structures. firms.  
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Cater & Schwab (2008) 
 
FBR 
Turnaround Strategies in 
Established Small Family 
Firms 
Organizational crisis 
Turnaround strategies  
A case-study 
approach 
Identifies unique characteristics of 
established small family firms that affect 
their ability to initiate turnaround strategies 
when encountering an organizational crisis 
 
Wan, Chen & Yiu 
(2014) 
 
GSJ 
International divestment; Behavioural 
perspective; 
organizational identity; 
organizational image 
 
Conceptual 
framework 
A firm’s international divestment decisions 
are influenced by its organizational image 
and identity. 
 
Kammerlander (2016) 
 
ISBJ 
Entrepreneurial exit and 
emotional pricing  
Behavioural finance A sample of 1,354 
SMEs’ views on exit 
intentions. Compare 
to 455 actual 
ownership transfers. 
A long-term relationship between an 
owner-manager and a firm, a familiar 
relationship between an owner-manager 
and a successor, and situational 
contingencies increase the emotional-
pricing; i.e. owner-manager’s willingness 
to sell the firm at a discount. 
Nummela, Saarenketo, 
& Loane  
(2016) 
ISBJ 
The failure of International 
New Ventures (INV) 
INV, failure, 
internationalization  
Four illustrative cases 
from Finland and 
Ireland (INV in 
software industry) 
Managerial capabilities, particularly 
managerial experience and business 
competence, filter the external drivers of 
failure. 
 
Wennberg & DeTienne 
(2014) 
 
ISBJ 
 
A critical review of 
research on entrepreneurial 
exit 
 
Review   
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Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Dehlen, Zellweger, 
Kammerlander, & 
Halter (2014) 
 
JBV 
Determinants of exit routes 
in family firms 
Information asymmetry  Quantitative 
Small- and medium-
sized privately held 
firms from Germany, 
Switzerland, and 
Austria that had been 
transferred to one or 
several individuals. 
An owner's inferior knowledge about the 
abilities of potential external entrants (in 
contrast to family internal successors) 
renders a family internal transfer more 
likely.  
A positive effect of signalling and an 
inverted U-shaped effect of screening on 
the probability of external exit routes. Firm 
age, as a driver of emotional attachment, 
weakens these effects. 
DeTienne (2010) 
JBV 
Entrepreneurial Exit – 
theoretical development 
 Conceptual  Explores the development of an exit 
strategy, reasons for exit and options for 
exit in each phase of the entrepreneurial 
process 
 
DeTienne, McKelvie & 
Chandler (2015) 
 
JBV 
Entrepreneurial exit 
strategies  
Entrepreneurial exit, exit 
strategies, motivation, 
stewardship  
Typology then test- 
using a cross-
sectional survey 
methodology 
A typology of entrepreneurial exit 
strategies consisting of three higher-level 
exit categories (i.e., financial harvest, 
stewardship, and voluntary cessation). 
Different predictors for each of the three 
exit strategy types. 
DeTienne, Shepherd, & 
De Castro (2008) 
 
JBV 
Persistence of 
underperforming firms  
Persistence; Threshold 
theory 
 
Conjoint analysis Environmental munificence, personal 
investment, personal options, previous 
organizational success, and perceived 
collective efficacy impact the decision to 
persist with an underperforming firm. In 
addition, extrinsic motivation moderates 
those relationship 
 
Khelil (2016) 
 
JBV 
Entrepreneurial failure as a 
multiform phenomenon that 
involves various 
configurations. 
 
 Explorative 
qualitative 
Study was conducted 
as a preliminary step 
to the quantitative 
Examines the different configurations that 
can occur and the associated profiles of 
failing entrepreneurs.  
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taxonomic analysis. 
Cluster analysis – 
face to face survey  
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
McMullen & Kier 
(2016) 
 
JBV 
Escalation of commitment, 
entrapment, entrepreneurial 
mindset 
Regulatory focus theory; 
the theory of action 
phases 
Meta-theoretical 
process model- 
With illustration from 
the events of the 1996 
Mount Everest 
disaster  
 
The decision to persist is set into motion 
long before individuals engage in the cost-
benefit analysis examined in most 
escalation studies. 
Morgan & Sisak (2016) 
 
JBV 
Fear of failure  Loss aversion  Conceptual model  When an individual's threshold for success 
is sufficiently high, fear of failure 
motivates additional investment. When the 
threshold for success is equal to the 
foregone outside option fear of failure is 
de-motivating. 
Shepherd, Wiklund, & 
Haynie (2009) 
 
JBV 
Costs of business failure Escalation of 
commitment; 
procrastination  
Conceptual Introduces the notion of anticipatory grief 
as a mechanism for reducing the level of 
grief triggered by the failure event, which 
reduces the emotional costs of business 
failure. Delaying business failure may be 
beneficial to recovery and promote 
subsequent entrepreneurial action. 
Singh, Corner,  
& Pavlovich (2015) 
 
 
JBV 
Venture failure 
stigmatization 
 
Entrepreneurial failure 
stigma 
 
A qualitative, 
narrative approach of 
the lived experience 
of 12 entrepreneurs 
Three episodes of entrepreneurs 
anticipating, meeting, and then 
transforming venture failure.  
Stigmatization is best viewed as a process 
that unfolds over time rather than a label. 
This process begins before, not after, 
failure and contributes to venture demise.  
Wennberg, Wiklund, 
DeTienne, & Cardon 
(2010) 
 
Entrepreneurial exit routes 
and their drivers 
 
Entrepreneurial exit; 
Human capital; Prospect 
theory 
 
Conceptual model, 
then empirically test 
the model using two 
Swedish databases 
Exit through liquidation and firm sale for 
both firms in financial distress and firms 
performing well. 
Human capital factors (entrepreneurial 
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JBV 
 
which follow new 
ventures and their 
founders. 
experience, age, education) and failure-
avoidance strategies (outside job, 
reinvestment) differ substantially across 
the four exit routes. 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Wennberg, Delmar, & 
McKelvie (2016) 
 
JBV 
Exit and growth decisions Decision-making theory  Quantitative - 
Examining a panel of 
14,760 new ventures 
in the professional 
services sector 
How risk preferences change as a venture 
ages and increases in size. New ventures' 
probability of exit and growth diminishing  
with age and size. 
Yamakawa & Cardon 
(2017) 
 
JBV 
Time to exit and escalation 
of commitment 
Escalation of 
commitment framework 
Survey data – 93 
firms that were 
objectively and 
subjectively in 
financial distress 
Entrepreneurs vary how much they delay 
exit based on the amount of investments 
they have made in their firm prior to the 
point of distress.  
 
Belderbos & Zou 
(2009) 
 
JIBS 
A real options portfolio 
perspective on foreign 
affiliate divestment 
 
Real options portfolio 
perspective 
Quantitative. Sample 
of 1078 Asian 
affiliates of Japanese 
multinationals 
Affiliates are less likely to be divested in 
response to adverse environmental change 
if they represent growth or switch option 
value to the multinational firm under 
conditions of macroeconomic uncertainty.  
Coucke & Sleuwaegen 
(2008) 
 
JIBS 
The impact of globalization 
on the exit behaviour of 
firms 
Globalization, trade 
liberalization and exit 
Quantitative, 
manufacturing firms 
in Belgium 
Belgian firms that offshore activities to 
non-European Union countries are able to 
substantially improve their chances of 
survival. Unlike domestic firms, the 
likelihood of exit of subsidiaries of 
multinational enterprises is found to be 
less sensitive to domestic market 
conditions in the host country. 
Dai, Eden & Beamish 
(2013)  
 
JIBS 
Foreign subsidiary survival 
in conflict zones 
 
The role of geography 
 
Geographic 
information systems 
data for 670 Japanese 
multinational 
enterprises 
subsidiaries in 25 
Greater exposure to geographically defined 
threats reduces the likelihood of MNE 
survival. Both concentration and 
dispersion with other firms affect survival; 
however, the effects depend on where the 
firm is spatially located (whether the firm 
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conflict-afflicted host 
countries. 
is in a conflict zone) and with whom 
(home-country peers or sister subsidiaries). 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Mata & Freitas (2012) 
 
JIBS 
Exit of foreign firms vs. 
domestic firms  
Liability of foreignness; 
foreign direct 
investment; exit 
Quantitative- Dataset 
on firms operating in 
Portugal 
 
Difference between exit rates of foreign 
firms and domestic firms increases with 
age, as exit of foreign firms increases with 
age while that of purely domestic firms 
decreases.  
Footlooseness of foreign firms is due to 
foreignness more than to multinationality. 
Nachum & Song (2011) 
 
JIBS 
Interdependencies in MNE 
growth trajectory 
Path dependence; 
evolutionary approach 
Dataset that details all 
the location moves of 
US legal services 
MNEs during 1949–
2006. 
The portfolio affects entry more than exit, 
suggesting that evolutionary processes 
affect MNEs’ expansion more than their 
contraction. Exit moves are driven 
primarily by internal MNE considerations. 
Santangelo & Meyer 
(2011) 
 
JIBS 
Increases and decreases of 
MNE commitment in 
emerging economies  
 
Internationalization 
theory; institutional 
theory  
 
A survey data set of 
subsidiaries of 
multinational 
enterprises in 
Hungary, Lithuania 
and Poland  
 
Under high institutional uncertainty, 
investors prefer low commitment but 
flexible modes that enable later 
commitment increases, whereas 
institutional voids increase up-front 
information search and adaptation costs 
that reduce the likelihood of early post-
entry adjustments. 
Moschieri, & Mair 
(2008) 
 
Journal of Management 
and Organization 
 
 
Research on corporate 
divestitures: A synthesis 
 
Review   
Boyne & Meier (2009) 
 
JMS 
Decline and turnaround Environmental change, 
human resources, 
turnaround 
Failing school 
districts in Texas 
Turnaround is influenced by changes in the 
munificence and complexity of task 
environments, and the appointment of a 
new chief executive and front-line staff. 
Schmitt & Raisch Corporate turnaround Turnaround; Empirical study of Retrenchment and recovery form a duality: 
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(2013) 
 
JMS 
organizational decline; 
organizational paradox; 
recovery; retrenchment 
 
107 Central European 
turnaround initiatives 
they are both contradictory and 
complementary. Integrating the two 
activities allows turnaround firms to create 
benefits that exceed the costs of their 
integration, which affects turnaround 
performance positively. 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Tangpong, Abebe, & Li 
(2015) 
 
JMS 
A temporal approach of the 
retrenchment–turnaround 
relationship 
Path-dependent pattern 
of the retrenchment–
turnaround 
48 case–control 
matched pairs of 
firms that either 
achieved a turnaround 
or did not. 
Declining firms that implement 
retrenchment actions early have a higher 
likelihood of successful turnaround.  
Early divestments and early geographic 
market exits, significantly contribute to the 
likelihood of successful turnaround, early 
layoffs do not.  
Bergh & Sharp (2015) 
 
JOM 
Influence of external 
owners on divestiture  
Agency theory 
Divestiture  
Quantitative. Data on 
205 divestitures  
The adoption of spin-offs or sell-offs is 
associated with the amount of outstanding 
common stockholdings held by outside 
blockholders and the size of the unit 
divested.  
Brauer (2006) 
 
JOM 
Divestiture: a review and 
research agenda 
 
 Review  
Buchholtz, Lubatkin, & 
O’Neill (1999) 
 
JOM 
 
Responsiveness to the need 
to divest.  
 
Theory of divestiture  Conceptual A framework of divestiture built around 
the core concept of seller responsiveness, 
which is defined as the readiness of the 
management at the selling firm to respond 
to the need to divest. How divestiture 
context, management characteristics, and 
governance attributes influence seller 
responsiveness and, in turn, the price the 
divesting firm receives.  
Dawley, Hoffman & 
Lamont (2002) 
 
JOM 
Post-bankruptcy 
 
The bankruptcy and 
turnaround literatures  
 
Quantitative. Firms 
that filed for Chapter 
11 reorganization.  
Viewing bankruptcy reorganizations as 
different choice situations. 
Firms with relatively high strategic choice 
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or low environmental constraint were 
found to benefit from refocusing actions.  
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Moulton, Thomas & 
Pruett (1996) 
 
JOM 
Business failure pathways  Environmental stress 
and organizational 
response 
Compares the failure 
of firms that declared 
bankruptcy from with 
the behaviour of 
matching firms that 
had not failed over the 
same period. 
Firm effects dominate industry effects in 
explaining failure. Four distinctive 
business failure pathways based on firm 
and industry growth patterns are described. 
In particular, debt-funded, forced-growth 
strategies create a high risk of failure 
regardless of industry growth rate. 
 
 
Norman, Butler & Ranft 
(2013) 
 
JOM 
Downsizing and resources 
 
Resource-based view Quantitative Differences in the relative likelihood of 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, acquisition, or 
remaining a nonbankrupt going concern 
based on the size of the downsizing, firm-
level intangible resources, the tangible 
asset intensity of the firm, and industry-
level knowledge intensity.  
Shepherd, Williams & 
Patzelt (2015) 
 
JOM 
Entrepreneurial decision 
making 
 Review Exit decision - one section of the review 
Trahms, Ndofor & 
Sirmon (2013) 
 
JOM 
Organizational decline and 
turnaround 
 Review  
Zheng, Singh, & Chung 
(2015) 
 
JOM 
Political ties and sell-off 
strategy of firms in 
emerging market 
 
Resource dependence 
theory and institutional 
economics  
80 television 
manufacturers in 
China between 1993 
and 2003.  
 
Political ties help firms exit an industry. 
Political ties facilitating sell-offs is 
contingent on the type of political ties and 
the state of institutional development.  
 
Leroy, Manigart,  
Meuleman, & 
Collewaert (2015) 
The continuity of a firm 
when entrepreneurs exit 
 
Theory of planned 
behaviour 
SEM-Survey data 
from 175 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs' sale attitudes are related to 
sale intentions, which are associated with 
firm sale. Sale attitudes are positively 
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JSBM 
related to whether entrepreneurs perceive 
firm continuation to be out of free will, 
their experience, the number of employees, 
and whether the firm is a multigeneration 
family business. 
 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Mayr, Mitter & 
Aichmayr (2017) 
 
JSBM 
Bankruptcy and 
reorganization  
Resource-based view Longitudinal data on 
SME that filed for 
bankruptcy  
Repositioning as an important factor for 
turnaround. 
 
Chung, Lee,  
Beamish, Southam, & 
Nam (2013) 
 
JWB 
MNE divestments  Real options and. risk 
diversification 
perspectives 
Quantitative- 
Japanese foreign 
subsidiaries  
Large MNEs with greater international 
diversification are less likely to divest their 
subsidiaries during times of economic 
crisis.  
 
Figueira-de-Lemos, & 
Hadjikhani (2015) 
 
JWB 
Commitment decisions in 
international markets 
Internationalization 
process 
Commitment decisions 
Risk management model 
Inferential abductive 
approach that merges 
the risk management 
model with empirical 
data collected from a 
32-year longitudinal 
case study on nine 
Swedish MNCs. 
When environmental changes are 
perceived as detrimental, firms tend to 
decrease their tangible assets and commit 
in a more intangible way.  
When changes to the environment are 
perceived as beneficial, firms follow an 
incremental path of commitment, 
preferably in tangible kind.  
Meyer & Thein (2014) 
 
JWB 
Dynamics of institutional 
constraints and the reaction 
of business to such 
constraints 
Institutional theory  In-depth case analysis 
focuses on four 
industries 
Develop the concept of ‘low profile 
strategy’ and propose a conceptual 
framework of home country pressures 
influencing MNE’s international operation. 
van Witteloostuijn 
(1998) 
 
Management Science 
Organizational inertia, 
strategic competition, and 
chronic failure 
 
 
Behavioural and 
economic theories of 
decline 
Conceptual and 
quantitative 
presenting tentative 
evidence from the 
chemical industry 
A theoretical argument is developed that 
explains voluntary exit and chronic failure 
by introducing a proxy of organizational 
inertia in a model of strategic Cournot 
duopoly. Inefficient firms may outlast their 
efficient rivals  
Berry (2010) Why firms divest Divestiture; corporate Quantitative. 190 U.S. Lower-cost production and new market 
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Org Science strategy firms over a 20-year 
period (1981–2000) 
opportunities in foreign markets can 
provide a better use of existing firm 
resources and these opportunities are likely 
to influence firm divestment of home-
country operations.  
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Berry (2013) 
 
Org Science 
When firms divest Divestiture, product 
diversification, 
geographic 
diversification  
Quantitative. a 
comprehensive panel 
of U.S. multinational 
corporations  
Product market relatedness and geographic 
market differences in growth, policy 
stability, and exchange rate volatility can 
moderate the negative relationship 
between performance and divestment. 
Feldman (2013) 
 
Org Science 
Legacy divestiture Diversification, 
divestiture  
A sample of 
diversified American 
firms during a period 
of intensive 
refocusing activity in 
the US 
The post-divestiture operating performance 
of firms that divest their legacy businesses 
falls short of that of firms that retain 
comparable legacy units, especially when 
the divested unit operates in the same 
industry as others of the divesting firm’s 
businesses. Newer CEOs are more likely to 
undertake legacy divestitures. 
Gaba & Terlaak (2013) 
Org Science 
Uncertainty and imitation 
in firm exit decision 
Herding models; 
learning 
Quantitative. A 29-
year panel data set on 
the exit of private 
venture capital firms 
Uncertainty fosters imitation only when it 
is idiosyncratic to the firm; uncertainties 
that are common to all firms, in contrast, 
actually reduce reliance on observational 
learning.  
Vidal & Mitchell (2015) 
 
Org Science 
Performance feedback and 
resource reconfiguration 
through divestitures 
 
Performance feedback 
theory and the resource-
based view 
Quantitative. 
longitudinal segment-
level data for firms 
operating in the 
global pharmaceutical 
industry between 
1999 and 2009. 
Firms with increasing performance, 
especially when they also have high levels 
of performance, appear to use divestitures 
in a “complementary Penrose effect” that 
frees resources firms can use for future 
growth, with the greatest impact on the 
number of partial rather than full 
divestitures.  
 
Erkama & Vaara, 
(2010) 
Rhetorical strategies to 
legitimate or resist 
New rhetoric Shutdown of the bus 
body unit of the 
Distinguish five types of rhetorical 
legitimation strategies and dynamics.  
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Org Studies 
organizational restructuring  Sweden-based Volvo 
Bus Corporation in 
Finland 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Kisfalvi 
 (2000) 
 
Org Studies 
Sources of strategic 
persistence 
Escalation of 
commitment, decision 
making, strategic 
leadership, strategic 
persistence  
 
Qualitative. Case 
study 
Two related streams of explanations for 
persistence: those that see inappropriate 
strategic persistence as a possible response 
to potential failure (escalating commitment 
to a chosen course of action) and those that 
see it as a possible outcome of success (the 
perils of success or excellence).  
Pajunen (2008) 
 
Org Studies 
Organizational processes 
and mechanisms 
Organizational decline, 
organizational processes 
Case study of the 
organizational decline 
and failure process of 
a Finnish 
conglomerate  
Examining the mechanisms driving the 
organizational processes 
Proposed mechanisms: commitment 
escalation, maladjustment, confidence 
erosion, and fragmentation. 
 
Almus (2004) 
 
SBE 
Pre-exit performance of 
new firms 
 
Shadow of death Quantitative – 
matched sample of 
exited and surviving 
firms 
The performance of firms deteriorates in 
the years before exit.  
Balcaen, Manigart,  
Buyze, & Ooghe (2012) 
 
SBE 
Firm exit after distress Firm exit, bankruptcy, 
acquisitions  
Quantitative.  
A sample of 6,118 
distress-related exits 
in Belgium 
Bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and 
M&A are fundamentally distinct exit 
routes for distressed firms, driven by 
different firm level characteristics and 
following a two-stage process. 
 
Carreira & Teixeira 
(2011) 
 
 
SBE 
Pre-exit productivity  
Industrial organization 
& resource-based 
theory, labour 
economics, and 
organizational ecology  
Quantitative. An 
unbalanced panel of 
Portuguese 
manufacturing firms 
covering a 10-year 
period 
Exiting firms have a falling productivity 
level over a number of years prior to exit.  
 
DeTienne & Cardon Impact of founder Entrepreneurial exit; Quantitative, survey Entrepreneurs intend to pursue different 
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(2012) 
 
SBE 
experience on exit 
intentions 
 
threshold theory design exit paths based on previous 
entrepreneurial experience, industry 
experience, age, and education level.  
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Akther, Sieger, 
&Chirico (2016) 
 
SEJ 
Exit and family business 
portfolio 
Social identity theory Case studies of 6 
family business 
portfolios  
Family businesses may prefer to shut down 
a satellite business rather than sell it, due 
to identity considerations. 
Blake, & Moschieri, 
(2017) 
 
SMJ 
Adverse changes in the 
policy environment and 
their effect on divestitures 
Corporate strategy; 
divestiture; 
expropriation; policy 
risk; Uncertainty 
 
Formal disputes 
between firms and 
governments that 
arise from adverse 
changes in policy 
Following a dispute, firms are more likely 
to divest both in the country where the 
dispute occurs and in other countries in the 
same region. However, the impact of 
disputes on divestitures is firm specific, 
applying only to firms directly involved in 
a dispute. 
Burgelman (1996) 
SMJ 
The process model of 
strategic business exit 
Evolutionary process 
theory of strategy 
making 
Case of Intel 
Corporation's exit 
from its core dynamic 
random access 
memory (DRAM) 
business 
Pattern of managerial activities through 
which resources and corporate 
competencies are internally redirected 
towards more viable business 
opportunities.  
Chang (1996) 
 
SMJ 
Corporate restructuring; 
diversification; entry and 
exit 
Evolutionary theory; 
organizational learning 
 
Longitudinal (1981–
89) data base on entry 
and exit activities of 
all publicly traded 
manufacturing firms 
in the US 
Entry and exit activities are understood as 
search and selection undertaken by the 
firm to improve their performance. Firms 
sequentially enter businesses of similar 
human resource profiles and firms are 
more likely to divest lines of business of 
different profiles.  
 
Dai, Eden, & Beamish 
(2017) 
 
SMJ 
Foreign exit and political 
risk 
Real options; Resource-
based view  
Quantitative - 1,162 
MNE subsidiaries in 
20 
war-afflicted 
countries between 
1987 and 2006.  
Highly valuable resources can become 
liabilities when exposed to harm. Best way 
to cope with external threats may be to 
exit. Bounded value of resources and 
options in the face of environmental 
contingencies. 
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Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Damaraju,  Barney, & 
Makhija (2015) 
 
SMJ 
Real options and 
divestments  
Real options theory Quantitative. Data on 
divestment 
The decision to divest a business unit and 
the decision to engage in staged modes of 
divestment are both sensitive to 
uncertainty. Staged forms of governance 
create real options that are of lesser value 
as compared to simply not divesting a 
business unit and also as compared to 
completely divesting a business unit. 
Durand and Vergne 
(2015) 
 
SMJ 
Asset divestments in 
stigmatized industries  
Categories; divestment; 
impression 
management; stigma 
 
Quantitative 
Analysis of the arms 
industry 
Media attacks on the focal firm and its 
peers increase the likelihood of divestment 
for the focal firm. 
Elfenbein & Knott 
(2015) 
 
SMJ 
 
Time to exit and delays Agency problems; 
behavioural bias; real 
options 
 
Population of US 
banks between 1984 
and 1997. 
Patterns of exit support models of rational 
delay under ability uncertainty. There is 
evidence of delay due to behavioural 
bias—firms discount negative signals of 
profitability relative to positive signals—
and organizational considerations—delay 
increases with the separation of ownership 
and control.  
Elfenbein, Knott & 
Croson (2017) 
 
SMJ 
 
Exit delays Behavioural strategy; 
escalation of 
commitment; exit; real 
options 
 
A laboratory 
experiment - subjects 
make decisions about 
when to exit a failing 
venture 
“Equity stakes”—receiving the firm's cash 
flows and having decision rights over 
exit—cause participants to discount 
negative performance information, retain 
overly optimistic beliefs, and delay exit. 
By contrast, participants without these 
high-powered incentives exit nearly 
optimally. 
Feldman, Amit, & 
Villalonga (2016) 
 
SMJ 
 
Corporate divestitures and 
family firms  
Agency theory and 
corporate strategy 
Quantitative methods 
based on a hand-
collected data of a 
sample of over 30,000 
firm-year 
observations, 
Family firms are less likely than non-
family firms to undertake divestitures. The 
divestitures undertaken by family firms are 
associated with higher post-divestiture 
performance. 
 
213 
 
 
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Fortune & Mitchell 
(2012) 
 
SMJ 
Firm exits at the industry 
level 
Evolutionary theory  Quantitative. Exits of 
struggling firms in the 
Internet sector during 
2001 
 
Managerial and functional organizational 
capabilities affect whether struggling firms 
exit by acquisition or dissolution.  
Exit by dissolution represents selection of 
both firms and capabilities, while exit by 
acquisition represents firm selection but 
capability adaptation. 
Hayward & Shimizu 
(2006) 
 
SMJ 
De-commitment and 
divestiture 
Mental accounting 
framework 
Event-history 
analysis. Contrasting 
the experiences of 
firms that divested 
acquisitions with a 
control sample of 
firms that did not 
divest. 
Poorly performing acquired units tend to 
be divested when executives can place 
them within ‘attributional accounts’ (i.e., 
accounts for the cause of the performance 
that do not incriminate them) and 
‘comprehensive accounts’ (i.e., within the 
context of overall firm performance) 
Lieberman,  Lee, & 
Folta (2017) 
 
SMJ 
Market entry, market Exit 
and resource deployment 
Diversification;  
resource relatedness and 
sunk cost 
 
A mathematical 
model, descriptive 
data, and company 
examples 
If the performance of a new business falls 
below expectations, a diversified firm may 
be able to redeploy its resources back into 
related businesses. In effect, relatedness 
reduces the sunk costs associated with a 
new business, which facilitates exit.  
Mata & Portugal (2000) 
 
SMJ 
Closure and divestiture by 
foreign entrants 
 
Theory of the MNE, 
transaction costs 
Quantitative. Survey 
conducted by the 
Portuguese Ministry 
of Employment. 
Ownership arrangements and 
organizational structure affect the 
likelihood of divestment, but exert no 
significant effect upon closure. Greenfield 
entrants being more likely to shutdown, 
but less likely to be divested. Firms with 
large endowments of human capital are 
less likely to exit, irrespective of the exit 
mode considered. 
Miller & Yang (2016) 
 
SMJ 
Diversification, dynamics 
of market entry and market 
exit  
Resource-based view Replication - panel 
dataset of 
manufacturing firms 
Firms tend to enter new markets that have 
human resource profiles that are similar to 
the firms’ existing businesses, and exit 
markets that have dissimilar human 
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resource profiles.  
Author(s) & Year Theme Literature/Theory 
Base 
Method Key Findings 
Moschieri (2011) 
 
SMJ 
Divestiture and 
restructuring  
 
 
Divestiture, agency 
theory 
Exploratory study 
based on multiple 
cases 
Factors of the implementation and 
structuring of a divestiture (e.g., sense of 
opportunity) may increase the performance 
of a divested unit. 
Soule,  Swaminathan, & 
Tihanyi (2014) 
 
SMJ 
 
Diffusion of foreign 
divestments  
Divestment, diffusion, 
social movements 
Using data on firms 
operating in Burma 
during 1996–2002,  
Beyond firm-level concerns, firms divest 
in response to the political characteristics 
of their home country, and the divestment 
patterns of others 
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion 
The tradition in management literature centers on examining and understanding exit as an event 
(e.g., Berry, 2010; Chung, Lee, Beamish, Southam, & Nam, 2013; Gaba & Terlaak, 2013; 
Wennberg et al., 2010), and most scholars equate the decision to exit with a single, binary 
(on/off) variable, compressing the nuances and richness of the exit phenomenon. Yet by treating 
exit as a binary choice/event, these studies not only compress a certain window of time during 
which exit unfolds, but also overlook the variance in the many activities that often precede the 
completion of the exit act.  
Research on exit as a process is still rare (cf. Burgelman, 1996), and despite multiple calls across 
disciplines to examine the processuality of exit (e.g., Aldrich, 2015; Moschieri, 2011; Wennberg 
& DeTienne, 2014), we still know little about how different mechanisms and activities unfold 
before exit is finalized. The current state of knowledge is further complicated by the many levels 
of analysis, from individuals to teams to organizations, and from project to division/subsidiary to 
corporation. While there has been growth in some processual insights at some of these different 
levels, findings remain piece-meal and are difficult to compare let alone aggregate among such 
distinct entities. Coarser views of exit as a binary event have avoided this granularity, and 
masked the inherent difficulties of translating processual insights from one entity or discipline to 
another. 
This dissertation contributes a three-fold discovery of exit as a process that unfolds over time and 
across entities. Essay #1 offers inductive insights about the interplay between an individual 
founder and one’s venture as the firm navigates multiple, cumulative emergencies. Essay #2 uses 
a case-comparative approach to bring to the forefront the interplay between the multiple 
institutional contexts a firm engages in internationalization to mitigate political and economic 
turmoil at home. Essay #3 systematically reviews and reorganizes the literature on exit across 
three different disciplines to shed new light into what we know/do not know about what 
precedes, but may not necessarily predetermine, exit. 
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Perhaps the most interesting insight emerging from the three studies as a whole is the partiality 
of exit. Instead of entities moving from being to non-being, we observe many granular decisions 
and actions by which entities stop some activities, so they can begin others. The surprising 
insight from Essay #1 that exit is often an occasion for entry is replicated in Essay #2 at very 
different levels of analysis (home vs. host country institutional contexts), and resonates with the 
multitude of proactive decisions and actions that firms have been shown to take to postpone or 
prevent involuntary exit. While findings remain challenging to transfer across different entities, 
the key realization is that hardly any entity disappears at once. Rather, the entities studied in this 
thesis get dismantled in parts and pieces in ways that help preserve some of the key original 
properties as well and as long as possible (Damaraju et al., 2014; Meyer & Thein, 2014). 
The second overarching insight pertains to the temporality of exit. While processes unfold over 
time, there are many different kinds of processes, from categories (Essay #3), to sequences of 
stages (Essay #2), to intricate pathways (Essay #1). The mere fact that any process unfolds over 
time masks the vastly different meanings that time may have, depending on which entity exits 
and/or why exit may be delayed by some or rushed by others under seemingly identical 
circumstances. This dissertation focuses on exit under distress, explaining how otherwise well-
positioned and performing entities (e.g., ventures, emerging market multinational companies 
(EMNCs) cope with unexpected emergencies at home (Essay #1), and even turn them into 
opportunities elsewhere (Essay #2). The two inductive studies underscore the range of efforts 
unfolding over many challenging months (and sometimes years), drawing attention to what 
happens before a given entity concedes and completes its exit act.  
5.1 Theoretical Contribution 
The dissertation advances a blended, multi-disciplinary understanding of exit as one of the ways 
firms respond to political turbulence (Hiatt & Sine, 2014; Dai et al., 2013; Dai et al., 2017). 
While the entities we studied were clearly distressed, their exits reveal a great deal of deliberate 
effort, and each essay of the dissertation underscores the adaptive nature of exit as it unfolds over 
time.  
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Prior literature has underscored that exit is not necessarily bad, and can have multiple functions 
for both dying and surviving firms. This dissertation complements previous definitions and 
treatments of exit by focusing on the termination of otherwise successful entities “against their 
will,” as so many of our respondents emphasized. While firms can plan for good exits, we 
examine a subset of circumstances where entities are forced out of their home at the peak of their 
performance. Taken together, the three studies speak to a specific type of exit precipitated by 
political and economic turbulence—despite strong performance (Berry, 2010; Gimeno et al., 
1997), well-matched markets (Mezias & Kuperman, 2001), sound planning (Hiatt & Sine, 2014), 
suitable strategic choices (Brauer, 2006; Decker & Mellewigt, 2007), and careful individual 
entrepreneurial choices (DeTienne, 2010). 
Essay #1 examines how entrepreneurs respond to political and economic turbulence that 
threatens the continuation of their ventures. We reveal two kinds of adaptation (temporal and 
partial) by which individuals and their respective ventures interactively navigated the exit 
process once exogenous emergencies precipitated the premature termination of an otherwise 
strong individual-venture relationship. Partial adaptation drew attention to those elements of the 
venture that remained pertinent despite the adversity. Temporal adaptation referred to 
entrepreneurial actions that either lengthened or shortened the exit process. We show that the 
combination of partial and temporal adaptation de-/re-personalizes the exit process, deliberately 
fissuring and repairing an increasingly fragile individual-venture relationship.  
Essay #2 asks how political and economic adverse conditions at home influence the 
internationalization of firms. We discover that, as adversity at home accentuates, firms multiply 
their options regarding whether and when to internationalize and, especially, their reasons for 
doing so. Restrictions on their resources, values, and opportunities brought about by distress at 
home trigger concerted, specialized, and sequenced efforts to identify institutional contexts with 
suitable complements. Similar to the first study, we find that firms do not quit, but rather 
progressively and deliberately transition from a deteriorating home to “greener pastures” 
elsewhere.  
Essay #3 unpacks the partiality and temporality of exit by reclassifying existing literature in a 
2x2 framework. We followed a systematic review process to first induce the way parts versus the 
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whole of an entity and, respectively, the flow of time have been previously modelled and then 
coded 90 studies to identify clusters of findings and communities of inquiry across three 
disciplines (strategy, entrepreneurship, and international business).  
Because the three essays were developed independently of one another and through different 
combinations of theories and methods, the definitions of exit, entities, as well as the relevant 
subdimensions of temporality and partiality brought out are conceptually and empirically 
distinct. Nonetheless, the three essays support one another by reiterating the importance of 
fleshing out the temporal and partial nature of exit as a process. Figure 5.1 summarizes the 
contributions.  
 
Figure 5.1  Contributions of the Three Essays 
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5.2 Context versus Contextualization  
The first two essays speak to exit respectively within and from contexts of adversity. The choice 
to focus on these contexts was motivated in part by the gap in the literature, which persists 
despite the incidence of political and economic turbulence and, in part, by my firsthand 
experience and interest in this subject as a native of Lebanon. For Essays #1 and #2, distress is an 
important boundary condition, which of course delimits the generalizability of our inductive 
insights to other settings. This compromise is a fair price to pay for revealing “indigenous” 
practices, especially in understudied settings (Williams & Shepherd, 2016). The value-add of the 
first two essays is the granular view of the unfolding struggles of entities operating in adverse 
contexts, and especially the counterintuitive insights on their dual management of parts and time 
to make even unavoidable exit more palatable. 
As a context, Lebanon is rather unusual, not only because the adversity there unfolded over 
decades, but also because entrepreneurs strived despite frequent crises (Essay #1). Furthermore, 
as the adversity intensified after 2006, Lebanon became a launch pad for EMNCs (Essay #2) as 
entrepreneurs driven away by declining resources, values, and opportunities at home began 
internationalizing extensively and some relocating elsewhere.  
Our deliberate choice of such an extreme context (Barin Cruz, Aguilar Delgado, Leca, & Gond, 
2016) is timely and called for as “this decade is characterized by political instability, economic 
volatility, and societal upheaval” (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016, p. 1880). 
Lebanon gave us a long series and a large range of adverse events by which to compare entity 
exits. In many other adverse contexts, entrepreneurs and organizations would not have faced as 
many, as varied, or as recurrent disruptions. Unfortunately, however, the incidence of such 
extreme contexts is increasing. Vivid stories and discourses in the public media showcase the 
ongoing struggle of firms of all sizes in Syria, with some refusing to leave (“The view from 
Aleppo,” 2016), and others rushing to take refuge abroad, where they begin anew (Leigh & 
Ma’ayeh, 2016).  
The limitations of the chosen context notwithstanding, this dissertation underscores that 
contextualization of mainstream theories can add important findings. While danger makes 
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extreme contexts rare research settings (Bullough & Renko, 2017), the growing prevalence of 
adverse events and their disruptive effects make such studies extremely worthwhile. By 
contextualizing theories of exit within (Essay #1) and across (Essay #2) contexts, the thesis 
broadens the applicability of current theories, surfacing new boundary conditions for what we 
may have prematurely taken for granted (Hiatt & Sine, 2014).  
Contextualizing theories of exit offers new lenses, and new ways of seeing refugees and their 
relationship to risk. We found some Lebanese firms relocating in comparatively riskier places, 
such as Nigeria at the peak of an Ebola outbreak, while Syrian firms uncovered opportunities in 
contexts like Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt (“Syrian Businesses in Jordan,” 2013), places already 
experiencing multiples challenges and instability that affected their own local businesses. On the 
surface, some of these emerging patterns seem to fly in the face of the risk-opportunity frames 
underpinning strategic choices regarding exit and entry, with firms escaping adversity in search 
of safe havens. Instead, our findings reveal contextualized understandings of strategic moves and 
a finer-grained, comparative (rather than absolute) understanding of risks and opportunities 
(especially in Essay #2).  
There have been recent calls to tackle the grand challenges of our times by getting closer to the 
key issues and protagonists (George et al., 2016) in a concerted effort to advance indigenous 
theories of management (Tsui, 2007). While precise findings may not be transferred outside the 
context in which they were induced (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), process theorizing generalizes back 
to theories and surfaces critical boundaries. Accordingly, we believe that the key lessons learned 
about how Lebanese firms have navigated exit within and beyond their home over 12 years of 
recurrent adversity holds important theoretical insights for understanding the seemingly 
counterintuitive behaviour of a broader range of economic actors who may see their political 
and/or economic contexts deteriorate unexpectedly or suddenly (e.g., contexts of the Syrian Civil 
War and Brexit). 
5.3 Implication for Policy and Practice  
This thesis contributes a contextualized theory of exit as a process, which suggests exit 
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dramatically redirects efforts at home and abroad in ways not captured by prior theories. In 
addition to the relevance of turning the spotlight on previously neglected actors (those running 
businesses on the frontlines of political and economic turmoil), the studies offer several 
counterintuitive insights about the complex role of exit in restabilizing economies undergoing 
major, cumulative distress.  
The key insight this dissertation offers is about the many parallel fronts and kinds of entities 
affected by adversity. We show that founders, ventures, headquarters, and subsidiaries are all 
grappling with different pressures in different ways and at different times—and that it takes 
concerted effort to survive these pressures. Our protagonists complained about unsupportive 
policy that added to their many burdens. They accepted the exogenous emergencies, but they 
could not – would not – accept the added risks or depleted opportunities that were the result of 
misguided political choices. Indeed, those firms that ultimately and completely exited (Essay #1) 
and relocated elsewhere (Essay #2) did so not merely because of the adversity at home, but 
rather because of the lack of transitional policies that could (at least temporarily) relieve their 
burden. Our protagonists were quite ingenious at finding new ways to cut costs or generate 
profits, sometimes converting their resources and assets into new uses, but such adaptive 
processes were often rendered impossible by old laws.  
For example, hotels owners were lobbying the Lebanese government to pass a law that would 
make it possible to sell a room or venue within a hotel under a “condo hotel” model so that they 
could reinvest the money into the main business (Murray, 2014). These owners suggested several 
small policy changes that could assist firms in disintegrating resources and assets of ventures that 
were no longer viable so they could repurpose them for other endeavours, which could then 
continue to offer (among other things) much-needed local employment. Other business owners 
also urged the government to recognize force majeure events so that rents could be waived in 
those locations where demand temporarily dried up due to major terrorist events. Note that many 
establishments in Syria sport signs hanging on their firms’ doors that read: “Closed for 
renovation.” Any policies that can allow such hopeful individuals to bear the economic burden of 
the conflict a little while longer may dramatically increase their chance to return, even recommit, 
to their homeland.  
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The second key insight this thesis offers pertains to the extraordinary degree of risk (both 
personal and professional) that most of the protagonists we studied willingly bear in the hope 
that their home context will be stable again soon. While in some cases these risks are 
overbearing, the longer and more stoically entities confront such risks, the greater their success, 
against all odds, both at home and abroad. Risk-seeking or risk-avoidance theories do not even 
come close to describing the refined coping practices we documented in our studies (especially 
in Essay #1). Observing the recovery of businesses in distressed home contexts may enrich 
theories of coping, and hoping, beyond the management disciplines. 
There were also a few simple lessons drawn from our findings. For example, partial exit served 
everyone better than either extreme. Contrary to accepted findings in strategic management that 
partial exit is less valuable than non-exit or complete exit (Damaraju et al., 2014; Vidal & 
Mitchell, 2015), we found that in contexts of adversity, partial exit is quite adaptive, adding just 
enough degrees of freedom between “business as usual” and total collapse. We also found that 
weathering adversity, even when the outcome is dire, strengthens one’s self-confidence (Essay 
#1) and emboldens expansions to challenging contexts (Essay #2). 
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Appendix A 
Reflexivity Statement 
 
Given the qualitative nature of this dissertation, I have decided to include a statement of 
reflexivity, since my prior experiences and beliefs have undoubtedly shaped this research 
(Willig, 2001). This statement is intended to allow readers to “explore the ways in which a 
researcher’s involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such 
research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, p. 228).  
I was born and raised in Beirut, Lebanon, and personally experienced multiple periods of 
political and economic turbulence that the country witnessed. I also worked in a family-owned 
textile business there between 2004 and 2008 before I moved to Canada. Having seen, firsthand, 
business ventures struggle and survive in inauspicious settings, I was intrigued by the reasons 
that firms stay in such an environment while others leave, and how firms can manage not to exit 
when the threat is impending. This interest formed the basis of my dissertation’s focus on “exit.”  
I was also motivated by the lack of understanding of this kind of adverse context in the 
management field, and eager to learn about unique behaviours that could inform the broader 
management community on how businesses in a politically and economically turbulent 
environment adapt, struggle, or leave for greener pastures.  
I have no prior involvement or affiliation with the hospitality industry nor the food and beverage 
industry. I chose to study these sectors because they were the most affected by this turbulence. 
Moreover, the political and economic situation in Lebanon worsened since 2011, after I had 
already moved to Canada. I undertook my first research trip to the country in 2013. 
When I reviewed the extant literature before and during the two empirical studies, I had a 
different framework for the systematic review. However, I went back to the exit literature after 
the two studies, and coded for different dimensions and themes. I then decided to focus on the 
partiality and temporality dimensions, which were also induced from the literature, because they 
resonated most with me and were consistent with my empirical studies. I had certainly been more 
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sensitized to these dimensions because of my first two essays. Nevertheless, I was able to unpack 
the exit process over these two dimensions and across different fields of study, and share more 
meaningful insights with a broader audience. I would like readers to be aware of my perspective 
and approach when assessing my research and findings.  
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